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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to present the sources and
nature of the changes that have taken place and are taking place In the
relationship between government and business in America} and to consider
these changes in a setting consisting of social, legal, and political aspects
in addition to the economic aspects providing the principal orientation.
To accomplish this end an analysis of regulation in three distinct
parts was undertaken.

First, the integration of regulation in its original

form was presented In terms of the social philosophy of individualism.
Second, the environmental changes affecting the internal consistency of the
original integration was analysed.

Finally, the pattern of regulation

that emerged from this evolution within the environment was discussed.
This pattern of control was then related back to the principles of
individualism to uncover and measure the elements of contradiction and
conflict implicit in the new configuration.
One of the primary types of data used in the study consisted of
court decisions, particularly decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States,

This data was selected because esphasiB upon constitutional

procedure in the United States has placed upon the courts the final
responsibility for consistency in social processes.

Another important source

utilized consisted of previously published works in the field of social
control, particularly public utility regulation.
Although much writing has been done on the subject of regulation the
present analysis goes beyond this writing in one Important respect.

The

emphasis here is upon the social underpinning not only of the original

pattern of control but of the changes that have been instituted In
that pattern*

In consequence the legislative conflict that accompanies

specific alterations in the regulatory adjustment becomes much more
than a simple dash of interests*

Bather this conflict is indicative of an

Ideological clash with each interest emphasizing one aspect of the philosophy
of individual!am to the exclusion of other aspects*

The dissertation Itself

isolates the major interests in the struggle and relates each to the
underlying social philosophy.
Individualism as a social principle requires both freedom of
choice and equality of opportunity as its two limiting dimensions*
extreme form these two dimensions would be Identical*

In the

On the basis of this

identity government regulation was not presumed to be necessary at the
time the Constitution was written*

In economic terms the spontaneous

operation of competition was to maintain identity between freedom and
equality*

Competition was to operate accordingto the principle of

opportunity cost* which principle depended in turn upon complete economic
elasticity*
As the economy developed, the degree of elasticity postulated
was not fully attained*
tended to separate*

As a consequence the two dimensions of philosophy

To restore equilibrium, a measure of government

control was instituted*
This original pattern of control was predicated primarily upon
an industry classification*

Into one category was placed businesses in

which inelasticities had appeared*

Since inequality existed in the operation

of these businesses to the extent of the inelasticity, regulation was

allowed as an offset to inequality by eliminating monopoly and
discriminatory behavior * Businesses other than these public
utilities were placed In a residual category and were not formally
regulated*
Although regulation was instituted for utilities limits
were placed upon its operation*

for the same season that the regulation

itself was dictated by the philosophy, the limits to regulation were also
fashioned by the philosophy*

to prevent control from resulting in a

greater loss in freedom than gain in equality the concept of 'fair
return on a fair value1 was adopted as the principal tool for assuring to
regulated industries residual rights equal to those enjoyed by non-regulated
industries*

This tool, it will be noted, was simply the adoption by government

of the competitive principle of opportunity costs*
Even while this adjustment to the regulatory problem was
being developed by the courts the changes in the economy that had made it
necessary were intensifying.

These changes consisted of an increasing

inelasticity of physical capital and an increasingly elastic market for
claims upon Income.

The incidence of these developments upon the

philosophy of individualism was a growing area of Inequality and a greater
difficulty of restoring equilibrium through regulation*
Had these changes in the environment been the only forces
influencing control patterns an adjustment in regulation could probably
have been made*

But the required degree of control if applied only to

utilities would have violated the principle of equal residual rights, while
if extended to all businesses it would have violated the competitive

principle of opportunity costs,

Xa opposition to these potential

inoonslstonolos the interests of freedom began to organise themselves against
extreme* In control*

Thus tho interests attaching to the respective

dimensions of individualism m m

to be arrayed against one another in the

process of setting precise metes and bounds of regulation*
The result of this ideological clash was essentially a
compromise In elsteh regulation see extended to non-utilities end stopped
short of the extreme for utilities.

In this way regulation endeavored to

avoid inconsistency in its operation by failing to make the economic
environment entirely consistent with the philosophy*

As a result of this

eoaprosdee the economy was neither free nor equal* although containing as
high a degree of each as could be made compatible with the existing degree
of the other*
Continued development of the forces at work In this sphere
of social relationships required a further evolution of control*

The

direction being taken by this evolution at present is the partial
abandonment of the competitive norm end the substitution of norms determined
by the group exerting the greatest amount of power*

These norms represent

a phase of the underlying philosophy disproportionately emphasised*

To this

extent control has lost its society-wide basis and political maneuvering is
substituted for debate of principle, although limits to political activity
are still set by underlying philosophy.
This newest development in the evolution of regulation in
America —

a degree of control through power norms —

constitutes a real

threat to community solidarity*

Whether or not social crisis will

result from loss in solidarity can not be determined in the course of
a single dissertation.

The test, however, will be whether or not

current conflict between the forces of freedom and the forces of equality
can in time be minimized through a discovery of a larger area of common
ground*

X
xmmwmim
Fart Is

The Problem and ite Setting

Public utility regulation in America has, in the past two decades,
been subjected to an increasingly severe criticism by two distinct
groups of people*

There are first those persons who would like to see,

and strive to Justify, a substantially lesser degree of control than is
presently exercised*

A second group takes the position that regulation

errs in the direction of liberality rather than strictness, and advances
numerous reasons for extending controls*
If either or both of these groups were obviously and demonstrably
wrong is outlook this difference of viewpoint would be scarcely worthy
of comment*

But both groups are able to marshall to their support strong

forces and convincing arguments*

As a consequence the actual course of

regulation is a compromise wholly satisfactory to neither extreme*
In a relatively well knit society such as the United States, where a
common heritage and a common background are taken for granted, it is
important to try to understand the source and the consequences of such a
vast compromise*

It is the purpose of this dissertation to make a

beginning toward such an understanding*
Compromise in utility control falls conveniently Into two parts— control
over the rate level and control over the rate structure* Control over the
rate level has, since just prior to 1900, been formally constructed around
'fair return on a fair value*9 let today this dual concept term is little
if any nearer to precise definition that it was when originally set forth
by the Supreme Court*

Actually it seems to have been used more to carve

out the current compromise than to add precision to control principles.

3
Fair return has teen made a wore or lees inactive partner in regulation,
while Fair value hae almost officially been defined ae historical cost
or reproduction oost whichever la the higher*

Among the federal

commissions there is some indication of a trend toward a more exclusive
nee of hiatorieal cost*

hot even if this were to occur the evidence

indicates that fair return will simply he substituted for fair value as
the compromise tool in regulation.

The consistency with irfiich the Court

recognises the existence of a zone of reasonableness is ample indication
of this probability.
In connection with the rate structure as well as in connection with
the rate level compromise has had an important plaee.

A dual approach to

utility rate structure is frankly implicit in the cost-of-service and
value-of-service technique customarily used by courts and commissions. The
inevitable degree of arbitrariness inherent In the allocation of overhead, and
the practice of intermittent exercise of control further demonstrate the
existence of this area for eoopromiss.
Perhaps even more important, however, than the existence of two signif
icant areas of compromise is the fact that these areas themselves are
consistently held to a range that is well within the limits of tolerance,
even though the resulting adjustment is not entirely satisfactory to any
single group.

Both the compromise itself and the limits to compromise

therefore, mast be considered as parallel phenomena in an analysis of regu
lation in America.

In consequence, the subject matter of this work will be

the structure and concrete nature of the pattern originally intended for
regulation, the environmental forces requiring an adjustment of this pattern,
and the compromise that evolved from the adjustment.

3
Although the above statements suggest tho contrary, this work is
not laUndid as a dissertation on society*
society is implicit —

Mevertheless tho concept of

and on occasion extensively explicit —

throughout*

this concept, It is fait, Bust ho at tho base of all social study rather
than ho reserved for use in tho field of sociology#

Scientists must bo

doubly careful in today* o specialised Community that understanding does
not become so particularised that interchange is impossible*

Only through

and for ecunumleatioa is education an instrument of social good* As
1
Professor Parsons aptly stalest "The empirical scholar will follow his
problems wherever they may lead and refuse to he deterred by any signs
which read foreign Territory***
Thus the reader will find in the ensuing pages analysis that is
more usually found in studies devoted to other subjects than economies*
Seme of the analysis in these associated fields will unquestionably
demonstrate to experts the lack of formal training of the writer*

It is

hoped, however, that such demonstration will not be taken to prove that
this attempt at correlation should not have been made*
studies today are vitally necessary*

Overlapping

If scientists in the various social

studies, rather than automatically label ‘unclean1 the work of the outsider,
will be critical and cooperative the communication of knowledge can proceed
equally with the acquisition of knowledge*
The social problem to be understood in the present instance is the
control of industry*

This is not to suggest that this problem is widely

misunderstood today*

A number of able treatises are available presenting

social, legal, or economic aspects of the subject*

likewise there are

works that have built a foundation for a combination treatment* Outstanding

1 Parsons, Talcott,
structure of Social Action* (The McGraw-Hill
Bock Company, Mew fork, 19370 P. 759.

4
anoag these are feral Foundations of Canit&ifep by john E* Commons, where
1
the economic and tho logoi arc analysed in combination* £ 4gfitogXJ^
Stool*

Karl kaanheim, where tho ooolal and tho economic in control are
2
ably bleadedj
and Bo J ^ Myloien do TravaiiSocial by Bmile Durkheim
3
oho dealt with tho ooolal and tho legal in modern life.
But tho few oho
have contributed real breadth to tho field of social control are only a
beginning*

Many acre Moot follow in their footstep* In order that this

meet significant phase of nodera life nay bo brought within the grasp of
a much wider group within tho electorate*
The present work will attempt to build a little higher the foundation
thus far laid*

Bore three phases of regulation —

and the economic —

will be brought into close juxtaposition in terns of

American econonic life*
lost in depth*

the social* the legal*

Admittedly most of the gain in breadth may be

Space limitations alone would dictate this result if

inadequacy of training did not*

Particularly will this be true of the

Chapters discussing social and legal phenomena*

For that reason these

subjects are presented in outline form only, and at the beginning*

The

latter part of the work contains a detailed examination of some of the
eeonomie implications of the concepts developed in the first part*

If, then,

students in the fields treated in outline form care to use the respective
outlines as points of departure for additional depth a composite body of
consistent theory will be developed* Thus, despite the loss in depth and
detail, the writer is earnestly convinced of the usefulness of broad analysis*

1
2

clt.
(K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1936*)

3 Translated by 0. Simpson under the title The Division of Labor
in Society* originally published in 1893*

5
Because ©f the difficulty of thoroughly integrating this particular
type of exposition in the course of detailed presentation# and in order to
provide the reader with a basis for perspective# the core of the argument
to follow will be summarized here*

This summary will also serve to sketch

the plea to he used in developing the subject*
The thing that distinguishes a society from a mere collection of
individuals is a 'feeling of togetherness•| a common set of ends; a common
culture; in short a basic and fundamental agreement as to the foundation of
life together —

in association*

This agreement will here be referred to

as community# and will be developed as the prime social force holding
eoapromise in the group within tolerable limits*

Because of community men

are willing to compromise marginal desires as long as the basic ends of life
are common*
But men do not always agree in detail upon ways and means*
group there is an element of disagreement*

In every

Differences arise as to certain

of the goals of existence or the means of attaining goals agreed upon* is
these differences take on sufficient importance to stimulate conflict a
struggle arises between men of opposing active attitudes*

Granted a

sufficient amount of community to make compromise possible It is precisely
this disagreement that produces the areas for eoapromise referred to in
connection with public utility regulation*

In fact the degree of community

that exists can quite accurately be measured by the size of this area of
eoapromise in inverse ratio*
To protect and foster the twin Ideals of equality of opportunity and
freedom from coercion# society in America organized itself into a government*
IQien this government was first faced with the problem of regulating business
it was necessary to devise an approach to this problem whereby a degree of

6
restraint could be placed upon industry without violating basic community
purposes.

The principal tool with which this was done was an industry

classification promulgated and made as consistent as possible by the
Supreme Court,

Into one class was placed the so-called public utilities.

These businesses were those found in a position of power exceeding that of
individuals related to them in the economy.

As a consequence it was agreed

that these businesses could be restrained in their relationships with the
public at large*

In this way the public was strengthened by social

organisation until it was equal in power to the businesses regulated.
a second and residual class was placed all other businesses.

Into

These last could

not be restrained (except as to incidental matters only) since they represented
no threat to equality as unrestrained.
With regulation, of course, came the danger that the public would be
strengthened beyond the point of equality with the enterprise regulated. To
avoid this the Supreme Court devised the tool of 'fair return on a fair
value*'

Thusf although restrained, utilities must be allowed an operating

net result equivalent to what they would enjoy if not restrained and not in a
position of unequal power.

In short, a regulated concern could not be

confiscated.
Within the framework set by these tools detailed regulation has evolved.
Accounting regulation, control of security

Issues etc, as well as control

over rate structures and rate levels have developed to aid society in
measuring and devising offsets to excess power within the community.

For

without means with which to measure power and devices with which to combat
power social ideals might become gradually though severely diluted.
Throughout the process of refining these tools, however, industry itself
evolved Into a set of relationships from which it became increasingly difficult

7

tofollow through the classification demanded*

Thus tho growth of

intricate lnterrelatiunship throughout modern capitalism, tho growth of
overhead as an Industry problem with, the consequent difficulty of
non-arbitr^qry pricing* and the apparently increasing threat of cyclical
fluctuation to business stability hate together made the earlier clear-cut
distinctions between businesses less distinct#

The economic concept that

describes this development is economic rent* which* although at one tine
properly identified with the utilities for purposes of regulation* is today
such an Integral factor in m a n y businesa that the s ogregation of utilities
has become less refiictio*
In one ether major way industry has evolved in such a manner as to render
less realistic the pattern of regulation as orginally promulgated*
evolution has been in the property concept*

This

As the definition of property

shifted fTcm anoemphaais upon use value to an emphasis upon exchange value*
the significance of the strictures against confiscation in protecting
utilities lessened in importance*

For with the emphasis upon exohang©

value* property became associated with expectations* and it became impossible
to correct a past injustice without cuttin
injurious to owners*

across expectations in a way

Although this is not defined as confiscation in the

regulatory pattern of today it does interfere with free choice* and is*
therefore* in an Ideological sense* confiscation*

This development In

busInesB-govemment relationships has been treated in terms of the financial
concept of capitalisation*
Regulation has moved to meet this ©volution in two ways*

In tho fir at

place* non-utilities have com© in for a considerable amount of control) and
in the second place* Ubillty control has stopped far short of tho extreme
that would have resulted had the original classification remained

a

substantially intact,

Non-utilities have been subjested to regulation

designed to enforce competition* stabilise employment* and iaprove
working conditions,

Utility control has been modified in that fair

value and fair return hare not been precisely defined* la that a
•zone of reasonableness1 has been allowed by the courts*and in that
value of service and cost of service have both been given weight
pricing*

in

the detailed discussion following does not treat all phases of

this process exhaustively* or even equally.

Attention Is centered primarily

upon public utility aspects* presently these in sufficient detail to enable
the reader to visualise better thee bad e processes involved;
The significance of this evolution in regulation in America in the
development of a basic conflict between two segments of society. On the
one side stand the proponents of equality insisting that the tools of
power held by enterprise be still further circumscribed.

On the otherside

stand the proponents of freedom Insisting that only with

freedom canAmerican

ideals be fully realised.

One aspect of this conflict* or course* consists

of a rationalisation of two sides of the status quo, the other and
potentially most important aspect is a noticeable rift In community occasion
ed by a process of redefinition of our ideological concepts —
equality.

freedom and

This rift provides at one and the same time a basis for compromise

in public utility regulation and establishes a better foundation for a degree
of insight into future developments.
Part 2s Social Philosophy in America
There seems to be substantial agreement today on the proposition
that American social philosophy has been largely identified with the word

9
1
liberalism*

Although this concept is by no means self-defining the

following statements summarise the substance of itfiat Is typically under
stood by the term,

*Th© root of liberalism, in a word, is hatred of

conscience and reason which the employment of coercion necessarily destroys.

3 JO

eoagmlsien, for liberalism has the respect for the individual and his

"Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded on this self
directing power of personality, that it is only on this foundation that a
3
true community can be built,* In short liberalism is basically Identified
with individualism.
Before attempting to describe individualism in terms of the structure
of social control in America it is desirable to briefly sketch out the
framework of the broader philosophy of which individualism is a part, this
broader philosophy —

materialism —

was set forth by a series of English

philosophers of idiom the most influential upon the development of American
concepts was John Locke*
the materialism of Locke begins with the science of knowledge. All
knowledge arises from experience. This must be true because, he claims, the
mind at birth is a blank page.

Whatever it becomes later must therefore

be attributed to what happens after birth, or experience. It follows from
this that an individual is conscious of and impressed by only those things
that appeal to the five senses. From an economic point of view this

1 layers, Gustavos, The History of American Idealism, (Boni and
Liveright, New Tork, 1 9 2 5 * 1 Liberalism is used here in the broad social
sense rather than the narrow political sense.
2 Stearns,Harold, Liberallam In America. (Boni and Liveright,New fork,
1919.) Pp. 10~U.
3 Hobhouse, L.T., Liberalism, quoted loc.cit.

necessitated an industrial organisation predicated upon the creation of
material things, and, what is even more significant, a social organisation
X
coextensive with industrial organization, Locke’s defense of the state
largely centers around the duty to protect private property, and he is
most emphatic in hie belief that the church should be excluded from
a
organised intercourse*
This presentation should at once make cleer that laisaes-falre in
the economic sphere was no small part of total materialism.

Since an

individual has few if any wants that are not material, the economic machine
becomes all-important*

Since no one can know anything he has not himself

experienced, every individual must be his own judge in both production and
consumption.

Finally, since society is additive of persons rather than
3
multiplicative, an individual working for himself (sensual satisfaction)
signified the noblest work of God.
The specific attempt in theory to Integrate these concepts was the
4
creation of a competitive society.
The core of this creation is quite

1 For a much fuller dieeussion of the philosophical implications
of materialism see Windleband, W., A History of Philosophy. (The Macmillan
Company, Hew fork, 1893.) F£. 430 ff.
2 Larkin, Paschal, Property in tfoe Eighteenth Century. (Longmans,
Green and Company, Hew Tork, 1930.)
3 This does not follow strictly from philosophic materialism,
but It cameearly and stayed late as economic interpretation of materialism.
See Smith, Adam, Wealth of Kailone.
4 Eicardo, David,
o£ Ppli&AWl lS2£2!SK> Classical
economics, of course, is nowhere as extreme as the above would indicate.

n

fantlar t© all economists ana to many others.

Repetition, therefore*

need not detain ne long, hut cohesion necessitates giving some attention
to the outer workings of competition.

In essence a competitive society assumes

that an individual eill work only for himself (individualism)* and will be
interested in maximum satisfaction of wants (materialism)* Therefore he will
put himself and his property to work at that task that will be most productive
(individualism -materialism).

The individual being the only one who can judge

his own potentialities (individualism)* only he can properly allocate his
swrria«a or them of bis property (lolaass-falre). If someone also happens
to be doing a job that an individual believes he can do better* competition
1
is permitted even though the inferior is ousted thereby (lalsscg-fairc)*
As an essential result of this type of society the following pattern
a
of resource-allocation was expected and desired* Every factor of production*
and every unit of every factor of produetion* would be placed in the most
productive position*

In consequence no unit of productive eapacity would

be able to better Itself by moving to displace some other unit. Every firm
would be operating at lowest average cost* and selling price and average
3
cost would be identical*
All factors would receive their marginal product*
and no amount of bargaining could bring them more* It follows that every
productive act would add to the well-being of its sponsor. Since this sponsor

1 Ibid* In addition any recent textbook on Principles of Economies
will present the same theoretical construction*
2 The best brief summary of the purely economic implications of
competitive society can be found in Miller* J.P.* Unfair Competition* (Harvard
University Press* Cambridge* 1911.) Chapter X*
3 This terminology and in part these concepts themselves were foreign
to the original formulation* The purpose of Including them here is to make
the analysis more widely useful by stating it in today's terms and concepts.

ia

mould be also a wise consumer, it would add equally to total social
enjoyment. Every individual act, thus, would contribute identically to
1
individual and to social betterment.
the tern *social betterment *, however, is relative*

Entirely apart

from the metaphysical problem of the existence of absolute values it is
still true that even the broadest social motivations appear only in a
setting that makes them really motivations rather than merely abstract concepts.
In the above description the analysis has not concretely set forth such a
setting. Rather it has made a complete circle.

Starting

the ideal of

individualism as the motivating force behind social action and social
relationships, there was derived a resultant social good that must in turn
be defined in conjunction with a definition of the ideal.
The usefulness of this circular approach to individualism Is to
emphasise that social philosophy is both eause and effect • If it is not
both —

if it does not perpetuate as effect the conditions through which it

is a cause —
and change.

an inconsistency arises with consequent social dissatisfaction
The problem that must next be resolved is that of sketching in

theory the content of individualism in such a way as to make It internally
consistent and at the same time consistent with the soolal ends postulated
above.
Two concepts, better than any other, can be used to describe the content
of individualism in America.

These concepts are free choice and reciprocal

power 0 Tree choice was demanded by the fact that the individual is his
own judge and jury.

Reciprocal power was demanded by the fact that

1 Smith, Adam, Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is In this essay that
Smith develops most carefully the ’•invisible hand* that guides individuals
acting selfishly toward the betterment of society as well.

13

individuals work for and by themselves and thus individuals would always
be compared with Individuals rather than with organisations,

these two

aspects ©findividualism frequently go by the more popular tonae of
freedoo and equality.
- 'it? Is meat important to note at the outlet that although
individualise may properly be said to have two dimensions* they a re not
all separate abd diet1not entitles.

Actually they are so much a part

and parcel of the same thing that neither can be defined except In terms
of the other* Free choioe can not exist except where reciprocal power
exists* and reciprocal power essentially means free choice.
for this reason that

It Is

ears must be taken to avoid the tendency in popular

parlance to lay disproportionate emphasis upon one or the other.
Vet only are the two special aspects of individualism consistent
with one another.
and effect.

In addition* this philosopny is identical as both cause

A situation characterised by free choice and reciprocal power

could not result in anything different* and at the same time a resultant
free choice and reciprocal power could not be produced by a different
eituatiWtts cause,

-'hile these two statements may seem to be a belabouring

of the obvious yet the Indicated internal consistency is a prim© requisite
tor any working ooolal philosophy.
It is not enough* however* th-t a philosopny be oonceptually
V

consistent. To be accepted and utilised as a framework for group living
it must also be reasonably consistent with the external environment*
In short* fit the facts.

It must*

In the days of John Locke* the typical business

organisation was the family-farm*

This period* too* was th© age of the frontier

when the next best alternative to the status quo was movement to tho frontier*
As long as opportunities were plentiful on the frontier an individual always

u

had a desirable alternative available*

This lack of organisation and

this availability of tho frontier made a philosophy of free-choice and
reciprocal power reasonably believeable, producing a degree of consistency
with tho foots adequate for stability sod solidity*
Contrary to this view, It has boon argued that ooolal philosophy 1a
America was inherently unstable from tho beginning*

a®

evidence It has boon

demonstrated that tho Constitution was written by property owners to protest
property*

However, In the contest of the economic organisation of 130 years

ego that feet dees not warrant the extreme conclusion sometimes drawn from
it*

Hunan rights were at that tine still so nearly identical with property

rights that it Could not be said that the emphasis upon property was
injurious to fcdstaa rights in 1790, nor that as a consequence tho Constitution
represented a bade conflict between forces*
The property bias of the Constitution was very important in another
way, however*

That bias, incorporated into law and court decisions, made

property the vested interest in American econode history*

As a consequence

control over property by the organised community m s placed on the defensive
and expanded only with difficulty*

As control expanded the vested interest

naturally allied itself with the freedom dimension of social philosophy,
while regulation was primarily justified on the basis of the equality dimension*
Control over property would not have been developed, of course, In an
environment identical with that prevailing in 1790*

It was only after an

evolution in economic relationships had produced an environment clearly
violative of the ideal that regulation as we know it today began to develop.
With property (freedom) entrenched as a vested interest it is only natural
to look for violations of the equality dimension in a search for an
environmental basis for regulation*
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The essence of economic equality as It has boon eaphasised in
America, to a condition la which social organisation precludes the using
of individuals

merely as means to anend.

be taken of no

one.

In other words advantage is to

Undue advantageexists if and when one individual

has a right not correlated with an equal responsibility.

Such a non-

1
correlation of rights and responsibilities produces privilege, not equality.
It is a well-known fact that a right is relative; that for every
right there la

a corresponding duty.

If "A* has a right to work, HBHhas

a duty not to prevent *A**» working; if "A" has a right to board a train;
*B* has a duty not to step "A* from so doing, etc.

But this type of

correlation, which is definitional rather than substantive, provides no
guarantee of equality in society.

It could happen, and has, that most rights

are concentrated in the hands of a few, while most duties are concentrated
with the remainder,

the few in this case are privileied, not equal.

The

significant criterion of equality is the distribution of rights as compared
with the distribution of duties.
For this reason equality is here predicated upon the correlation of
rights and responsibilities for each social unit, rather than upon the
correlation of rights and duties for the group as a whole.

The distribution

of rights and duties is fair (equal) when and only when every right for an
individual creates for this same individual a social responsibility.

If,

therefore, an Individual is held accountable as a member of society as well

X A fair exposition of this viewpoint by an economist can be found
in Hadley, A.T., Standards of Public Morality. (Putnam and Sons, Hew fork,
1396.)
2 Hall, Jerome, Readings in Jurisprudence.
Company, Indianapolis, 1933.) Chapter XX.

(The Bobbs-Merrill
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X
as In his individual capacity, society sill bs integrated*
thus it is that a competitive society such as the one outlined
earlier in extreme terms is not,in theory, an atomistic society, and
sot integrated merely by the fact that the self-interest of different
individuals are coincidentally harmonious*

Rather such a society is

integrated by the fact of agreement on the desirability of the social
non,

Xt is tills implicit and more or less automatic faith in the

equation of rights and responsibilities that constitutes equality and
freedom, that keeps individual activity within the bounds of harmony*
Thomas Hobbes in The leviathan clearly presented the consequences of
the truly atomistic society —

the war of all against all*

The subsequent

writings of many classical economists were intended to prove Hobbes wrong*
What they did prove rather was that society was not atomistic in the first
a
place — net that the consequences pictured by Hobbes were erroneous*
Stated in more general terms the self-interest postulated in Classical
economics is the calculated type of social relationship*
interest does not operate in an unlimited field*

However, self-

Xt is built upon a

community underpinning, a basic and common set of values that spontaneously
closes to the individual self-interest a large part of the theoretical field
of activity*

The real sovereign even in this society is thus the community

spirit*

1 For a fins presentation of this approach with reference to the
individual and the social side of private property, see Ely,Richard T*, Property
and Contract* (The Macmillan Company, Mew York, 19H#) Voluran X*
2 Parsons, opv cit*, pp.89 ff.
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If# in original outline, society was spontaneously integrated, it
beeomee of vital Importance to understand why and how this spontaneity
was lost*

Modern business organization, in contrast to that in the
1
eighteenth century, Is a process of bargaining*
Capitalism itself is
practically synonoaaoue with exchange, since a high income for a society
presupposes specialization, and; specialization necessitates exchanging
surpluses*

thus, economic purpose, as we know it, is centered upon exchange9

not upon the isolated dual exchange that constitutes a single transaction,
Z
but the series of such exchanges that the courts recognize as a going
3
business. Concretely, this purpose is a maximum net of output over Input
in whatever terms these are measured in a particular case.

In popular terms,

the aim of a business is to maximize net profits through buying and selling.
Every exchange relationship contains potentially an opportunity for a strong
party to dominate a weaker party.
over submission*

Wet profit is the excess of domination

Wet loss is the opposite result,

the type of society that

we have defined as representing the social ideal — - a free and equal society-**
would leave no net balance either positive or negative.

For a right is a

dominance; a responsibility is a submission. Where these two have been

1 See Clark, J.M., Social Control of Business. (The McGraw-Hill
Book Cospany, Mew Iork,193o •) % 1 1 ff *
2

23s U.S. 153; 223 U.S. 655; 287 U.S. 178; 792 U.S. 290; 292 U.S. 398.

3 Modern economic theory is using more and more the idea of a "stream*
of
and outputs, which stream Professor Conwions considers the going
concern. Commons, John &., legal Foundations of Uapitaliam* (The Macmillan
Company, Mew fork, 1924.) Chapter ?.

xa
accurately correlated, therefore, they cannot diverge*
But freedom in society presupposes choice*

Where tha principal

social organisation la a prowess of bargaining, the actual choices that
nan make are of paramount importance.

Essentially these choices will be
X
to earn a living in one way as compared with another* In a free society

these decisions will be made on the basis of the net result as above
outlined*

Individualism necessarily forces every individual to have regard

for that course of action that will prove most advantageous*
Each of the choices that an individual makes as to alternative courses
of action amounts to a choice of degrees of power over others, maximum
advantage being the highest possible degree of power over others In the
2
game of business* or the largest net balance of domination in the economic
order*

Lalsaea-falre economics correlated rights and responsibilities

quantitatively; that is* predicating only one degree of economic power as
basic*

In technical economic terms this degree of power represents

equality between average cost* marginal cost, and selling price for every
3
seller*
Advantage to every bargainer was equated to disadvantage; or to
general social advantage*

Society was equal because it could not be other*

wise*
In the face of the development of an environment substantially
different from the one on the basis of which the philosophy was originally
constructed* it was inevitable that basic inconsistencies would arise and in

1 Knight, Frank H** "Ethics of Cocqpetition", Quarterly, Journal q£
Economics, Volume XXXVII, pp* 611 ff«, August, 1923*
2

Cojssoons, sa* clt,* chapter III.

3 Myers* Albert, Elements &f IM o m Economics* (Frentice Hall, Inc.,
Hew fork 1911*) Revised Edition, chapter XIII*
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time product dissatisfaction.

Xt tat also to be ejected that a pattern

of adjustments would be worked out to lessen the degree and one-aidenes*
of the dissatisfaction.

this pattern of adjustments Is otherwise known

at regulation*
At regulation expanded the original bias in favor of property
protection lost wteh of its force, and society found it necessary to
balance More and More carefully the interests involved in order to assure
a compromise of agreement rather that a compromise through power. Today the
gap in philosophy that must be bridged by regulation is so wide that power
compromises are becoming apparent in some areas.

Evidences of this type

of social relationship are 1log-rolling* and legislation through blocs and
pressure groups.

Through these and similar elements in our government it

sometimes happens that calculated interests become formalized into law
through power rather than compromise.
Summarised as part of an introduction the above process of developamnt appears clear-cut and single.

Actually forces of extreme ©onplexlty,

operating in many and devious ways, have all contributed to the result
Indicated.

With primary emphasis upon economic forces, and drawing material

mainly from the field of public utility regulation, this dissertation attempts
to trace some of the significant phases of the indicated evolution.
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CHAPTER X

m w m * patm m or m m u t x m
A social philosophy, of course* can not be understood solely
through an understanding of it* broadest sources* aims* and principles*
To bo really useful in integrating a society* philosophy must bo ultimately
translated into narrower terns consistent with the concrete environment. The
oooood stop toward on understanding of social philosophy in America ie
therefore to reduce it to the problems that its application brought to tho
surface*

Tho purpose of this chapter is to oonsidor tho too dimensions of

indivldnaXtsm in term* of the broadest problems of application* while tho
following chapter will consider thorn in terns of a still narrower sot of
applications*
The principal subject natter of this chapter still bo the Supreme Court
of tho United States*

So closely allied to philosophy is regulation that

jurisprudence naturally plays an important part In working out the details
*

of social organisation*

This Is particularly true in the Halted States whore*

for reasons that will bo made more clear later* a supreme jurisprudential body
1
was created for precisely this purpose* As Felix Frankfurter aptly remarks#
*0ur basic probleias— whetfter of industry*
agriculture* or finance— sooner or later
appear In the guise of legal problems*
Professor John R* Hemmon* is therefore
justified in characterising the Supreme
Court of the Halted States as the
authoritative faculty of economics'1*

1 mlaw
and Politics* (Harcourt, #raee and Company,
Hew York*“
m m m m assssvss ewMHSHewpeeMWMMMP
*
^
1939.) P. *#.

Xt, mow* for purposes of analysis* 0* toko the position that
tho working out of tho pattern of social control in the United States
eon be *funnelled1 through tho Supreme Court* we must at the outset
concede the corollary of that position*

We must understand that individual

court decision* ere net isolated facts In our political coianuniiy but are
carefully Integrated by human minds assiduously trained in the art of
consistency*
On the basis of this corollary it Is at once obvious that a first
step in presenting the legal pattern of regulation will be to set forth the
principle of integration in terms of which individual court decisions are
consistent*

Xt will be suggested immediately that the Constitution

provides such a principle*

However it is one of the specific aims of this

chapter to demonstrate that the Constitution is not the sol*~~-lmd*ed» not
even the fa,imary-~~«ource of consistency for regulation*

The deeper source

is a fundamental community belief in free enterprise* individualism* equality
of opportunity —

from which belief the Constitution Itself was derived*

law or regulation Is an attempt by the community to protect Its
values*

Whenever the action of individuals or groups violates a basic

cemmanity value laws ere passed*

Since In the typical case a law affects

only a small group within the community It can perhaps be fairly said that
law Is the Imposition of the will of the community (through force if
necessary) upon those who by their actions have Indicated a tendency to
live outside the area of proper behavior Illicit in community ideals*
Xt is not at all strange that* in a society predicated upon freedom
and equality* the first legal principle the Supreme Court actually set forth
was the principle of principles*

If the iivlividual (enterprise) is to be

the vital element in the economy it is imperative that the individual know
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the rules of the game whenever he wishes to make a eomaitment* Mo one
can plan either a life or a business if such important factors as the
attitude of government are unknown or subject to change without notice.
For guidance on this point the Court went to the Constitution and took
the provision against ex^post facto laws as a concrete demand for a
principle in all things.

John R* Commons has elaborated upon this

statement in the Constitution and has developed what he claims la the essence
of the relationship between the individual and law in American capitalistic

2
society.

This principle is that no individual (business) can be punished

(controlled) as an individual (business) but only as a member of a group
of individuals (businesses).
for murder*

Thus no law can be passed punishing John Bones

A law can be passed, however, punishing all murderers of whom

John Jones may be one.
Assuming, now, the existence of principle, it might be helpful to
inquire into the reason for its desirability. The average person, of
course, takes principle so much for granted that to even ask the question
may at first seem foolish.

But the underlying basis for emphasis upon

principle is so intimately and intricately related to the entire system of
underpinning for the American way of life that a brief examination may be
well worthwhile*
Behind our Constitutional system is a fundamental belief in natural

1 Since our form of government is predicated upon reason it is
evident from an even broader viewpoint why it is believed that principles
are possible. Generalication (principle) is the essence of reason.
2 SSL* cit.. pp. 312 ff.
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Emphasis upon principle must he Intended, otherwise every ease
would be decided as it arose rather than in advenes,

the essential

element in standards is their relationship to the future#

A principle

laid down by law is the pre~judging of all subsequent eases,

law thus

establishes a continuing and consistent probability for persons to base
their calculations of the future upon.

It mist be continuing because

principles are invoked until alteredg and it must be consistent because
only so can control by mood be avoided.
It could hardly be overemphasised that a lav for the future has
been peculiarly favorable to the growth of the modern institutions of
capitalism.

A business concern, engaged in producing or distributing the

goods that asks up our standard of life, is predicated upon profits.
1
Profits (or losses) are closely related to the unknowable* in enterprise,
lav could be a sufficiently large unknowable — - presumable in an adverse
way — * to severely limit technical advancement were it not for the
provisions against retroeative law.

This is more and more true as fixed

and specialized capital makes up a larger and larger proportion of total
business assets.
Having firmly established the principle of principles, and starting
with a presumption against government Interference, it was next necessary
for the Court to establish a principle to enable a determination as cases

1 Recent distribution theory is placing more and more emphasis
upon the relation of risk and profit. The classic thesis can be found
in Knight, Frank H.,
SJ& front. (Houghton-lilfflln
Cojqpany, Hew Xork, 1921.)

as
cross as to what regulations would ha permissible and what regulations
would not be permissible*

Analysis of this problem it tha principal

requirement few a discussion of tha legal pattern of regulation and to
it tha remainder of this chapter will be devoted*
Tha process of defining proper subjects for regulatory laws mist
be approached la two distinctly different ways*

It mist be defined in

tarns of tha Constitution! tha 5th and 14th amendments, and also in tarns
of the season law, tha source of tha police power*
Police power is tha right of a government to govern.

Originally

police power scant only tha right of a government to establish conditions
relative to any or all activity that affects tha public health, safety,
X
and morals*
However, when the traditional definitions of these terms
mads them inadequate to the task of enabling government to cope with the
capitalistic economy that had developed under a substantive laissez-faire
approach to business relationships the police power was expanded to include
the right of a government to determine proper prices to be charged
consumers by any business declared to be ‘public utilities9.
It is at once obvious that police power is neither a self-defining
nor a static concept*

Experience in the form of specific judicial

pronouncements is constantly defining and re-defining its Implications*
The problem then is to attespt to uncover with some exactness the content
and limitations of the police power*
A superficial answer to this problem can be immediately given*
Police power is defined through its polar partner

due process in the

1 Freund! Ernest, The Police Power* (Callaghan and Company,
Chicago, 1904*)

26
1
5th and 14th amendments*

Bat this clarification la scarcely helpful.

For duo process la itself neither self-defining aor static,

tha result

tor regulation la that ce hare polar approaches to tha relationship
between government and Industry, both of which east be aonsldarad as
mutually Halting and defining the other, but neither providing a
sufficiently precise or fined content to serve as definition or limitation
of tha aphere for government action.
Since these polar and mutually limiting approaches to regulation
are so far apart it could appear that there is room for a considerable
amount of arbitrary dealing by regulators,

Actually the relationship

betceen government and business in this country could not be said to have
bean arbitrary at any time in its development.

Bather the rules existing

at any one time have exhibited a rather high degree of consistency, and
chile there hae been, as could be expected in a nation as large and
dynamic as America, a changing trend in the relationship of government to
business, this change Itself has been consistently and gradually in the
same direction.

Although there are a fee oho night refer to this trend

as arbitrary most could agree that, considered in the large, it has not
been so,
Xt strikes the thoughtful person Immediately and forcefully that
a consistent pattern of regulation in both the dimension of time and the
dimension of space is itself proof that regulators — * finite men that

1 Due process is not to be thought of in the procedural sense
of trial by Jury, but in the substantive sense of Just compensation.

they

*

m

do utilise principles sad standards*

It is tho belief

of tho writer that tho principles available for this purpose can
come from only one source —

social philosophy*

the fact that at any

given time regulation le consistent is evidence that tho community
ideal has a tendency to penetrate most minds similarly*

the fast that

thoro has been a discernible trend is tho.scops and content ©f regulation
sis^ply demonstrates that community ideals change as the external
1
environment, so to speak, poses new problems*
Given, now, the existence of a division of labor between the police
power and the due process clauses of the Constitution, it should next
prove instructive to examine the direction this division of labor has
taken in the history of regulation.
parts.

The division has developed in two

The first of these is in terms of the scone of regulation, or the

balance between public utility regulation and general police power
regulation*

The second is in terms of the pxftePjt of regulation, or the

balance between confiscation and due process*
Historically the police power has been divided into the two
categories mentioned earlier*

The first of these gives the government,

federal or state, power to establish conditions surrounding any or all

%
activity that affects the public health, safety, and morals;

the second

1 This type of analysis has been most powerfully developed in
the field of sociology* See Parsons, Taleott, £&« olt«* p* 193*
Z Fruend, Hrnest, op. cit* The Police Power. This la an exhaustive
account of the development and status of this category* It is noteworth
that this volume includes all government activity in America under this
one head.
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give* tha governamnfc* federal ©r state* power to determine proper
prleee to be charged consumers* by apy business declared to be qi public
utility!
7he economic thesis of the Supreme Court in defining these separate
and distinct approaches to the police power* although never explicitly
stated* seems to have been the following* control over business details
affecting public health* safety* and morals is by nature m

incidental

control that has little or no relationship to the ability of the controlled
to stay in business or make a profit.

On the other hand* control over
1
prises is in very essence an external “attach1* upon the most vital aspect
a
of the entire business process,
therefore it was a most logical step
for the court to permit virtually any regulations that could be demonstrated
3
to be merely incidental to the major operation of the business concerned*

but to be extremely cautious about permitting over-all regulation of a
particular business.

Since economic freedom had become deeply instilled in

public consciousness* it was felt reasonable to suppose that price
regulation should be placed on the defensive.

1 this is* perhaps* the proper word* for the reason that while
the doctrine of public interest was being formulated, the cases coming into
court were attempt* by government to limit the sphere of action of
transportation cofl$>anies.
Z In other words* what J.IS. Clark calls the heart of the contract.
Op. cit.f pp.176 ff.
3 HEegolation to be valid must tend to some ulterior good to
which the destruction or curtailment of rights Is merely incidental•“
11 Am Jur. 1007* See State vs. henry* 37 N.M. 336.

m

But the court1s entire economic thesis is not cosqplete at this
point • the justices seemed to be emphasizing that activity in our
industrial society Must be interpreted in one of two ways; either it is
composed of single, isolated aets having no substantial relation to a
business considered as a whole; or It consists of general acts,
interrelated with the composite of all other acts making up the particular
business process under consideration.

The former group consists of any and

all acts that, taken in and of themselves, permit of superficial and
extensive control without detriment to the ability of the business to
sustain itself.

The latter group consists of those acts that directly

relate to the financial well-being of the concern, and do not permit of
superficial control.

The court has apparently felt that any all-embracing

act must be regulated on an intensive basis, and that regulation of such an
act must be justified on somewhat more elaborate grounds than control of
1
superficial acts*
The position of the court, admittedly complex and confusing because
never stated forthrightly, can perhaps be made clearer by pursuing a
slightly different line of discussion*

Let us suppose that an act, a tiny

fnaction of the oos^tosite activity of a concern, is considered detrimental
to social well-being*

To prohibit this act will leave the business in the

same position as before.

As justification for its regulation, therefore,

a legislature must prove only that this particular act is injurious to the
public interest if unchecked*

1 “ In the first place, it is established by a series of cases that
an ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking
of private property* * *tt Justice Holmes in Hoble State Vs. Haskell,
219 U.S. 104* Emphasis supplied*
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Let us now suppose that another act, an act which itself
embraces numerous acts-** say quoting a priee to a consumer-— seems
also detrimental to social well-being*

&ut in controlling or

limiting this one action, limits are also placed upon many (perhaps
1
all} other acts of the business*
Thus control spreads itself to
action not specifically contemplated by the law Itself until it
embraces the entirety of the operations of the concern controlled*
Thus control is established over, not an act, but an entire business
process*

Therefore, a legislature must prove that, not the act, but

the entire business* if unchecked« is potentially injurious to the
public interest*

Actually, in Munn vs. Illinois the first and

precedent-setting case in the matter of price regulation, the court
came as close as it ever has come to establishing the above-stated
economic thesis*

In that decision Chief Justice $aite remarked:

Indeed, there is no end of regulations
with respect to the use of property which may not
be legitimately prescribed, having for their object
the peace, good order, safety, and health of the
community, thus securing to all the equal enjoyment
of their property; but in establishing these
regulations it is evident that compensation to the
owner for the use of his property, or for his
services in union with it, is not a matter of any
importances whether it be one sum or another
does not affect the regulation, either in respect

1 Xt is a well established principle of American
Constitutional law that Constitutional guaranties are no bar to
legislation "not operating unreasonably beyond the occasions of its
enactment • • ♦ H 11 American Jur. 991. See also Borden vg,. Louisiana
State Board of Education, 168 La* 1005*
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to its utility or mode of enforcement. One say go,
in like manner, through the whole round of regulations
authorized by legislation, State or municipal, under
what is termed the police power, and in no instances
will he find that the compensation of the owner for the
use of his property has any Influence In establishing
them* Xt is only tdiere some right or privilege is
conferred by the government or municipality upon the
owner, which he can use in connection with his
property, or by means of which the use of his property
is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys
an advantage over others, that the compensation to be
received by him becomes a legitimate matter of
regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such
cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, In
exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only
determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be
enjoyed* When the privilege ends, the power of regulation
ceases.
Essentially, then the court demands the same proof, whichever
category of the police power is being invoked.

Xn the one case, however,

proof of public Interest is extended to a single act; while in the
other case this proof is extended to the entire business.

So far as

the writer is aware this fact has never been made clear by textbook
writers in the field of public utilities.

Once it is clearly recognized

it can be further used as a tool for investigating the ramifications
of the coi2rt,s economic postulates.
This 'hll or nothing" approach by the court, pushed to its ultimate
conclusions, looks weak when judged in the light of today*s economy. But
it should be noted that when the principle was first set forth the
economic environment and thus the need for regulation had not yet
developed to a point intricate enough to actually push the court's approach
to anything like its ultimate conclusions.

1 94 B*Sf 113,146

What is important here is that
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a principle was required delineating the proper sphere for government
control*

In order that thia principle might be as definite as

possible the court formulated the line of demarcation between the
environment to be controlled and that not to be controlled in extreme
terms.
Two things stand out at this point*
has a common denominator*

First, all regulation

That common denominator is, as would be

expected, public interest as defined in terms of social philosophy*
Second, price regulation was forcefully placed on the defensive —
result clearly called for by the ideal.

a

A succinct understanding of

these significant facts will help clear the way for an understanding
of the second part of the division of labor between the common law
and the Constitution —

the balance between confiscation and due

process.
Obviously the fact that the Supreme Court defined the categories
of regulation in absolute terms, could not, in our social setting, be
interpreted to mean that the right to control was itself to be absolute.
Such an interpretation would be the equivalent of placing the public
utility industries at the mercy of the law rather than within the sphere
of legal protection.

Accordingly it was necessary that a supplementary

principle be devised to set forth the proper extent of government
regulation.

As such a supplementary principle the Courts promulgated

and developed the legal concept *fair return on fair value* and its
opposite fconfiscationf, both interpreted in relation to due process.
Government regulation has been replete with references to the
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due process clauses of the Constitution*

Thus persons may not

be deprived of property without "just compensation."
called the test of confiscation —

This test —

is invariably applied in utility

rate cases as a constitutional limitation upon the exercise of this
aspect of the police power.

Yet it is a "firmly settled" concept of

law that the due process clause has no effect upon the exercise of
the general police power (protection of the public health, safety,
2
and morals) •
At first glance this would appear to be an irreconcilable
conflict between the Constitution on the one hand and the police power
on the other hand.

However, an examination of decisions makes a

reconciliation of the conflict quite simple*

Xt is said, for example,
3
that due process limits the improper exercise of the police power.
Also it Is said that due process prevents unreasonable or arbitrary
4
exercise of the police power.
The conclusion to which we are thus
forced is that the court will disapprove an injury to property rights
only if the injury is improper, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Sometimes

1 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments*
2 11 Am. Ju t . 998* See also Murphy vs* California, 22$ U.S. 623.
There are numerous state cases emphasizing this same point.
3

Grenada Lumber Company vs. Mississippi, 21? U.S. 433*

4 Dobbins vs. Los* Angeles, 195 U.S. 223*
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private rights can be abrogated, and sometimes they can not*
However, nowhere in all the multitude of pertinent decisions handed
down by the courts on this subject, are the terms improper* arbitrary,
or unreasonable unambigously defined*

Such a definition is one of the

legislative problems in the sphere of regulation*

The group that

defines these terms is, to all intents and purposes, a substantive
legislative body* even though the elected representatives of the people
do write the formal language of the law*
forced itself —

or been forced —

Thus the Supreme Court has

to become a basic legislator on the

subject of property rights and their limitations.^
The legislative position of the Supremo Court can perhaps be
understood more adequately by reference to an earlier point*

Disapproval

of regulation is found inside the Constitution in the 14th* 10th, and
5th Amendments*

Approval of regulation is found outside the Constitution

in the police power*

Thus the responsibility of the Court is to steer a

consistent course between the Constitution and the police power.

In the

absence of explicit definitions to serve as standards a consistent course
must utilise certain Implicit definitions or standards*

Since the court

has been quite consistent in its Interpretations it seems proper to think
in terms of an integrative principle for decisions*

In the nature of

1
Jerome Frank has contributed a candid recognition of the
fact of judicial legislation. Frank* Jerome* Law and the Modern
Mind* (Tudor Publishing Company, Hew York, 1955.) 6hapter # •

thing* it M t u inescapable that this principle can be no other than
the dimensions of social philosophy presented earlier*
The question as to the specific content of due process is not
so easily dismissed, although in general terms it follows a rather
definite pattern*

"dust compensation” in the Fifth Amendment and "due

process of law” in the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments are equivalent
1
terms.
Just compensation and "fair return on a fair value" are also

a

identical in connotation*

Although the precise substance implied by

these vital regulatory concepts is primarily economic, the strictly
legal implications do warrant further examination here*

The purpose

will be to link more closely the balance set forth by the courts,
between general and public utility regulation on the one hand, and between
confiscation and due process on the other hand*
An important corollary of the philosophy upon which our society
3
is based is free will*
An equal society must be one in which membere
have equal choices.

Ordinarily, therefore, the government may not

1 Smyth JSLm Ames, 169 B*S* 466* Here "due process" was not
argued as sueh* Instead Justice Harlan centers his famous remarks
around "Just compensation. n The equivalence of these terms is inherent*
2 Board of Public Utilities Commissioners va. N.Y. Telephone
Co*, 271 H,S* 23, Here Justlee Butler appears to use the two phrases
interchangeably*
3 Since much of our early constitutional thinking was inspired
thereby, reference might be made to John locks9s tyo Treatises
on
tenant, so influential in solidifying E n g l a n d ^ judicial system,
as well as in formulating ours*
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Without unduly extending this analysis the above relationships
can be brought into even eloser juxtaposition,

the typical case of

government intervention is one that can in soms sense be described as
monopoly as contrasted to the free competition upon which unenforced
equality must be dependent*

Xt is a well recognized characteristic

of monopoly that the choices of actual or potential consumers are much
more narrowly circumscribed than where enterprise is competitive • Thus
government intercedes for the consumer when the latter^ choices are in
danger of being Interferred with by business*

And this process is

precisely the obverse of intercession by government for business when
the latter*s choices are in danger of being Interferred with by the
public interest*
Xt might be helpful here to summarize the legal pattern of
formal control to this point*

The argument has been developed as follows*

Beneath and behind society in America is a belief in natural law* a belief
that envisages government as a resultant of society rather than a cause,
and itiich considers equality of opportunity as the natural and thus the
ideal social state*

Mien it became necessary to superimpose a minimum

of government upon this superstructure of equality the need for principles
of control became paramount*

Without principles some few might pass

beyond restraint while at the same time others might drift outside the
protective custody of society*
To meet this need for principles two opposing ideas have been
constantly counterpoised against one another, both in determining the

38

scope of regulation and in determing its extent*

The first of these

is the police power, or the positive right t© govern*

The second is

the Constitution, or the negative obligation to respect the status quo*
The result of this opposition insofar as the scope of regulation is concerned
was, as would be expected, a compromise.

For most businesses the victory

was with the status quo* with the exception that clearly incidental
regulation to protect the public health, safety and morals was to be
allowed*

But for some businesses —

called public utilities —

the

victory was with police power in that price regulation as well as
incidental regulation was to be allowed.

This key problem of industry

classification is not automatically solved, of course, by the division of
labor indicated*

The actual process of classification can only be

accomplished through a rather general agreement as to what is necessary
for the realisation of the twin ideals —

equality and freedom*

Insofar as the extent of regulation is concerned the same
opposition between the Constitution and police power is evident*

Here,

however, the principal factor is primarily type of regulation and only
secondarily type of industry*

Where regulation is merely Incidental

the police power is absolute*

The charge of confiscation can not be

successfully raised to avoid such regulation*

But where regulation goes

to the heart of the contract the Constitutional provision of due process
is utilized to check the operation of the police power*

And again the

ultimate determinant as to which shall rule must be a general agreement
as to what is necessary for the realization of the underlying ideals.

In
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making final determinations as regards both scope and extent of
regulation the Supreme Court plays a most important part.
To this point the legal pattern of regulation has been
discussed without extensive reference to the legal terms that are
most commonly heard in this connection —

rights and property*

It

seems desirable now to fit the above analysis firmly Into a more
traditional terminology.
It is a relatively common thing to define property in terms of
rights*

Private property thus becomes rights accruing to Individuals.
a
But these private rights are not absolute* The state may decrease or
increase these rights, not capriciously, but according to certain
reasonable principles*

These principles all comprehend or are

comprehended by the poliee power*
The police power comprises all the power of
the State except the power of taxation and the
power of eminent domain, and these powers are them
selves merely auxiliary powers in aid of the police
power* The object of the power of taxation is to
raise money to enable the state to exercise the
police power and the object of the power of eminent
domain is to enable the state to acquire property
for the same purpose*’

1 "Property is a bundle of rights*" This is the classic
formulation of Richard T* Ely* Property and Contract * (The Macmillan
Company, New fork, 191A*) Volume I, p*60*
2 "Rights and privileges arising from contracts are subject to
regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals,
and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as
Isall
property." 11 Am Jur. 1000* See Stephenson vs* Binford, 287, U.S. 251,
and Thornton vg* Duffy, 254 U.S. 361*
3 Long, J.R*, Cages on Constitutional Law* (The Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester, New fork, 1936.) Third Edition,
pp. 1069-1070*
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This statement has a peculiar significance in the field of
regulation*

*t could accurately be said that regulation by the state

is the source of all limitations on the sphere of rights surrounding
private property*

If* then, the police power is also the source of all

2
regulatory property-right limitation,

there must exist a relationship

of identity between the police power and regulation*
A semi-syllogystic presentation of this significant relationship
between regulation and the police power might be outlined as follows f
(1) All limitation of rights stem from the police power* (2) All exercise
of the police power results in a limitation of rights. (3) All limitation
of rights stems from what we are here calling formal control or regulation*
(4) All formal control results in a limitation of rights.

Things which

are equal to the same thing being equal to each other, it must follow
that regulation (formal control) and the police power are identical
concepts*

This is a highly significant fact from the point of view of the

student of regulation*
name for regulation.

Police power is simply the political theorist's
Regulation is the economic theorist's name for

1
This is a simple truism, only formulated here to help
emphasise a set of relationships not adequately emphasized before*
2
Or a power concurrent with the police power in a particular
case* The courts can validly distinguish between police power and some
concurrent power (e.g., taxation), but the former is inherent in all
limitation o f property rights. Freund, o p . cit*
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poll©* power*

Stripped ©f superficial verbiage, economists and

lawyers hare for many years concerned themselves with the same
problems— kept apart by inadequate and often quite irrelevant dis
tinctions that served only to becloud the issues*
Private property is the political approach of our society to
equality*

is such* equality (or some concept of equality) is enforced

by the police power*

but private property is also the economic approach

of our society to equality.
economic regulation*

In this guise equality is enforced through

Standing alone in either the political or economic

sphere private property could have little meaning,

taken together these

two represent a most important element in what we think of as our social
organisation*

It must follow that metes and bounds in both spheres can

likewise have little meaning unless interrelated into a significantly
unified whole*
We have by now briefly outlined the method by which limitation
of property rights is made the common denominator of all regulation* In
a society in which equality is important this limitation cannot itself
be potentially unlimited; that is* in a world of private property, where
property is defined as a bundle of rights limitations of rights must
not be arbitrary or capricious, but carefully equated to social needs
1
and desires.
If we look upon the rights taken aw&y it would follow that

1 In the words of the court; "When the legislature appoints an agent
to act within that sphere of legislative authority, it may endow the agent
with power to make findings of fact which are conclusive, provided the
requirements of due process which are specially applicable to such an
agency are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and
not arbitrarily** St. Joseph Stockyards Co, vs.United States, 298 U.S. 30*
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regulation treats businesses or persons unequally*

But if we center

attention upon the rights retained in these same cases, equality
is evident as the governing rule*

This may be merely restating the

difference between a pessimist and an optimist, one saying his glass
is half empty, the other saying his glass is half full*

But the

realistic approach must consider the pertinent fact to be the size
of the residual bundle of rights*

Though practical politics and

administrative error may militate against realization of the ideal —
equality In the size of these residual bundles —

it would be a crass and

undemocratic person indeed who would deny that this equality in the
size of residual bundles is the end-in-view.
In conclusion it may be helpful to point up once again by way of
emphasis the concepts developed in the course of this discussion*

In

the first place it has been demonstrated that social control has
numerous dimensions among which the economic, the legal, and the
sociological are of prime importance.
property*

The economic dimension is private

The legal dimension is definition of private property through

the courts*

The sociological dimension is the existence in the minds and

hearts of men a belief in ©quality and freedom as characteristic of the
ideal state«
In the second place it has been emphasized throughout that the
specific approach to be taken by regulation can not be derived
exclusively from the Constitution*

Rather the Constitution and the

police power provide polar and mutually limiting approaches to regulation,
the precise division of labor between them being determined in the last
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analysis by the Idea existing in the minds and hearts of men ae to
the Meaning of social philosophy*
Finally, it was pointed oat that the Supreme Court dree a
eery sharp line of demarcation between the police power and due process
ae to both the seenf and the extent of regulation, the court permitted
incidental regulation of all incidental business activity, but allowed
comprehensive regulation of only these fcjaihesses whose acts could not be
said to be incidental,

Share incidental regulation only is allowed

due process is not invoked; while in those eases in which comprehensive
regulation is permitted due process is relied upon for protection*
This, then, is the legal pattern of regulation*

Just as In our

society equality is considered to be important, so is the legal community
organized to enforce that state where inequality arises*

The operation

of that organization is through limitation of rights~primarily
property rights*
for every citizen*

Its procedure is a simultaneous restraint and protection
Where a basic inequality exists police power acts to

restrain while at the same time due process acts to protect*

Where a

non-basie inequality exists police power operates without due process on
the thesis that no real injury is potential*
Before turning to the economic pattern of regulation there are
a few items of broad significance that will repay mention. Regulation, it
will be noted, was not invoked to protect the Freedom dimension of
philosophy*

This was to be expected since freedom or the private use of

one*s property was the vested interest in terms of basic philosophy* Thus
the equality dimension was the stimulus for control.

LL
Xt Hill be noted too that this legal pattern operated An such
a nay as to keep the freedom dimension in the vested interest category
by placing property fight limitation on the defensive*

And, so difficult

was it made to classify an industry as a utllityf there was really very
little price regulation for many years*
scarcely touched by regulation*

In this situation freedom m s

Obversely, the reason freedom was touched

but slightly was because inequalities had net extensively developed*

thus

it was easy for both sides to compromise their differences, and it follows
that the compromises required were small*

As a consequence the motivation

for power control rather than compromise control was limited,

the result

was a situation in which relationships were largely harmonious*
Finally, to anticipate briefly a later part of the discussion, the
concretely harmonious adjustment of property relationships does not
characterise the entirety of the history of regulation in America* As
capitalism matured control was forced to operate in areas and directions
not contemplated from the beginning.

The result was a modification of

control to allow for a somewhat different interplay of interests and a
somewhat different economic environment*

The following chapter presents

the concrete framework for modification by outlining in some detail the
specific steps regulation must take to insure the existence of reciprocal
power where inequality is threatened*

The present chapter and the

following one can be considered as Phase X In the development of social
control. Later chapters will present further phases of this evolution*
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the function of the law In proportioning the two dimensions of
individualism*—

freedom and equality—

is not limited to the broad

function of classification ae might be inferred from the preceding
chapter.

In addition the courts hare the task of applying the

classifications and assessing limite to them In particular cases.
However* the tools used in the process of detailed application are
primarily economic rather than legal*

Xt is for this reason that

this more detailed pattern necessary to give concrete substance to
regulation is termed in this chapter the economic pattern*
Before elaborating upon these economio tools several important
relationships should be made more clear.

In the process of regulation

as such freedom was not an important consideration for the reason that
the issue of freedom was decided through classification.

Business

organizations that were to be ♦free* were set aside and regulation was
not allowed*

Businesses not mo set aside were those that the dimension

of equality demanded not to be free in the same sense,

thus* up to the

point of confiscation* at which point residual rights were considered
equal* regulation did not need to concern itself with freedom.
If the dimension of freedom was not an important consideration for
regulators* the dimension of equality assuredly was* Xt has been developed
that utilities were defined as threatening inequality*
they were to be regulated*
wanton.

For this reason

Still* however* regulation was net to be

Every regulatory act was to be reasonably related to the end in

view, namely, greater equality.
concept ©f equal residual rights*

This requirement is a part of the
Freedom, by definition, ©an ©a&st

only where ©quality exists, and as long as regulatory procedures are
specifically designed to produce equality, freedom, as broadly conceived,
could not be an issue#

It is precisely for this reason that it w&i

necessary that rights and responsibilities be defined carefully to permit
of accurate equation*

From this necessity the economic pattern of

regulation directly stems.
Eight equal to responsibility means reciprocal power*

means

that no one shall eaoert a greater amount of control over the economic
system than the economic system exerts over him#

It means that no

business may be given authority to extract from others a greater sacrifice
than others may extract from it*

It means that there is to be no net

balance of domination at any point in society*

Xt means that the outward

flow of transactions shall equal the Inward flow of transactions, both
quantitatively and qualitatively*
shall equal economic output*

Xt means finally that economic input

Economic theory would define this concept

as a condition in which every factor of production received its opportunity
1
cost —
A*S>, a sufficiently large sum to keep it producing at maximum
efficiency, in other words, cost-of~®erviee♦
It is not to be thought that society ever does actually equate
sacrifices In anything like this ideal way.

Even this all-important

1 Gemnill, Paul F., Fundamentals of Economics.
Sew York, 1939.) Third edition, pp.390 ff.

(Harper and Brothers,
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element in government must follow the very pragmatic economic
principle*

Thus if formal control can work to close some gap

between right and responsibility, without opening a bigger one
somewhere else, control Is very apt to become an established fact*
Following the economic principle further, scarce enforcement
facilities will be transferred from a small gap to a larger one until
1
both are approximately the same size* Thus, making allowance for
politics and mistakes, society simply does the best it can*

At any

time, therefore, regulation may be said to represent the nearest practical
approach to the ideal.
The legal right of a seller is the right to charge a price
for his goods; the right of a utility is to make a charge for its
services*

The economic responsibility of a seller is the responsibility

to reward factors of production for their services*

As a matter of

practical expedience both of these are measured in dollars*

Formal

control cannot stop with equating these superficial emblems, however,
2
but must endeavor to assure that the dollar sacrifices really
represent the real sacrifice involved.
important

This last is probably as

as the comparison of dollar amounts.

Regulation has tended

to concentrate mainly on dollars* Recent trends, however, are toward

1

Knight, F.H., g&gfe, Unortalnty an£ Profit, p. 65.

2 See Clark, o p . clt** chapter VII, for an analysis of dollar
versus other social sacrifices*
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a broader ii««,

the approach here taken will include both dollar

and raal sacrifice*.
Right and responsibility ara equal if payments by customers
equal payments to factors.

this condition suggests that prieo and

average coot should bo equal.

Xt implies, further, aquality between

average long~run coot and average long-run revenue, tho orthodox
competitive equilibrium*
Thia aquation between consumer payments and factor payments
immediately suggests the problem of knowing the magnitude of each.
Inequality might conceivably be remedied by raising one magnitude or
lowering one magnitude , or possibly both methods might be used.

If

consumer payments exceed factor payments, for exasqple, factor payments
might be raised or consumer payments might be lowered*
case the latter is most apt to occur.

in the typical

Where factor payments exceed

consumer payments, on the other hand* a reduction in payments to the
factors or an increase in payments by the consumers may equally solve
the problem.

But before remedial measures can be adopted the

magnitude of the inequality must be known.
this question of knowledge is famtlar to students of regulation
as control over accounts and reports*

All comprehensive regulation

must make use of this particular tool or fail.

Although this fact is

1 West Ohio Gas Company ys. Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio, 294 U.S. 63. There have been a number of recent decisions of this
same general nature.

quite obvious regulation had developed quite far before accounting
1
regulation became an accomplished fact*
A business is a flow of transactions,

this flow is always

in two directionss the inflow of assets; and the outflow of assets*
this exchange of assets is the business or bargaining process. The
inflow of assets represents the relationship between the business and
the environment which it dominates (rights)* The outflow of assets
represents the relationship between the business and the environment
which dominates it (responsibilities)*

The economic difference between

the two is the net balance which the business desires to maximise If
positive, or minimise if negative, and which regulatory authorities
desire to minimise whatever the direction*
But these asset-flows cannot be measured by the business world
In general terms*

They oust be reduced to the unit of account**** money —

in order to be comprehensible and comparable. The translation of these
flows, for purposes of record, into monetary terms, is the accounting
process*

The result of this accounting process is formal evidence of the

size of the two flows of assets*

As such it indicates the existing

relationship between rights and responsibilities*

This latter relationship

is the starting point of control*
But this relation between asset-flows is a valid starting point
for regulation only if the recorded flow in dollar terms is identical

1
Wilson, towing, and Eutal.r, PublloUiillfer Economic..
(Th. McGraw-Hill Book Coapaajr, tow Xork, 1938,) Chapter IT.
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with the actual flow in dollar terms.

In other words the accounting

fact oust be consistent with the actual fact.

If the asset-Inflow is

understated, or the asset-outflow is overstated, the net balance of
right-responsibility indicated by the formal records will not be
representative of a true substantive relation.
Thus accounting regulation must first beware of actual fraud.
This is done by forcing the business to submit production reports,
sales reports, etc.. to enable the regulatory authority to satisfy
itself that all outflows of dollars represent inflows of assets, and
that all inflows of dollars represent outflows of assets.

By thus

correlating physical units and monetary results the controllers can
exert a considerable pressure for honesty on the part of the corporation.
The more items of income and expenditure the business must have proofs
for, the more careful they are apt to be about not distorting facts.
The economic pattern of equating rights and responsibilities
is not complete with an exposition relating to equality between the
recorded dollar facts and the actual dollar facts* An equally important
problem for the regulatory authority is to be certain that the recorded
and actual dollar facts are consistent with the economic facts purported
to be represented.

If, for example, the economic fact involved is greater

than its symbol stated in dollar terms, the business has assumed rights
in excess of Its responsibilities.

If the dollar fact as stated is

greater than the economic fact, the business has assumed responsibilities
in excess of its rights*

In the first case the business is earning
1
a profit in excess of factor—cost.
^n the second case the business

1 Boulding, Kenneth E., Economic Analysis. (Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1941*) Chapter XX.

i» net fully relmfeureing the factors used,
Stating these facto In torso* of the accounting problem
suggested above pvoNMtt :th^ fbiioMng:

^ o business is a

series of eeemetsie happenings* *o»a are favorable end seme are un1
favorable, in the profit sense.
Bet all of thee taken together
make up the business organisation) favorable happenings corresponding
to rights, unfavorable happenings corresponding to responsibilities,
these tee sets of circumstances are dual in nature.

a

a real sacrifice Is Involved,

On the one hand

On the other hand there is set up a

monetary sysbol as representative of the real scarifies.

To some

extent there Is a tendency to concentrate on the symbol to the neglect
of the substance beneath.

But the problem of regulation considered

here Is hoe to asks actual dollars (assuming they h&v® actually been
spent} correspond precisely to the flow of economic goods and services
Into the business.

In more orthodox terms this simply means that the

productive process Should be economical in the real sense rather than
merely in the monetary sense,
There are innumerable aspects of this problem.

To satisfy

them all would be to outline the entire set of ramifications of economic

1

Commons, gg, gift,. chapter V,

2 Sacrifice is used here to mean that economic resources are
to be used, which, if used in this way, cannot be put to other uses,
3 Vsblen, Thorstein, fhf Instinct of iorkmanshio. (B,W* Huebsch
Company, Ben Xork, 1918,)
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regulation*

Only the basic ones will be considered*

Perhaps ae good

a startling point ae any would be the certificate of convenience and
necessity.

This is a device which permits a business to organise or

extend its operation within the sphere of operations covered by certain
regulations*

Essentially control in this sphere aims to place an

initial check upon rights as compared with responsibilities*

*f the

applicant is ready and willing to assume responsibilities, rights will be
accorded him*

Zf there are so many rights already in the field that there

are no responsibilities remaining, rights will not be accorded the
applicant*

If, of two candidates seeking the same rights, one is more

qualified or willing to assume responsibilities equivalent to the rights
granted than the other, the former application will take precedence*

If,

after rights have been granted, the applicant begins to be lax in
a
responsibility, his rights may very well be taken from him*
This initial check is not solely for the purpose of making
business responsible to society.

It might equally be designed in a

specific situation to make society responsible to business*

If when an

applicant wishes to extend his activity with the approval of the regulatory
authorities,the authorities feel that there are not enough rights remaining
in the field without injuring rights already distributed to warrant the

1 This term, convenience and necessity, has a technical and
restricted usage in the public utility field* The connotation here implied
is much broader than this, applying to all Inclusions and exclusions that
legal authority must approve, rather than simply to ingress and egress.
2 Moeher and fifawford,
att.li.ty Ba$H3StiSB«
Brothers, 8#w Xork, 1933.) ChapterJtlXE.

(Harper and
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assumption of the particular responsibility desired, the application
will Ini denied*

this would bo tho case vhercvsr a commission refused

to grant a certificate because operations would thereby besoms
financially unprofitable*

On every occasion that supply in a given

industry is in ensues of the amount that ean be sold at cost* society
has been awarded rights in excess of its responsibilities*

Certificates

of convenience and necessity are designed to provide an initial cheek
upon all such eases where either the flow of factor-sacrlflee exceeds the
flew of eonsumer-Hsacrifice , or the flow of consumer~sacrifice exceeds the

X
flow of factor-sacrifice.

the need for a recognition by society of a

responsibility to business was much slower in developing than the
assessment of business* responsibility to society*

But the economic

pattern of regulation that ©Ur society utilises does work both ways*
A further ramification of the principle of equating real
sacrifice to dollar outlay Is closely related to accounting regulation*
Regulated businesses frequently wish to purchase new assets
bid In the assets of a competitor*
increasing the inflow of assets*
sdght happen*

or perhaps

This would have the effect of

As to outflow of assets, several things

Outflow might not be increased, or at least by as much

as the inflow was Increased*

Perhaps outflow to consumers will increase

through being able to charge higher prices in the absence of competition*
Or, finally productive efficiency might be increased so as to increase
outflow by more than the amount of increase in the inflow*
Whichever happens, rights will be increased by the asset purchase,
In the sense that the economic power of business is potentially greater*

X

Loc* sit,

the first alternative marts responsibilities are not rising in
proportion,
purchase*

Efficient regulation sill probably not permit the
the second alternative refers to an increase in monetary

responsibility, but none in real responsibility*

Efficient regulation

here else mill probably disapprove the purchase*

$he last Is represent

ative of situations, not rare, In which the monetary outflow (payment for
the asset) is not commensurate with the real asset inflow*

In such a

case the purchase will probably be allowed, but rates to consumers will
be subsequently lowered*

In all of these cases, and others could be

suggested if space permitted, regulation will select that alternative
which most nearly equates right and responsibility*

In selecting this

alternative the new result will be calculated in such a way that the
asset-inflow of domination will be equal to the asset~outflow of
submission*
Another problem that looms large in the economic pattern of
regulation, is that of securing capital*

Capital cost, with the

exception of labor in some instances, is the largest single coat of the
1
average public utility*
The reason fair return has always been such a
vital element in the theory of control is because it is important*
Regulation can only afford to neglect minor issues, and then only until
all bigger Issues are solved*

1 The normal public utility corporation must have an operating
ratio of less than 70 percent in order to make 6 percent as a fair return*
This is assuming a 12 percent capital turnover. A 70 percent operating
ratio means that capital cost is 30 percent of gross earnings*
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The cost of capital brings into focus an entirely now group
of personal —

the owners and creditors of the corporation —

otherwise members of society Itself,

who are

thus an entirely new set of

responsibilities oust be comprehended as a part of the relationship
between this group and the corporation and the consumers,

the securing

of capital produces for the corporation an immediate set of rights for
future use.

The responsibilities created are continuous* emphasising

themselves whenever payments to suppliers fall due*

If the rights

themselves grow less in value over time* the regulatory authorities
must consider, at least* limiting responsibilities likewise.

If

opportunity arises after the bargain is consummated to limit respond**
bilities* authority must make a corresponding adjustment of rights.
This would involve an adjustment of fair return.
The Implicit content of the capital bargain* then* Is not a
single set of rights and responsibilities* but two sets.

The flow of

assets into the concern must be equated to the flow of services to
consumers.

Also the flow of assets into the firm must be equated to the

possibility of a flow of payments back to the capital suppliers. These
two sets of relationships emphasize* better than any other illustration
could, the triangle of regulation, consisting of the consumer* the
owner* (and creditor)* and the business,

All three are related to each

of the others* but all relationships are indirect.

That Is one reason

for the complexity of regulation,
A very new facet of the economic pattern of regulation is the
regulation of utility expenses.

This control is not as complex as many
1
others* largely because it is more transitory or more minor.
But when

1 Minor only In the sense of being scattered rather then
concentrated into a gingle bargain* Actually it is only the more
concentrated items that have thus far warranted commission control.
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1

connected with another new set of problem# in regulation —
of intercorporate relations

that

it is of compelling significance. The

relationships here considered are not tho year to year relationship#
Comprehended by the capital and depreciation problems.

They are the

week to week relationship# involved ae the business endeavors to keep
itself supplied with the labor and material# needed for daily operations*
These too items are the items that can most properly be referred to as
"flowing11 through the business.

Together they make up about 50 percent

of a utility1s total expenses* including capital costs,

this daily

flow of services into the business process contributes to the flow of
services to consumers in a certain way.
The right of the management to stimulate this Inflow of
services is correlated with the responsibility to continue the flow through
the firm to consumers*

Several circumstances may disrupt this process.

Xn the regulation of service companies the Securities and Exchange
Commission discovered many flows into these concerns that did not

2
contribute to the servicing functions in any way.

Since the corresponding

flow to consumers was lacking* the Coma&ssion forced the withholding of
a part of the inflow.

This has been the usual treatment of non-utility
3
expenses where comslssions have Jurisdiction*

1 Concern in this field dates back to the Federal Trade
Commission investigation of holding companies, completed and published
in 1927. Senate Document 92* 70th Congress* 1st Session.
2 Kennedy* William F.* "Regulation of Utility Servicing Under the
Holding Company Act of 1935% Journal q T Land and Public Utility Economics.
Volume XVII* pp. 27-3®* February* 1911*
5 Barnes* Xrston R.* 3&S. Economics g£ Public Utility Regulation.
( F.S. Crofts and Company, New fork* 1942.) Chapter XXX.
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la addition to this possibility of divergence between fight
and responsibility, there is another important one*

a society built

around the coopetitive principle, it is initially assumed that every
bargain is a competitive one, each party to the transaction seeking to
buy as cheaply as possible or to sell as dearly as possible*

Every
JL
transaction thus is to be typified by "arms-length11 bargaining* This is

probably an illicit assumption in view of the fact that the bargaining
process comprehends competition only as to the net result*

But the

transfer from this view to the position that competition is a silent
partner in each isolated transaction could not have been avoided in the
type of society postulated*

But in every transaction that results in an
a

inflow not justified by the outflow, regulation is intended to intercede*
One more facet of the economic pattern of regulation will be
noted —

service regulation*

The quality of service furnished by a

utility is a function of the costs to the company.

High quality must

result from high costa, and low quality must result from lower costs* For
any quality of service there is one and only one cost that will equate
rights and responsibilities*

The commission mist so control the

1 This term was popularised by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the seals of utility securities through
investment bankers who were friendly toward their clients* This is an
amicable method of defrauding that the Commission has sought to cheek
through competitive bidding of underwriting* The phrase itself, however,
has a much more universal significance*
2

Federal Power Commission vs. Natural Gas Pipeline Company,

315 C.B. 575-

n

operations of the regulated enterprise that every flow of service-quality
to consumer can to equated effectively to the proper flow of factor-costs*
^
*• " a" “ “ a *“ •
- v
regulatory Jurisdiction or actual practice*

* -” 1™ * « • * -

In addition to the above discussion of loeasuring and equating
rights and responsibilities throughout society at large there remains
the mors concrete task of presenting both in term
and the rate structure.

of the rate level

Of these two separate aspects of utility

regulation the sore significant is the rate level,

this greater sig

nificance stems from the fact that the rate level is the central meeting
point of buyer and seller.

Though not necessarily the place where

responsibilities are equated, It is the place where they must be equal,
Whatever happens behind the price charged must be reflected in the price
charged, or the happening itself has no economic significance for the
concern under consideration.
Kate structure, on the other hand, is a gross result of
business operation rather than a net result.

Errors in rate~structurs,

from a business point of view, can be compensated for by simply shifting
responsibilities.

But errors in regulation the t affect the rate level

are permanent errors, beyond repair by the expedient of shifting burdens.
Simply stated rate level regulation consists of two basic
elements.

In the first place, regulated businesses must be limited to a

degree of power consistent with the competitive ideal. In the second

1

Barnes,

clt.. chapter XXX.
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place,they must not be forced to accept a degree of power less than
the competitive ideal.

Xt is obvious, of course, that these two

requirements can be consistent with a single net operating result.
Furthermore regulation must endeavor to achieve this single result
without guaranteeing utility earnings* Earnings received by a utility
in a competitive environment are an economic phenomenon basically
related to a demand and supply situation rather than to regulation.
Only government ownership can constitute a guarantee* Since government
ownership is not here at issue, the statement that regulation cannot
guarantee earnings is a truism*
But merely stating this truism does not exhaust the subject* The
statement that government must allow a competitive return is the same
as the statement that government must guarantee earnings up to a fair
return, to the extent warranted by economic conditions. There is no
other way of viewing the injunctions of the High Court*
The above significant concept can be graphically illustrated* In
the accompanying diagram let K R represent the total possible revenues
from the various possible quantities of output shown on the 01 axis* Let
CC represent actual cost of producing various quantities of output* The

7T
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dlagrast thus illustrates what is a well known fast in public utility
eeoaesdes, that there Is a olds range «f output that can produce a revenue
in excess of oost«
The significance of this rang* of output producing a revenue
la iXMii of oust Is that it demonstrates ths non-reciprocal power
situation represented in ths sass of public utilities,

% e v y different

output that could ha sold at a profit is a degree of power that ths
utility ssn exert osar consumers*

The uneoewrea choice as to whisk

output to produce would bs determined on ths basis of ths principle of
ths greatest not domination*

ths purpose of regulation is to msk s ths

single degrea of power resulting in equality between outflow and inflow
ths <as

this result Is achieved

consumers do not make coerced choices and ths concern itself is son*
psnsatsd to precisely the sans degree that it would be if competition
rather then regulation United it to a single degree of power over the
environment,
Under the conditions illustrated the ideal output is Oif, to
be sold at price Si,

this output and price essentially defines the

precise balance that the regulatory comiseion mist strive to find as
*
♦
between output, cost, and revenue, Any output less than Ok (say €®f )
would sell for soae price between kfM

as a miniiaum, and HfT as

1 The max i m a price at which a given output can be sold, with ofc
without regulation, is defined by the ft ft curve. The nXnlnmm price a
seller would voluntarily offer to take for his goods is defined by the
G G curve.
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a maximum.

The n'lC price do®a not allow the maximum utilisation of

plant and equipment.
factors,

The H*T price permits economic rental® to the

Any output greater than OH (say 0$**) would sell for a

maximum and Minimum prise of N f%Z — * th® S* V
th® question by definition.

price being out of

A commission could not insist upon such

an output, for It would then not be allowing an economically possible
fair return.

Thus the task of the commission is always to assume as
1
full a use of facilities as is consistent with economic conditions.
But even regulated industries have depressions*

Many times a fall in

prices will strike utilities with as much force as unregulated
industries*

Such times pose the greatest problems in regulating the

rate level. This type of problem can be Illustrated in a diagram similar
to the one above

fi

4

1 Full utilisation is demanded by the fact that a public utility
is considered necessary to social welfare. Economic Conditions, of course,
refer to the relation between CC and RR, as representative of the
coordination of the rights and responsibilities Involved,
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Here there li no combination of price and quantity that will
permit the utility to recover costs*

However, since it must continue

to operate , it oust select some combination between output and price 9
the optimum output for all concerned d l l be, under the circumstances,
the output 0H«

the revenue from this output will not return costs. But

neither eill any other output#

the real virtue of OH outputf ae compared

d t h CUf* or €Rtv is that OK cornea closer to returning costs than any other
output#
Xt is quite plain in the two eases that, regardless of general
operating circumstances* there is one output preferred above all others#
Xt is the task of the Conralssion and the utility together to find that
output relative to any given situation*

Such a task Is extremely difficult,

Xt Is immediately evident that for any utility operating d t h OK
output in ease 1 and OK output in case 2, actual return is less than fair
return for the reason that the utility receives back its cost in the former
circumstance but falls short of this goal in the latter circumstance*

Ko

regulatory commission could look upon this operating result as desirable* let
it is dear that so remedy can be sought in case 2,

Thus the commission

(and the utility) must turn back to the situation in case 1#

An output

slightly lews than OK mould produce a surplus revenue that could be used to
make up the deficit in case 2,

Then actual return mould equal fair return.

The basic idea embodied in this latter approach is that of a time
dimension#

There is no abstract virtue in an equation of cost and revenue

in a particular year.

One year's operation in the life of a public utility

is but one point within a process.

One year's operation can no more be
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considered apart than an Individual can be considered outside the
totality of society*
a conception.

Indeed there is no purpose to be gained by abch

Business, to be interpreted realistically must be looked upon as

a flow, not a fund*

thus the tine dimension is a really basic fact*

The portion of the economic pattern presented above has been stated
throughout in terms of equating total rights and total responsibilities#
this analysis should help shed light upon a problem that has long confused
students of regulation —

the soas of reasonableness#

Many persons seem to

implicitly accept the view that several rate levels may be equally reasonable
for all concerned#

Between the upper level of excessive profits to the

company

and confiscation of the company's property, the commission may
1
use its own discretion as to the actual hates permitted# From our approach

It would seem that for every possible outflow there can be only one proper
inflow that will equate right and responsibility*

It may be that this

theoretical ideal is unattainable» In such a ease a sons of reasonableness
might be defined as thearea between this ideal and the nearest approach
the commission can make*

But if the equation of rights and responsibility
2
is treated as a practical matter, this definition would not be helpful#

1
D 119#

Kabbett vs, Northern Connecticut Power Company, P.U.R. 1933
there have been a number of similar cases*

2 Certainly it could not be agrees that his zone is the series of
rates between competitive price and monopoly price* The correlation between
rights and responsibilities would be wholly impossible If such a definition
were adopted* Thompson and Smith, Public Utility Economics. ( The McGrawHill Book Company, New fork, 1941#) P* 268*
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If there I* a son* of reasonableness it is legal, not economic*
Legally, sine* the courts are not supposed to substitute their judgment
for that of the commission, there nay be such a gone* although the courts
1
have made no insisiwbrGs upon this view as an economic fact*
Equally ae difficult ae the specific problems of the rate level
are those connected with the rate structure, or the internal consistency
in terms of the underlying philosophy of the rates of a utility concern*
In brief the key problem here is that of penetrating into the
indivisibility of a modern corporation deeply enough to actually allocate
costs in terms of various conditions surrounding actual operations*

It

follows that the greater the degree of indivisibility existing in the
regulated concern the more difficult is a solution to this key problem, and,
perhaps, the less likely regulation is to achieve the precision required
by the equality dimension of the underlying philosophy*
It is a well known fact that customer personnel is a variable
group*

Xt is equally well known that much property used by many regulated

concerns does not destroy itself in the service of the consumer group

1 "It cannot be assumed that any railroad corporation, accepting
franchises, rights and privileges at the hand of the public, ever supposed
that it acquired, or that it was intended to grant to it, the power to
construct and maintain a public highway simply for its benefit, without
regard to the rights of the public* But is equally true that the
corporation performing such services and the people financially interested
in its business and affaire have rights that may not be invaded by
legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the
protection of property." Smyth vs. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 545# Surely no
clearer mandate for reciprocal duties (which must be exact by definition)
could be given by a court.

X
existing at any given time.

Utility property le typically depreciated
a
on the baale of a 40 year life*
Thus it le not enough to be sore that
over this period rights and responsibilities are equal as between the
business and Its customers.

It becomes equally important to be certain

that rights and responsibilities to each 'generation* of customers are
kept equal*
A machine or any other permanent asset Is a continuing flow
of assets-in and assets-out.

the conaumar-saorifice is made more or

less regularly as long as the outflow of services continues.

The

factor-sacrifice Is made only once, when the asset is purchased*

Both

these sacrifices*, following the terminology here used, must be equal*
If the factor-sacrifiee were the result of the coneumer-saerlfice the
problem would be much simplified.

But since the factor-sacrifice is

determinate once and for all when the permanent asset is added to stoek,
consumer-saeriflce must be the derived element.

Thus each year the

outflow from and inflow to the business (that part of it directly resulting
from the fixed asset) must be equal*

If these two are equal over the

life of the asset, but unequal in certain years, then the business is
making itself under-responsible to the group of consumers over-charged,

1 Depreciable property in public utilities will represent from
#0 percent to 95 percent of total assets*
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission considers 15 percent of
total operative expenses as a representative figure in its calculations* In
many instances the percentage will be higher*

and over-responsible to the group under-charged*

It la tha function of

depreciation accounting and its control to avoid those latter injustices
X
aa much aa possible*
Bepreciation la not tha only situation in which tha two main
flows are equal, but subsidiary flows diverge.

Any business with a degree

of complexity will have different classes of customers or different types
of service*

£&eh class of customers or each type of service represents a

portion of the total asset-flow, both in and out*

actually, for exas^le,

customers are usually classified on the basis of their relationship to the
total flow*

Those having the same relationship to the total flow are
a
classed in one group and treated similarly*
but the classification itself, whether of consumer or type

of service, difficult though it frequently is, only suggests the problem
3
of pricing* Every pricing entity (consumer or commodity) is recipient
of certain contributory flows from various parts of the business enterprise
Each entity is also responsible for certain inflows from consumers. The

X For an excellent discussion of the purposes of depreciation, as
well as things which are not purposes of depreciation, see Mason, Ferry,
Principles of Public Utility Depreciation. (American Accounting Association
Chicago, 1937w The views expressed here represent a concensus of
opinion among students of regulation*
2 Ke Bates and Bate Structures» P.U*R. 1931 C, 337. This is a
discussion of the principles of customer classification* Courts,
commissions, and writers alike seem to agree that classification should
follow cost lines*
3 The problem of rate regulation proper is the problem of the rate
level* This problem under discussion here is th t of the rate structure*
This last is probably the most complex, but perhaps not the most important,
for reasons we can investigate later*
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problem of the rate structure la to devise a system of pricing that
nill relate these tee opposite flows la a more or less equitable fashion*
This la similar to but not quite identical with the depreciation problem*
the pricing complication arises because the service-flow
from asseta to services la not direct*

Bather the flow la first into

a central hopper* and from there out to the various services*

And

since the consumer-sacrifice must again be derived from the factor-sacr1flee*
the flow from the latter must be broken down Into its component parts as a
part of the pricing process* otherwise a situation of over-responsibility
and under-responsibility will arise between group® of customers*

thus this

problem arises in all cases where an asset produces a single flow of
service* which flow contributes to more than one service or class Of
1
customer. These will be called here non-allocable flows.
The regulation
problem here is to separate flows into their component parts*
The right involved here* is the right to reimbursement
for the factor-cost.

The responsibility therefrom Is a single flow* but

which culminates in several different places without ever actually
separating.

This series of subsidiary responsibilities must be made to add

up to the single sight* and be themselves equitable with relation to each
other.

This problem* of course* is much bigger than the accounting problem

1 Economists typically use the term joint cost .There is* however* a
very real difference between joint cost and non-alloeable cost. The
former implies necessity as to the production of two products simultaneously*
Both terms refer to impossibility of separation. But non-alloeable cost does
net imply the necessity inferred by the term joint-cost.

68

that produces it.

But if the problem is not m t at tha accounting

level* it can be effectively met nowhere*
Following from this analysis another confused point in
regulation any submit to partial illumination.

It is now generally

agreed among students of regulation that value of service has little
1
significance for the problem of rate regulation*
But in other
circles the concept is still current*

Where this is true cost of

service is supposed to set the lower limit to price* and value
service the upper limit.

of

If ever there were a situation that could be

defined as the area between competitive price and monopoly price* this
2
would be that situation*
As popularly interpreted value of service is
simply any point cm the demand curve for total product that is not on the
cost carve,for that particular consumer class or type of service*Any
condition of this nature* if allowed by the regulatory authorities*
gives the regulated industry several possible degrees of economic
power over consumers*

If one of these degrees of economic power equates

rights and responsibilities as between a consumer class and the utility*
none of the others can*

And it is very little help to assert that

cost of service is used in fixing the rate level* while value of service
assists in adjusting the rate structure*

the right-responsibility
3
relationship is not altered by the distinction*

1

Thompson and Smith, gp.. elt*. pp. 260 ff*

% Proman* lewis A,* Principles of Economics* (The Irwin Press*
Chicago, 1941.) Volume II* p. 329.
3 Value of service may be invoked verbally on failure to calculate
cost* This procedure Is dictated by expedience, however* and has no
substantive meaning in regulation* See »arnes.po*cit*. pp. 291*292*

Before concluding this discussion of the eeonomie pattern of
regulation a fen comments to link this chapter more closely with the
one preceding might be helpful#

Although in totality regulation

inevitably sounds quite contrary to social emphasis upon individualism,
this surface incongruity tends to disappear when related to the larger
whole*
In the preceding chapter the legal approach to property defined as
*a bundle of rights1* was accepted as satisfactory*

This definition,

however, considers the individual only in his relationship to his own
property, together with the tools used by the courts to protect property*
Individual rights and property protection are socially valid only if
placed In a substantive setting*
reason for being
were represented*

Private property would have little

an integral part of a social philosophy unless society
Sly considers private property as an entity held in

trust for society, to revert back to society if ever social purpose can
1
be served better in that way*
This statement, however, does not
define the real content of the social relationship recognised*
stantively, property is more than a bundle of rights*

Sub

It is also a

bundle of responsibilities, the alee of which society is continually
comparing with the sise of the rights-bundle.

Whenever society discovers

an inequality in the size of these two bundles that appears to be larger
than "necessary1*, an adjustment is made or attempted.

X

PTQPTty and Contract. Voluar I.
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In all of this public utilities are not unique.

their

relationship to society is fundamentally not different from the
relationship between society and any other item of private property.
But with the above economic background much of the argument of the
previous chapter should stand out more clearly.

she economic philosophy

of equal society Is the correlation of rights and responsibilities.
Wherever this task is efficiently performed by informal control, regulation
is not necessary.

At all points where there is a divergence between

the two under informal control, regulation is Indicated.
business this equality is spontaneous.
is needed to produce equality,

*n most

In public utilities regulation

through the concept of equal residual

rights the net result in both eases is identical,

thus all business, or

all property, is on precisely the same footing in t arms of both the
underlying social philosophy and the actual application of that
philosophy to individual cases.
Professor Glaeser, in his classic treatment of public
1
utilities, has presented an analysis of the theory of the origin of
separate treatment for public businesses.

He traces the peculiar relation

ship of these concerns to the public back to the feudal relationship of
2
rights and duties.

1 G I m m t , Martin G., £s414SSa SL
(Tha Hawaii1an Coapany, Hen Tork, 1927.)
2

Pp. 160

tt.

tttlUfar Eoonomlca
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1* eoncluds* therefore* that the significance
of the phrase "business effected with e public interest*4
resides net so much in the character of the industry thus
classified* as in the complex of rights and duties that
go with such dassificstion . This incites that its
importance is that of an Institutional development • The
core of it is represented by the feudal conception of
relation, shteh has been hardened into a social habit
by becoming commonly accepted, the conception* thus
generalised* has been given greater solidity and rational*
coherent form by being organised into a definite mode of
legal procedure. There was a persistent need for developing
such forms of procedure and* as a consequence* these forms
have crystallised into an institution which controls the
continued performance of the function.
It mould be more than futile to deny this relationship
between the feudal economy and capitalism.
Glaeser is well grounded.

Basically* Professor

But it does not necessary follow that the

feudal relationships were transferred only to the public utility
field*

Bather it seems implicit in the entire laissez-faire

philosophy.

It is & thesis of this dissertation that the "complex

of rights and duties" is a superficial distinguishing characteristic
of the utility enterprise* and that these rights and duties arise out
of industry itself.

Certainly it could not be agreed that the

utility concept has a universally accepted connotation.

Indeed it is

a difficult part of teaching a course in Public Utilities to define
the term. Bights and duties* in the sense presented by Professor
Glaeser —

rights and responsibilities as we have been using these

terms— - are the universal content of all business (private property)

1

P. 171.
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in our capitalistic society*

The only thing "peculiar*1 about tho

utility business is that its rights and responsibilities nsodsd
formal correlation before such correlation was necessary in other
businesses*
this chapter* like its predecessor* has presented regulation
in entrees teres*

That regulation has nowhere appeared in this form

is essentially a result of two factors*

In the first place* regulation

would have reached this point only through a process of evolution* for
only gradually could the business environment have changed sufficiently
to have necessitated the extreme of social control*

In the second place*

when the environment did necessitate near-extreme measures in terms of the
early el&ssifleatien set up by the courts* the same environment was forcing,
changes in the classificeation and resulting In a weakening of the
principle of equal residual rights*

& consequence certain issues of

regulation were compromised drastically* preventing extremes in control*
The two chapters immediately following will discuss respectively the
breakdown of the classification and the weakening of the principle of
equal residual rights*
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new approach* ttThe essence of the conception of rent is the conception
of a surplus earned by & particular part of a factor of production over
1
and above the mintmnm earnings necessary to induce it to do its work**
Squally Instructive for our purposes is Ifrs* Robinson*» explanation as
to why rent has always been so closely associated with land*

According

to her analysis the concept is reducible to a reward to the owner of
"free gifts of nature*11 these goods are free gifts in the sense that
they do not owe their existence to human effort*

therefore these gifts

need not be paid to perform their function* the most important example,
historically, of economic goods that do not need to be paid to exist, Is
2
land*
Thesc facts broadly outlined the discussion of and controversy
3
over economic rent for well over a century*
It seems advisable here to summarize a portion of Mrs* Robinson’s
treatment in order to secure a clearer grasp of the total rent picture,
4
before proceeding into its corollaries*
The first requisite for the
existence of eeonosdo rent is an inelastic supply for the factor under

1

Ibid,* p. 102*

2 Mrs. Robinson continues as followst "But the conception of rent
has often been too closely interwoven with the conception of land*
Particular units of factors of production which belong to the other three
broad categories, labor, entrepreneurship, and capital, may also earn rent,”
3 For an orthodox treatment of rent as a concept applicable to the
land factor, see Froman, £2 * cit.. Volume IX, chapter XXIV*
4 Op * cit** chapter VIII* This summary follows Mrs. Robinson’s
analysis quite closely* No attempt has been made to be original*

W

Consideration.

If It la to be had in whatever quantities desired at

the sane price, it is in perfectly elastic supply, and no rent will be
earned.

Suppose, for example, individuals would be willing to work any

amount for $3 per day, and that at a lower wage no one would work at all.
the wage rate could not rise above #3, because no entrepreneur would
offer more*

the
wage rate could not fall below $3,w or the economic
*

machine would stall completely.

Thus every unit of the labor factor would

be receiving enough, and Just enough, to keep it at work, and no rent
1
would be paid.
On the other hand, suppose that more work is to be had in a
given industry only at the price of higher wages,

hat us assume that

100 amre workers would be available at every $1 per week increase in the
wage ratei 1,000 men would be available at $21 per week} 1100 at $22 per
week} etc*

If wages were to rise from $21 to $22, everyone who was

previously contented with $21 would be receiving a *free gift", or a
“surplus* over and above that necessary to keep him at work.

This rent

arises from the inelasticity of the supply of labor, or the fact that new
units hired cost more and the price of previous units
reason.

rises for this

It makes no difference to the theory whether the new units cost

1 Mrs. Robinson uses capital as her example, rather than labor. She
gives as the reason why interest will never rise above $$ in her
illustration, that at a higher rate a veritable flood of savings would be
thrown on the market, forcing the price down, this Is not implicit in
her assumptions, nor is it necessary to complete the picture. It is
sufficient that no entrepreneur would hire capital at a greater price. If
he did there would be a rent.
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a n t k w u iM ttq r u * ] » u * f f le l* n t , o r boeauao th .y are aoro
•m “ “
are hired.

“

“

*“ "* “ “

“ ■ •«" * “

“
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It it at once apparent that tha conception of rout here
defined la capable of two vary different interpretations or applications*
It sight rafar to tha total economy

JL*&# how much whole factors of

production receive over and above necessary eoata ($300,000 par year
say ha necessary for a single top executive as long a# thara ara numerous
other #300,000 a year executives located elsewhere.

But tha whole group

taken together could be cut materially without destroying these valuabla
services).
economy —

Or It might rafar to the paymnts made to one segment of tha
!..£• how much fractions of faatora receive in excess of that

required to keep than in this particular segment of the economy,

^he

first necessitates defining the costs that are essential to keeping a
given factor at work* the second necessitates defining the costs that
ara essential to jceeplnfi a part g£ a given .factor, at wor^ where

ig,.

The former poses tha problem of distribution3 the latter tha problem of
regulation.

It la this last connotation that is relevant to present
2
purposes, and which will be the primary concern from this point.

1 Sea
in this work
to a unit of
is in excess
occupation.”

Beulding, op. £&., pp.229 ff* The definition of rent given
is as follows* "Economic rent may be defined as any payment
a factor of production* in an industry in equilibrium* which
of tha minimum necessary to keep that factor in its present

2 Mrs. Robinson*e treatment stops short of the application of rent
to regulation. It is at this point that the present work hopes to shed
new light upon tha relationship between government and industry*

17

These latter application* of rent theory can best be appreciated
in tern* of opportunity cost*.

In an economy a* complex a* ours*

virtually no factor of production has a single use*

The versatility

of a factor, in fact, is measured in terms of the number of alternatives
for occupation that it has*

Non-specialised factors have many of these

alternativesi specialised factors have fee alternatives*

In a capital**

istie society the owner of every factor le desirous of employing each
unit of ownership in the most profitable of the available possibilities*
H

must follow that no unit of a factor will work in one capacity, if It

could better itself in another capacity*

Thus the necessary cost of any

productive unit is that just necessary to keep it from transferring its
services to another segment of the economy*

These costs are the necessary

payments made to all agents contributing to a given production and are
1
called opportunity costs*
however, there is no magic relationship between necessary payments
to factors and actual payments*

The contract between the factor and the

entrepreneur is a product of bargaining, and nothing is a bargain if it
could be gotten cheaper*

With this qualification, opportunity or necessary

costs represent only the minimum that will be voluntarily accepted by the
factor*

The actual payment will be worked out according to the relative

bargaining strength of the contesting parties*

Whatever the factor

receives in excess of necessary payments ~~ which will be measured

1 Gemmlll, Faul F., Fundamentals of flconomicB.
Sew fork, 1939*} Third Edition, pp* 390 If*

(ttarper and Brothers,

n
by the quality of the next lowest alternative —

is ft free gift, so

to speak, or economic rent; that which could be dispensed with
completely without injuring economic effectiveness,
the potential amount of the economic rent depends upon the
else of the bargaining area,

this in turn is a function of the margin

between the two beet alternatives*

If the margin is wide, a factor with

much bargaining power can retain a substantial surplus; if the margin
is narrow the maximum surplus will be small,

%

the ease of Edgar Bergen,

margins are probably wide — - alternatives defined as "with* McCarthy
cosqpared to "without* McCarthy,

this may present the alternatives

unfairly, but the issue can be clearly seen,
in small margins,

the ordinary workman deals

that is, the amount he can get from one Industry is not

far different from that which he might get from some other industry
requiring about the same skill — * assuming he could get another job,
which factor might be an important limiting consideration,
Further analysis requires additional terminology*

Earnings
1
equivalent to opportunity costs will be called transfer earnings, since
they ere the lowest possible earnings that can be paid to the factor
without its transferring its services elsewhere.

Each unit of production

receiving no excess over transfer earnings may be said to be at the
margin of transference, since any reduction of earnings would result in
actual transference • The actual receipts of any unit of a factor will be

1 This termi^j|ogy is suggested in Henderson, H,D,, Supply and
Demand, (Hareourt,Trace and Company, New Tork, 1922,) Pp, 94 ff. See
also Robinson, p£, cit,. p, 104*
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called actual earnings, as distinct from transfer earnings. Each unit
receivimg more than transfer earnings will bo called an intrawflarginal
unit, as distinct tram tha unit at the margin of transference, which
unit will be known aa the marginal unit*

Finally, since inira~®arginal

units may represent aa infinite variety of eases, the term degree sL
intra-aargin&lneaia eilX be employed to designate such difference*
Immediately, it can be seen that there is a unique relationship
between capitalism and economic rent*
maviarising returns#

bargaining la for the purpose of

The essence of capitalism is the bargaining process*

Thus every unit of a factor is most vitally interested in the greatest
net returns*

Met returns has the same conotation here that it has in

economic terminology ~~ gross receipts minus cost of output* Cost of
X
output to a unit of a factor of production is its transfer earnings*
Since this is a constant amount at any given time, net returns is equivalent
to actual earnings minus transfer earnings*

Economic rent, therefore, is

identical with net returns, and will henceforth be used In place of the
latter term.

Reduced to essentials, economic rent is the amount that

every unit of a factor seeks to maximise in the bargaining process*
Economic rent can now be presented in a slightly different
light*

Transfer earnings represent the nearest approach to the concept

sometimes referred to as real sacrifice*

The excess of actual earnings

over transfer earnings is a "free gift." In the terms already discussed

1
This refers to a unit of a factor within an industry, rather than
to an entire factor* The latter analysis could be made in similar terms#
but its essential features are sufficiently distinct to warrant its
exclusion at this point*

so

at some Xength, actual earnings can ba thought of as related to
individual rights; while the real sacrifice represented by transfer
earnings can be considered the social responsibility implicit In a
given bargain,

Economic rent is aa excellent monetary measure of the

excess of right over responsibility or vice versa.
This principle of rent maximization is quite an in^ortant
corollary of our economic system.

It is, for exaa^le, anticipated that

a factor sill be Interested in minimising responsibilities and maximizing
rights.

Such an approach is the basic content of free bargaining in a

capitalistic system.

It has long been recognized that a firm endeavors

to generate a maximum output with a minimum input,
general substance as the equivalent statement —
a mini aim of responsibility.

This has the same

a maximum of right with

But the firm and buyers represent only one

side of the bargaining process, the output side,

%

the other side stands

the factor or factors that represent input, in a similar relationship to
the firm.

Our analysis of economic rent broadens the bargaining principle

of maximization.to include all business relationships (transactions).
With the outline thus nearly completed, a restatement of the
business process should be instructive.

Free enterprise contemplates a

struggle between the various bargaining units

the prize being a

wariness amount of net Income as compared with other units,

These bargaining

units determine their own size and extent on the basis of profitableness.
Buyers, as bargaining units, are virtually coiqpelled to play alone.

There

are certain fundamental reasons why some business units or some factor
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X
units tend to grow largo more rapidly or slowly than others.

But,

regardless of also or extant, ovary bargaining unit has but one

2
over-all aim —

to maximize economic rent*

Tha firm, In bargaining with

buyers, casks to maximise total rent accruing to it; while the factors, In
bargaining with tha firm, seek to maximize an individual portion of this
economic rant*

Tha strongest unit retains the largest share of the rent* Tha

weakest unit retains the smallest share*

(It might be well to bear in mind

for future reference that strength may be a function either of else or of
a peculiarly favorable situation)*

The over-all summation of rights and

responsibilities are disposed of in this way*

The strongest emerge with the

largest share of the individual rights; while the weaker emerge with
responsibilities*

The economic setting of regulation becomes the size of the

bargaining area and the relative strength of the opposed bargaining units*
Zt is now necessary to revert back to the generalized theory
of economic rent that is the hub of the argument in this chapter.
Brs* Robinson has very carefully pointed out that H ... if the supply
curve of a factor, drawn up on these principles, is perfectly elastic to
an industry we shall know that none of the units contained in it are
3
earning rent from the point of view of that industry”* It is of much

1 These are the advantages of large scale production* For a
fuller description see Jones, Eliot, £&a grggt Problem i& J&a United States.
(The * « u i m Company, Hew Xork, 19227}
2 Since It is highly undesirable to confuse the issue with the
highly controversial consumer's surplus, no analysis will be made of economic
rent for the consumer* Such an analysis would belong more properly to the
larger problem of distribution*
3 Sel* eit** p. HO*

aa

mere than academic importance to aphasias thla fact.

For It follows

from the present analysis that any correlation between rights and
responsibilities must hinge upon sons relationship analogous to
elasticity of supply for the factors of production*
Perfect elasticity of supply means essentially that every unit
of factor affected is equally free to adjust itself to a new situation*
To the individual firm, elasticity of supply means a horizontal supply
curve for the factor, which In turn means that every added unit costs
1
the same as the preceding unit, and is equally efficient*
For the factor,
elasticity of supply means that the next best alternative Is an equivalent
one, both in terms of reward and in terms of output*

In both these cases

all factors directly concerned encounter no obstacles in adapting them-*
selves to a new dynamic situation*
Imperfectly elastic supply, on the other hand, connotes precisely
the opposite*
efficient*

For the firm, added units of a factor cost more or are less

The same phenomenon, stated from the viewpoint of the factor

considered, refers to leaving situations of Increasingly higher reward*

In

other words, whether considering the firm or factor, alternatives have become
separated, leaving a bargaining area between separate alternatives, which
area meand economic rent*
It is essential to the economic principle that opportunity
costs should tend to equalize*

Unequal opportunities, viewed by a factor

of production, are the impulse to shifts in employment by factors, the
shift being from a situation of smaller profitableness to one of greater

X

Ibid** pp. 107 ff.
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1
profitableness*

In the process of this movement, the profitable

opportunity will become less profitable, while the unprofitable one
will become more profitable.

The movement will stop only when all

opportunities are equally profitable*

The economic principle in these

terms states that a factor of production will distribute itself among
the various possible alternatives, until one more unit could be hired
a
in any one of these alternatives it being a matter of complete indifference
which alternative is selected*
From the standpoint of economic rent this equalisation of
opportunity costs has a real significance*

In the first place any

factor would necessarily be in perfectly elastic supply, since an
entrepreneur adding to output could draw one factor from each alternative
employment, and therefore at the same price*

By definition there would

be no difference between these factors in reward. Therefore they would
3
all be available at the same price*
Thus no economic rent would be paid*
And not only would every unit of all factors find their equilibrium, but
dynamic changes would find each factor equally able to adjust itself to
the new conditions*
Immediately the important qualification of the theory of
opportunity cost equalization becomes apparent*

1

Gemmill, op. cit., pp. 391-392.

2

Knight, op* cit** pp. 83 ff*

The theory rests upon

3 It might be urged that these factors from different employments,
though receiving the same reward, have efficiencies differently adapted
to the new employment, Certainly this is possible* But to advance the
argument is simply to add a qualitative difference to a quantitative
problem* Ho essential damage is thereby done to the theory of the
bargaining area advanced here. The problem only becomes more complicated*
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an assumption of complete and perfect mobility of the factors of
production,

both in terms of reward and in terms of efficiency* This

mobility of the factors makes economic rent impossible.

To the extent

that there are obstacles to factor shifts, or opportunity cost equalization,
eeonomle rent can and will exist*
All of this can be partially clarified by illustration* Pipe
lines for petroleum and petroleum products have typically been highly
profitable*

During the recent depression many of them were earning 20

or 30 percent on invested capital, while other agencies of transportation
were going bankrupt*

The reason for this anomaly is that the alternatives

facing one who has oil to transport are not at all close to one another*
Shipping by pipe line is cheaper than the next best alternative, whether
the pipe line earns 6 per cent or 23 per cent, these percentages giving
a rough index of the large bargaining area existing In the o H trans
portation field*

Whatever capital receives In the pipe line industry in

excess of what it would receive elsewhere, is economic rent*
The pipe line industry well illustrates the fact that divergence
between the quality of alternatives, gives rise to an economic rent to
the factor most favorably situated*

This industry also illustrates why

factors do not move to wipe out the differential*
specialised commodity.
handle all business*

A pipe line is a very

Between two points one line is usually enough to
If one line can earn profits of 50 percent, while

two lines would only earn a profit of one percent, the situation is not

1

Knight, gg, cit*. pp.81*2

as
i

on* that can be remedied by factor movements .

Xt seems desirable to translate this illustration into the
terminology introduced earlier.

Capital Invested in the pipe line

industry has transfer earnings of, let us say 5 percent, to the extent
2
that this capital eomss to earn more than 5 percent, It becomes
intra-aarginal, The degree of intra-marginalness is the bargaining area
beteeen the capital owners and oil shippers.

To the extent that the

capital owners have a maximum of bargaining strength, they receive all
of the rent,

A substantially different situation is quite conceivable.

To the extent that the over-all situation permits faetor adjustments,
alternatives will become continuous again.

Otherwise the inelasticity

involved will be permanent rather than temporary.
At this point again, it should be instructive to refer to
pure competition, and its relationship to the equation of rights and
responsibilities.

Under pure competition all factors* as well as all

individual firm demand curves, would be characterized by perfect elasticity.

1 Xt is very important to realize that in our financial society
the capitalization process serves to close those gaps in the continuity of
alternatives * However, the gap cannot be closed without giving rise to an
economic rent, which Is the item capitalized in the prodess of revaluation.
2 Xa actual practice this excess will be capitalized in the
capital market. Here it is sufficient to note that In a particular
case capitalization is not a true "process11, but simply an occurence. That
is, it does not take place over a period of time, but all at once. This
is the main reason why rents are difficult to contend with in regulation.
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Perfect mobility of productive factors would eliminate economic
inelasticity end equal!so opportunity costs*

Every unit of a factor

of production would be at the cvargtn of transference* m

unite would

bo intra~»arginal, Actual rewards would represent real economic
a&criflco ( In ao far aa a sacrifice can bo measured in monetary tome),
I
and the cost to the consumer would bo the true economic cost involved*
Xt Is now possible to demonstrate more fully the essential
nature of the bargaining area uncovered by dynamic economic change*
relationship between a factor and a firm is a power relationship*

^he

Each

endeavors to exert a maximum degree of eecmosde power over the other*
Under pure competition* this would still be their goal*

But under pure

competition* with all that is implied by that term* each bargaining unit
would be faced with only one possible degree of power* equalised
opportunity costs*

This one degree of economic power would be precisely

that degree that would equalise right® and responsibilities* (transfer
earnings end actual earnings}*
The condition of "equilibrium" for economic units can be
stated broadly as follows! no bargaining unit that is in position to
decrease its economic power* has an Incentive to do $0$ while no unit
that has an incentive to Increase Its economic power* is in position to
do so*

That generalised statement can cover every situation* whether

economic rent exists or not*

1

Knight* £&.

But the purely oospetitlve situation* and

PP* 76 ff*
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that desirable if equalising rights and responsibilities Is important*
must be stated more oarefully,

Classical equilibrium for the bargaining

unite in the economy contemplates a situation in which the degree of
power exercised by the unit Is identical with the decree of power it
«ue* be allowed if it is to remain at verb* ...that isf any decrease In
the eeencnie power it escorts (its reward) would necessitate a shifting
employment* Whenever this statement and the above generalised statement
do not say precisely the sane thing# rights and responsibilities are not
equal*
Obviously say bargaining area is Inconsistent with the shore
formulation*

As has been indicated previously* the existence of snore

than one degree of economic power In the hands of a bargaining unit Is
1
incompatible with equality in society*
in so far as regulation has in
aind enforcing equality it will operate to remove from bargaining units
this bargaining area*

Ihis will entail abolition of economic rent* which

in turn can be accomplished only by doing away withesonomio inelasticities *
Economic inelasticity and economic power are virtually eyncaimasMis
terms*

But this power may spring iron taro different sources,

first# it may

com© from an inelasticity that* aa far as the factor itself la concerned*
just happens*
the factor*

Second* it nay be an inelasticity deliberately planned by

If the inelasticity is planned* the planning factor will

maneuver itself into a position enabling itself to receive It*

Xf the

1 The classic treatment of this subject is
SSi flggEto
by Henry George* (Sterling Publishing Company* Hew York* 169k*) George*
however* carrier his reform suggestions to Impossible (and illogical)
extremes*
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allow competition f u H opportunity to adjust to dynamic change In
1
all areaa at the same time or in equal proportion. These
Inelasticities operate to convey to some bargaining units an un
warranted degree of economic power over others.

Regulation was conceived

to destroy this privileged relationship in favor of equality*
In concluding this phase of analysis of the public utility
concept, a final definition of inelasticity, following lines previously
suggested, will be offered as an analytical tool.

An inelasticity in

the eeonony le any condition, orset of conditions, wherein a dynamic
change permits one bargaining unit to substantiallyalter the quality
of alternatives facing another unit or group of units*

To the extent that

the operation of the dynamic change uncovers Inelasticity, its result is
economic rent, which is the quantity that bargaining unite desire to

a

maximise, and which regulation endeavors to minimise.
A relation of this analysis specifically to public utilities
resolves Itself Into a discussion of the economic characteristics of
utilities*

A moat common attribute by various writers is that of
3
furnishing an indispensable service. Economists are much more careful

1 The situation is this more complex than it is frequently
understood to be* Hote this statement by Wilson, Herring, and Eutsler,
o p * cit** p* 94t ”Since public utilities generally operate under conditions
of monopoly, any given public utility Is free to fix the rates for its
product or service at the point that will yield it the largest net profit •”
2 See Thoapson and Smith, pe> cit*. p. $6.
. * The significant
factor surrounding public utilities has been the inperfect operation of
economic forces, thereby giving the utilities an excessive amount of economic
power over those obliged to bargain with them*”
3 Jones and Blgham, Public Utility Regulation. (The Macmillan
Company, New fork, 1931*) Pp. 62 ff.

bqw

than formerly in the use of this term because It has no universal

meaning,

In fact it has no meaning at all without quite arbitrary

definitions and distinctions.

What is meant by the tern indispensable, the

writer believes, is that the real quality of alternatives can be altered
by certain dynamic changes.

*f the price of electricity in a city were t©

be suddenly doubled, the quality of alternatives for the population would
be seriously altered.
sharply.

Some would be forced to curtail their comsurspiion

This would be a definite hardship to almost any user*

Others

would cut down on other things, which curtailment would likewise be a
hardship*

In other words control over a basic service gives the

controller degrees of economic power, not consistent with the responsi
bilities he has assumed*

The inelasticity involved centers in the fact that

the transfer alternative is widely separated from the present alternative,
leaving the dependent units under the control of the independent unit within
the bargaining area thus left*
Clearly "indispensability of service11 could not stand alone
as a justification for regulation,

Probably no one would gainsay that the

service performed by soft drinks in a city is indispensable, Xf all
soft drinks were denied persons in the city, or the price were summarily
doubled, the population would probably consider Itself ill-treated*
Certainly the quality of their alternatives would be substantially
altered*

But, contrary to the case of electricity, no bargaining unit by

itself can thus control the quality of alternatives.

The independent units

in this case have no power to widen the bargaining area between the transfer
alternative and the actual alternative for the dependent units.
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Both of the above cases can be compared with the manufacture
and sale of the "yo-yo”# Even if control of this entire activity
were centered in one bargaining unit, society would not be likely to
interfere.

If "yo-yos11 were suddenly taken completely off the market

the alternatives of people could not be said to be substantially altered#
The same would be true of any Industry making a contribution to the
economy that is not considered particularly significant by the individuals
who take advantage of it#
An allied concept frequently advanced describing the public
1
utility is the privilege of eminent domain,
Eminent domain is the
right conferred by the state to limit condensation for a piece of needed
property to a reasonable amount#

This power is not limited to use in

helping public utilities, but extends to any function that the state
wishes to perform and in which the state has jurisdiction#
Important in the utility field#

It is quite

Suppose a utility needs a particularly

advantageous water site# The owner has placed a price of $10,000 on
the property, while transfer earnings (opportunity cost) are $5,000#
This owner, as a bargaining unit, is definitely in a position here to
alter substantially the quality of alternatives of the utility#

The

bargaining area represented by this quality of alternatives is the area

1 Ames vs. Union Pacific Bailway Company, 64 Fed# I65. Eminent
domain can logically be shown to be subsidiary to the public utility
concept itself*
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between $5 #000 and $10,000*
economic rent.

this difference in money amounts is

Eminent domain (regulation) in this situation will

equalise transfer earninga and actual earnings, thus destroying economic
rent and equating bargaining poser between units.
It ia frequently observed that public utilities are natural
1
monopolies.
A natural monopoly is a business so constructed economically
that it is impossible to operate it aa a competitive enterprise,
definition of itself is not selective as between businesses.

this

All

businesses have some characteristics that tend toward expansion. But most
of these are not public utilities.

In the broad sense, therefore, natural

2
monopoly is only a matter of degree.
can be used selectively.

But in the narrow sense, the term

The more narrow definition contemplates only

that situation wherein a resource is used that la limited by nature. In
this category could be listed city streets, water supply, dams, etc. This
characterisation of the public utility as compared with the private
business is only another way of defining regulation in terms of the
protection of alternatives.

A city desires to inaugurate a utility service.

There Is only one suitable location for certain of the necessary
appurtenances.

The unregulated control over alternatives by the bargaining

1 Dorau, Herbert, Materials for the Study of Public Utility
Economics. (The Macmillan Company, Hew fork, 1930.) P. 188.
2 Triffin, Robert, Monopolistic Competition and General
Equilibrium Theory. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1940.)

utility would permit of various degrees of power.

For the population

tho alternatives uncovered by a rise in prieo would be to do without
the service or do without the things that equivalent money would
purchase.

Either alternative is qualitatively much inferior to the

lower price*

The bargaining area (sons of inelasticity) is the

difference between the no-profit pries and monopoly price*

Monopoly

profits are the economic rents that regulation desires to eliminate*
This elimination takes the form of identifying the actual alternatives
with the transfer alternatives —

thus equating rights and responsibilities

by moving the bargaining unit to the margin of transference.
It is further contended that utilities are regulated because
1
competition is ruinous, forcing rates down to unremunerative levels*
Unremunerative levels, economically speaking, simply mean levels below
opportunity eost for the several factors.
to the capital factor.

This applies particularly

But whichever factor is forced to receive

rewards lower than transfer earnings, It Is contributing to society in
greater proportion than society can claim as a right against the factor•
In such a case the right-responsibiliiy divergence is opposite to the
usual relationship, society rather than the factor receiving the economic
rent.

But poorly paid factors are, in one important sense, just as

much a legitimate cause for concern in society as overcharged consumers.
Thus regulation has a similar social function to perform in both cases*

1

Jones and Bigham, ££. s4i.f pp. 70 ff.
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The above suggestions should indicate in part why utilities
were selected for regulation before other businesses*
is somewhat store subtle than usually recognized*

But the reason

the fact that

regulated industries are frequently service industries rather than
X
producers of commodities is not significant in and of itself* What
is important is that the closer the relationship between the producer and the
consumer the more apparent is the unfairness connected with economic rents*

2
So more is it significant that the product is locally consumed.

This,

incidentally, is by no means universally true, except in so fay as this
is merely a restatement of the fact that services are in general regulated
before goods.

The significant fact is that technical conditions make

transportation difficult, and decreasing cost factors will virtually
3
dictate market, saturation with a single firm — thus producing a
monopoly.

The statement that the products of regulated Industry are
4
highly standardized, also, is by no means universally true (e»g* the
radio industry),

Again the more subtle significance of standardisation

is that discrimination is easily visible without service (cost) differences,

1 Cooke, M*X»,, Public Utility Regulation*
Company, Sew Xork, 1924*1 Pp. 16~17*
2

(The Ronald Press

Doran, op* cit** p. 186,

3 Economies has run into much difficulty by not consistently
defining a market. Here a market will be defined as a homogeneous group
of customers. Thus a market is the competitive area. Stated in this way
a market and the cost conditions of industry take on a more correlate
meaning than is sometimes given to them,
4

Dorau, op. cit*. p* 187*

n

but hard to detect where qualitive differences are also present*
the economic inelasticities that surround the utility
industry are the basic justification for regulation to equate rights
and responsibilities*

All of these inelasticities are but

manifestations of one principal inelasticity that basically patterns
all others*

This sane inelasticity is present In all Industries in

varying degrees*

This inelasticity is that of capital structure* Public

utilities have a very low capital turnover, estimated by the University
1
of Illinois, Bureau of Business Research at 0*127*
This turnover
fraction means that the annual gross income of an average utility is
one-eighth of its capital investment*

This might be compared to the

retailing business, for example, whose annual gross Is three times
capital investment*
basically fixed*

This capital structure in the utility industry is

This fixity is at one and the same time its inelasticity*

Tor once invested it cannot be invested elsewhere, or increased without
substantial other adjustments*

The difference between the actual value

of the investment and its opportunity cost is the bargaining area between
the utility and the rest of the economy, the area within which actual
returns may fluctuate without causing the specific item of capital to be
removed.

This area may be positive or negative, advantaging the factor

!> standard financial Ratios for the Public Utility Industry.
(University of Illinois, Orbana, Illinois, 1929*)

or society.

Bat in both oases its regulation status is the same*
In substance, however, it seems advisable to distinguish

between these two possibilities.

In prosperous times the economic

rent is positive, favoring the factor• Here the inelasticity revolves
around the fact that capital goods cannot be increased immediately, that
some strategic location may already be taken, and that the business
operates according to a principle of short-run decreasing costs.

In

depression years actual earnings may fall substantially below transfer
earnings.

But since capital can not be moved for technical reasons,

the result is relatively permanent losses.
But, whether times be bad or good, the business as a
bargaining unit must concern itself with making every individual transaction
contribute a maximum amount toward net returns,

the potential contribution

of an Individual transaction to net returns has no automatic relationship
to the partial right and responsibility involved.

Inelasticities in the

economic structure make it possible to claim as a right against one buyer
as contrasted with another, higher charges than could be justified by a
1
definition of the social responsibility involved,
Although the above analysis is stated in terms of capital
inelasticities almost exclusively it is implicit that inelasticities

1 Professor J.H.Clark has furnished a full-length treatment of the
problem of capital inelasticity, the Economics of Overhead Costs,
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923,)
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pertaining to human beings directly are equally conteiaplated.

The

economic environment and the criteria of success are such that the
most effective individual adjustment ie frequently a highly specialised
adaptation.

Social dynamics can just as quickly produce positive or

- negative rents in this as in the capital situation.

When it does an

inequality results that society nay or may not take it upon itself to

<Mrrect.
This subject of inequalities between human beings apart
from the external environment, of course, opens up & wide field for
discussion.

The social philosophy of America, even in its more extreme

forms, does not postulate absolute human equality.

In fact the working

out of the philosophy in practice takes extensive advantage of the
existence of inequality,

ffoat is postulated, however, is an environment

in which natural inequalities would be made commensurate with the
assumption of offsetting responsibilities • As capitalism developed the
environment lost much of this quality.

As a consequence of this

environmental development the adjustment to the regulatory problem had
to take cognisance of the human counterpart to what has been here
discussed in terms of capital inelasticity.
The above detailed discussion of economic rents resulting
from inelasticities has several ramifications that are of importance?
here.

It is obvious that the fact of specialisation in the eoononywboth

human and capital —

and the existence of great aggregations of capital

n
*ere net instantaneous in appearance, but developed to their present
status through a long process of evolution,

thus it is not surprising

that the development of regulation has been gradual, in the sense of
merely heaping abreast of changes in the environment, As a consequence
regulation has slowly been intensified until in certain oases it represents
a very high degree of control*
The relationship between rents and regulation also makes it quite
clear that utilities are today not the only businesses that have characteristics
aaJcing for a need of regulation*

Most businesses are specialised and

represent large aggregations of capital.

The differences between businesses

from the standpoint of control becomes one of degree only, rather than
being capable of statement in the extreme terms once used by the courts*
▲ further io^ortaat ramification is that regulation as formal control
is a process of equalising differentials in power throughout society (reciprocal
power) in the face of the growth of a society of organizations rather than a
society of individuals as was originally presumed. Men are today relatively
less in competition with men; relatively more in competition with groups*
Most of the regulation of the past fits into a category that may
properly be called negative regulation, or taking away rights*

In the

environment from which the social philosophy of individualism arose It was
taken for granted that every individual would make his choices from
opportunities some of which were favorable. Thus regulation developed to
bring about equal treatment of Individuals by certain businesses and to
prevent inequalities from arising, through profiteering*

It is easy to see,
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however, that specialization and all that is implied by the term could
conceivably develop to the point where all opportunities available are
unfavorable ae defined by the philosophy.

An excellent exasple of

this is a period of depression during which large groups of people are
unable to find esploysient and hence are unable to be Tindividuals'.

In

order to deal with cases of this sort a positive regulation has developed.
these

various ramifications, in addition to illustrating

In part how environjaental changes have forced a modification of phase X
in the history of regulation, also serve to indicate in part the direction
that this modification has taken.

With the breakdown of the original

classification of industries, regulation has been forced to develop
subsidiary classifications the net result of which is to assure degrees of
regulation commensurate with degrees of. departure from social Ideals. In
a later chapter the nature of these subsidiary classifications will be
delineated.
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CHAPTER XV
CAPITALIZATION AND REGULATION

Specialization in the economy is only one of the nays
the environment of capitalism has developed to make unrealistic the
original adjustment to the problem of regulation.

The other principal

nay in which this has secured has been through the development of the
capitalisation process.

The environmental changes that have taken

place as a result of the perfection of this process have had their
primary effect, not upon the scope of regulation as In the case of
specialisation, but upon the extent of regulation.
It will be recalled from chapter XI that the limit to the
extent of regulation was in large part set by the Constitutional
provision of just compensation.

Just compensation itself turned out to

be simply the competitive return or fair return.

If the norm of

coBgfetition is attained, it was presumed, no one would be confiscated
in the sense of losing by government dec ree the right to choose a degree
of economic power consistent with the reciprocal power called for by
the ideal.

In this chapter a reexamination of the concept of confiscation

will be undertaken, a reexamination made necessary by developments in
the economy over the last 100 years.
So many of our legal relationships are shrouded by the
fiction of the corporate personality that we frequently fail to understand
just who it is that is confiscated by an unreasonably low rate
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1
level*

It ie not th« business entity itself that Is wronged*

to

have suits brought by and against business concerns nay fit the
technical requirements of a judicial system, but it is a far cry
from the dignity of the human personality upon which we pride ouh~
selves*

Rather it must be recognised that individuals only can be

confiscated*

If equality has any meaning in a democracy, individuals

must be compared with individuals rather than with a ledger of accounts
receivable and accounts payable *
Granting that individuals are the confiscated unit, it is
next pertinent to inquire what it is they possess that Is of value and
that the law seeks to protect*

Again, it is not the business*

An owner

may find satisfaction in the prestige of ownership and control but it has
never

been either the explicit or the implicit purpose of philosophy

to guarantee this particular satisfaction*

The choice as to whether or

not to become an owner of a business does not center around the legal

2
protection of executive authority*

In a legal system where free will and

choice are basic, an individual cannot be wronged by society in a
3
relationship that society does not sponsor*
Thus injury must follow
philosophy*

1 In one of his first opinions as a Supreme Court Justice, Justice
Black formally rebels against considering the corporation as a person. See
the dissenting opinion, McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co*, 302 0*3, 419* This
extreme position is, of course, unnecessary to realistic understanding of
the human problem involved*
2 The right to be "boss* of a business has no legal value* Wo business
man has an exclusive right to his authority* All business relationships, even
in a democratic society, are entered into with a congenital infirmity —
subject to control by government in the public interest*
3 Even if power were the motivating force, an unreasonable return
is no necessary deterrent* A railroad executive, for example, is not sub
stantially Injured by the fact that his road does not make a fair return*

lot

The constitutional limitation of regulation is protection
of property.

If the property of individual participators in a business

enterprise is act the business as such, shat is it?
investment.

And what is an investment?

It is simply an

It is a claim*

£a his epochal

book Hature of Capital and Income. Professor Fisher does considerable
1
damage to reality by considering things of value to be physical assets*
Hhen the Stream Court changed its interpretation of value from "use^value”
to *exchange-valuert it effectually destroyed the significance of physical

a

objects as a source of value*
The creation and usage of claims to facilitate industrial
expansion was an inevitable concomitant*

Increasing per capita wealth and

income were contemporary with a more and more elaborate division of
labor in society.

This minute and technical division of labor necessitated

a highly developed exchange mechanism.

This mechanism has more and more

trended toward a type of market in which physical goods seldom appear,
3
but in their stead claims to ownership of goods are transferred*
The most obvious result of the widespread usage of claims has
U
been the divorce of the ownership of goods and the control of goods*

1

(The Macmillan Company, New fork, 1923*) P« 68.

2 The change of approval by the high court was parallel to a similar
trend in academic economic circles* bee McCracken, H.l#, Value Theory and
Business Cycles* (The Falcon Press, 1933,) Book IX, Part 1,
3

Boulding, op. cit., chapterXV.

4 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and PrivateProperty*
(Commerce Clearing House, Hew fork,1932.)

&t fact, this phenomenon, from the standpoint of financial
efficiency, Is ths principal advantage of the exchange of claims*
Furthermore this fact furnishes a basic definition of a claim, to
aid in further analysis of the significance of these Instruments for
regulation*

This definition of a claim 1st an instrument enabling the

transfer of the ownership of goods without a corresponding transfer of
the goods themselves.
Another accos^janying feature of the growth of finanee
capitalism was necessarily a change in the definition of property. Instead
of considering property the mere possession of a commodity, It came to be
1
thought of as the possession of a right to an income from a commodity.
At this point lies the real significance of the separation of ownership
and control of goods.

He who controls physical commodities has no

valuable rights if another has a prior claim to the income of these
coamodities.

The valuable rights accrue to the owner of the claim. Thus

the above change in the definition of property could not have avoided

2
making its appearance as claims became more and more socially significant.
To recapitulate in parts valuable ownership is not a business
but an investment . An investment is not a physical good but a claim. And,
finally, a claim is not valuable because It represents goods, but because

1 Commons, op. cit., Chapter II, gives an exhaustive treatment of
this new interpretation of property that Professor Ely did much to
popularize.
2 See Chicago, Milwaukee
13$ H.S. 413.

and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,

1G4

it represents income*
facts*

These statements are anything but isolated

Stated separately each one virtually contains the meaning of

all together*

Stated compositely they add up to one of the most

significant recent developments in economic and jurisprudential theory***
the concept of expectation*
The theory of expectations has had a rather unique history in
economic exposition*

Senior developed the term 11abstinence1* in order to

incorporate "salting*1 into economic costs*1

Later Bohm-Bawerk made the

concept sore general by expanding its use to include demand as sell as
n
supply* Specifically Bohm-Bawerk asserted that "present goods are, as a
a
rule, north more than future goods of like kind and number*'1 Since
e
*
Bohm-Bawerk Interest theory has basically followed some variation of
this theme.
3
criticism*

"Orthodox" theory accepts this approach without essential
This does not mean that there is perfect agreement among
*

theoreticians as to the precise relationship between time and production,
but only that there is substantial agreement as to the fact of this

1 Senior, William Nassau, Political Economy. This concept has
been hinted at earlier by other writers, but a full discussion awaited
Senior's treatment*
z Big, t n A U l W frftasry. SL
1091.) ** 237.
3

(Smart's Translation, London,

Froman, gB* cit** Volume XI, chapter 26*

U Knight, Frank I*, "On the Theory of Capitalt In Beply to
Mr* Kaldor," Econometrics, Volume VI, January, 1936*
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relationship In industrial development* due to the all-pervading
influence of tine in the nodera business system.

Some of the more

important ramifications are as follows t production in advance of
demand; fixed costs and the business cycle; stock market growth ; risk
and insurance; and "average11 return In regulated industries*
Because of this very tacit treatment by the majority of
writers, it is not surprising that a student of law and a student of
economics would one day generalise tins as an all-important influence
in the social relationships of the day*

ffae two men who performed this
1
2
service were, respectively, Professor Commons and Professor Keynes*

Although there is little difference between the two writers in terms of
the basic problem treated, the work of Professor Keynes seems more
pertinent to the present study, and will be
upon most heavily
3
in further analysis* So effective has been the work of these writers
that time and expectations are taken for granted today, whereas a few
years ago they were scarcely mentioned*

Here the problem will be to

relate expectation to confiscation and the nebulous relationships that
constitute due process*

1 gp* cit. It is not implied that Professor Commons is not an
economist* But a careful study of his legal Foundations* particularly
footnotes and controversial issues, demonstrates that the principal train
ing utilized was legal rather than economic, with respect to this particular
treatise*
2 Kaunas, John Ifcynard, Th& Qanaraa $fe2SEZ st
end Money* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, mew fork, 1935*)

“"Ir Interest.

3 Perhaps the moat refined (difficult) treatment of expectations
as a part of general economic theory is Hicks, «7*H., Value and Capital*
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939*)
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In the sane

my that an entrepreneur’s production plan is

a bundle of expectations,

so is the investment plan of an institution

that has disposition control over money capital*

Ivory investor Is

confronted with an almost endless maze of possible places to invest his

2
capital*

Each considered possibility conveys to his mind a certain

probable (anticipated) result*

These probable results are then

assembled and compared one with the other, in relation to the over-all
ambition of the investor*

Finally that investment is chosen which

is expected to contribute most to the over-all goal*
The basic ambition of the investor is monetary return, and results
are principally measured with this yardstick*

Financially, every

opportunity for investment has a certain qualitative desirability for the
investor, depending upon the returns which he anticipates from the
investment*

This quality of desirability is the composite result of all

those characteristics that make an investor prefer one investment over
3
another*
For purposes of comparison, in the mind of the investor, this
eosgjoslte result is assessed a certain value, which can conveniently be

1

Keynes, op. cit** p. 24, footnote 3*

2 Keynes* terminology may be helpful at this points ”• * * the
bundle of vague and more various possibilities which actually makes
up his state of expectation when he reaches his decision.M
3 These characteristics are quite familar to students of finance*
An excellent enumeration will be found in Graham and Dodd, Security
Analysis. (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New fork, 1940*) Hevlsed Edition,
Chapter IX*
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1
called the present worth of the investment.

The relation between

present worth and expectation is as follows! a relatively high present
worth is expected to accompany a relatively large composite expectation^
and a relatively low present worth is expected to accompany a relatively
low composite expectation.
In addition to a present worth, every investment also entails
a cost.

This factor can be much more accurately stated, in most cases,

in monetary terms than present worth.

In fact it is because cost is

rather easily stated in monetary terms that it is necessary to reduce
present worth to a common denominator with cost.
When the investor is able to compare present worths and
corresponding costs, the choice of investments is simple. The situation
is reduced to the level of any other transaction situation in economic
a
theory.
That investment will be selected which will (sxpectatlonally)
bring to the investor the greatest excess of "value" above actual "cost.”
It is at once evident that the significance of expectations
in investment carries capital value clearly into the legal concept of
choice suggested earlier.

A given investment is a choice of one

opportunity from the innumerable opportunities that are available to an

1 Williams, John Burr, Zisst Theory of Investment Value. (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1938) Chapter V.
2 It might be added that the expectional qualities embodied in this
type of transaction are not different from those Involved in the purchase
of any physical commodity In the economic system.

laveator la our society today*

Thus the legal relationship between

a confiscating agency and the economic unit (owner) confiscated is
basically reducible to the Jurisprudential doctrine of will*

the

thing confiscated, or In danger of confiscation, is an expectation,
and to interpret confiscation apart from expectation is apt to be
quite meaningless*
Of course regulation does not deal with one investor and one
investment*

Its scope includes many investors and many investment®,

Therefore, rate control facets the problem of confiscation over the entire
capital market, rather than in one isolated segment of it*

It is this

fact more than any other that has confused some of the more fundamental
issues of regulation*

An approach to confiscation through valuation

assumes that it is the group that Is confiscated*
generalized fair return makes the same assumption.

Approach through a
Obviously the

group, numerically at least, is composed of individuals*

But the in

dividualistic basis for American jurisprudence demands the conclusion
that the group be considered as an aggregation of individuals, rather
than that the group be considered as an entity in itself*
imroator can b, confiscated ifl & group, but only a& m

Thus an

Individual.

All of this may contribute some little bit to an under
standing of the general nature of confiscation*

But it adds very little

to an appreciation of the specific qualities of that elusive regulatory
concept*

In the market place where claims are bought and sold It is

impossible to segregate individual expectations.
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3$ is of the essence of investments that their quality should
tend to equalise*

The restless desire of individuals to part from am

Investment yielding 10 per cent and take up an Investment yielding
1
15 per sent assures this tendency.
All economic literature, from
the beginnings of economics as a science to the present day, has
emphasised the levelling process in an acquisitive society*
a
theory this process is known as capitalisation*

In modern

Technically this process of capitalisation means that value
3
flows from income to capital, rather than from capital to income* This
fact is parallel to the common definition of property as nthe right to
4
income.” But whatever the inspiration, the fact of capitalisation is
very closely related to the legal concept of confiscation*
Perhaps an illustration can best elaborate the relationship
involved*

Suppose a claim is exchanging on the market for $100*

This

means that the actual and expected income, all things considered, has
stimulated expectations valued at, roughly, $100 in the mind of a
composite group of investors*

We may further assume that the actual

income, which is expected to continue in the future,

9

»
is $$ per annum*

1 Ricardo, David, Principles of Political Economy, ch, IV.
2

Fisher, op* cit,, chapter XXIX*

3 This meaning for capitalization only reaffirms basic Austrian
economies, which states that value is in the mind. See Commons, o p .cit..
chapter II, for a discussion of the shift in Supreme Court decisions to
this viewpoint•
4 Ely, ££.. cij,.
5 By the term ^expected to continuew is meant that this investment,
if held, will continue to yield $5j or that if the principal were with
drawn in the future it could be invested in a similar risk to yield the
same income*
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This relationship indicates that the over—all expectations of
investors who purchase similar claims, warrants placing a value of
1
twenty times annual income on this particular claim.
How let us suppose that the government, through lowering
rates charged or raising taxes paid by the concern whose claim is under
consideration, lowers the income received by the claim holder to $4
per annum.

Prior to the reduction in income the investor has a "right

to income" which is valued at twenty years* income by the general state
of expectation in the market.

After the reduction the same situation

persists, because it is clear there has been no fundamental change in
general expectations by the mere occurrence of this more or less
isolated incident.

But, due to the fact that Income is U

instead of

the investor now has a claim worth $80 instead of $100,
Following from the spirit of social philosophy it would be
argued that confiscation has really taken place in the above example.
After all, 20 per cent of a man’s property has disappeared through
regulatory activity.

The important fact, however, as far as

confiscation is concerned, is that this type of thing is not confiscation
in our legal process.

The apparent contradiction in the above state

ments makes the definition of confiscation in actual use seem arbitrary.

1 This la the "prevailing rate of interest,.w This term cannot be
precisely defined, but it basically represents the general state of
expectation in the money market.

But it has already been emphasized that an individual can not really
be confiscated if he knows what his rights are in advance*

Thus any

definition of confiscation is satisfactory if rigidly adhered to by
regulatory agencies*
However, even the no si well-meaning and conscientious government
east have difficulty along this line.

For every tine a new industry is

brought into the regulatory field, every tine important new regulations
are found necessary in a regulated industry, every tine a rate of return
to a regulated company is found to be too high and adjusted downward-" in
all of these cases the activity of governnent appears as retroactive
legislation to all investors who do not predict governnent moves sub
stantially in advance,
status

quo

Stated differently, if capitalists use the

as the basis for discounting the future —

is in harmony with laisseg-faire —

and this practice

any change in the status quo must out

across expectations and thus destroy capital in the way described*
Xt is at once evident that the above is representative of the
typical situation in public utility rate control*

An investor is

confiscated, not when the return on Investment falls below a certain
level, but when the return on investment is forcibly and suddenly reduced*
Even then the investor who is confiscated is not any investor who happens
to own a claim whose return has been reduced by government action, but the
individual who holds the claim at the time of the action that reduces
the return*

Thus confiscation cannot be represented as any given rate

level, but as a reduction in this level*
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There are further ramifications of this approach to the
problem of confiscation*

Due process means, substantively, that the

rules of the game, so to speak, will not be changed except between
innings*

Section 9* paragraph 3 of the Constitution has the same

1
meaning.

Restraint upon retroactivity in legislation is a promise

to citizens that no penalty shall attach to any action, if the penalty be
2
not known to the doer at the time the activity was commenced. It Is
the essence of financial activity that it is continuing in nature, rather
than spasmodic*

Non-retroaction in regulation requires that choices be

not interferred with —
defined —

after they are made. Thus confiscation must be

from an ideological standpoint —

as cutting across past

expectations•
The important tendency for expectations to equalize
throughout the capital market, casts further light upon the economic
usefulness of the Fifth Amendment and its interpretation in regulation
3
cases.

If value can pertinently be considered in relation to expectations

regulation not only must not take property without compensation, but it
literally must not take property at all.

Regulation is intended to leave

everyone with equal residual rights, regardless of the number of rights

1

"No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.'1

2 By "known" here is meant "part of the law." Of course mere
ignorance is no particular defense,although basic misunderstanding might be*
3 Bye, Raymond T.. Principles of Economics. (F.3. Crofts and
Company, New Tork, 1942.) Fourth Edition, p. 35*
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actually taken away.

Fundamentally, however, regulation does not

have this decision to stake in a financial society*

The process of

capitalisation is the equaliser, and regulation of Isolated segments
of the eeonoffly does not substantially Influence this process
even
1
though universal and unchecked regulation might have considerable
Influence*

If compensation is paid, property is not taken; and if

property is taken compensation is not paid*

Thus* not only does an

attempt to apply due process result in an economic inconsistency, but
the very wording of the phrase suggests an impossible situation*
It follows from this discussion that it is virtually impossible
to regulate without confiscating property*

Whenever a commission finds

an undesirable situation existing, it can propose a remedy only by suggesting
retroactive action —

i.e., action that cuts across the lines of choice,

which is by definition confiscation in our society*

The course of action

outlined by the commission may be non-confiscatory for the choices made
from that time forward, but it is certainly confiscatory with reference
to all past choices affected*
A case in point may be helpful*

In 1920 the municipal

government of lima, Ohio, passed an ordinance prescribing the maximum
rates that might be charged for gas*

The time specified for the operation

of the ordinance was five years, and the rates specified called for

1 Unchecked regulation refers to any more or less whimsical
action on the part of a "dictator**, i.e., expropriation policies on a
large scale*
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substantial reductions iron the schedule then in offset*

The company

appealed to the Public Service Commission for relief from what it
considered an unfair and unreasonable structure*

the Commission revised

the schedule upward, but refused to allow as an operating expense the
total asked by the eoapany of an item called “unaccounted for gas1* —
as a result of leakage, condensation, contraction*

lose

this account was

being charged annually with 9 per cent of the total volume of gas handled*
The eoanissien insisted upon whittling this item down to ? per cent of the
total volume of gas handled, on the alleged ground that proper care would
result in less loss*

The company appealed the commission1s decision,
1
which appeal was finally carried to the Supreme Court*
the Supreme
Court, through Justice C&rdezo, very properly disapproved the action of
the CeondLssien, implying that it involved confiscation, although the word
was not directly utilised*
For our analysis here, only an outline of the opinion of the
Supreme Court is significant*

The Court inferred that the Commission

had erred in fact, rather than that it was mistaken as to the principle
involved*

Obviously such an error is confiscation in its worst form* But

at this point it seems desirable to consider the ease assuming that the
Commission was right as to the fact of waste*

Of course, even so, this

2
fact necessitates proof, a necessity strongly emphasized by the Court*

1 uest Ohio Gas Company v* Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
(*0.1), 294 O.S. 63.
2

Loc. cit.

xi5

The company's business had been conducted for some time
on the basis of a 9 par eent wastage factor« It® financial relation*
ships with eiaimholders —

the general world of expectations <— was

predicated, in part, upon this factor.

To suddenly alter this

circumstance would have forced the company to make a choice between
two possible adjustments* either it would have had to be content with a
9 per eent leakage, and a 7 per cent Conuniasion allowance; or a 7 per
cent actual leakage, the additional expense of lowering this loss frost

1
9 per eent to 7 per eent,

2
and a 7 per eent commission allowance*

Clearly this is no alternative at all*

Either alternative, from the

faets of this case, would have meant a lowering of residual return by
about 1 per eent in 6 per cent* Such a return, unless offset by some
3
kind of financial elasticity within the business itself, would cut across
previous expectations in a most drastic way*
The case cited above is one of an existing undesirable
situation, that ordinarily must be corrected by a regulatory order— but

X Obviously, if the cost of reducing the loss were the financial
equivalent of the 2 per cent leakage, no "wastett is Involved* This tern
could be applied only if the expense were less than the financial
equivalent of the loss checked. That sort of analysis would Indeed require
evidence* led this kind of a decision is quite commonly considered a
purely managerial decision*
2 The Commission might order the leakage loss reduced and permit
the necessary costs to be included in the utility*s expense account* However,
there are few Jurisdictions that will permit the inclusion of such highly
conjectural costs*
3 This might be a reserve, a surplus, a padded expense elsewhere,
or an upturn in general business fortunes* Hone of these, however, can be
depended upon in a given situation. The first two probably could be used
to better advantage elsewhere, or else should not exist; while the last two
should not exist in any event*
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in which confiscation can be avoided only by the noat penetrating
analysis and judicial decision.

Frequently, In fact most commonly,

the correction cannot be nade even with analysis and judgment, without
confiscation.

this will invariably be the case when the Commission
a
finds a utility earning an excessive rate of return.
This situation presents a real parados for regulators to
resolve.

If they regulate for the future, the result is retroactive,

confiscating past expectations.

But if regulation is not for the
3
future then prior excesses must be made permanent.
Tet one choice must
be made.

There is no possibility for compromise.

Basically, this

paradox accounts for the precarious position of legislation in the
matter of regulation in past years.
tread upon someone9s toes.

A corrective approach is bound to

Since the Supreme Court is the great "protector",

it has been anyone9s guess as to whose rights the court would choose to
proteet in a given ease.
Even more interesting than the above paradox itself is the
problem of how it developed.

1

See Be Black Biver Telephone Company, P.U.K. 131 C, 26.

2

The bulk of the litigated cases are of this nature.

3 It follows from what has gone before that the permanency of
past excesses cannot confiscate holders of claims. This is true because
they make their choices with previous facts in mind. But consumers, by
definition in a public utility, have no such elasticity of choice, and
can — figuratively — be confiscated.
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The most significant aspect of this development is the fact
that when the consitution itself was written ”just compensation11 was
principally intended to provide for the necessities of eminent domain*
In this type of property taking, note, there is an actual transfer of
ownership of a physical good*

The government reaches an agreement with

the private owner ( in or out of court ) and gives to such owners a
quid pro

quo

in money*

Beally nothing more is involved except a simple

purchase and sale*
la public utility regulation the situation i« not so simple*
Bare the government receives no property and makes no payment*
possession remains with the private owner*

Full

The effect of government

action is sliqply to lower the rate of return actually earned to a ’fair*
return*
The essential difference between these two types of government
relation to business is the time factor*
ship without time dimension*

Eminent domain Is a relation

If the private owner is realising $1000

per year on his property the price paid by the government will be a
capitalization of that annual income at the going rate of Interest* The
owner is free then to do whatever he likes with the principal*

If he

chooses to reinvest in another property producing income at the rate of
$1000 per year his financial situation has been unaltered by the transaction*
The reason, of course, is that the action of the government carries with
it no connotation of a wrong to be righted*
The situation is very different in public utility regulation*
Here there is a specific wrong to be righted — • a change to be instituted
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inseparable process in time —
middle of the gam*.

any change in roles must come in the

thus the change in the concept of property from use

▼aloe te exchange value has resulted in a significant gap between just
compensation and non-retroactivity .
It is in no else to be inferred that the writer is un
equivocally opposed to confiscation as here interpreted.

It is simply

suggested that the regulators are in a difficult position with respect
1
to regulation* being forced to confiscate whether they wish to or not.
This confiscation consists of decisions which determine* not whether
2

rights are to be protected or not* but whose rights are to be protected.
In determining whose rights should be protected* regulators likewise
determine whose rights are to be sacrificed.
Clearly the problem here is much deeper than approval or
disapproval.

Confiscation is an inevitable accompaniment of adjusting

past relationships.

Since police power Is principally exercised to

prevent unjust enrichment of one section of society at the expense of
another section* correction of prior maladjustments may frequently entail
a taking from those who have been a party to the enrichment.

This is* by

1 The traditional view of the function of the court is well expressed
by Jerome Frank*
most lawyers deny the reality of judgemade law." Law and the Modern Mind. (Tudor Publishing Company, New Torfc*
1935.) P. 33, footnote.
2 The view that judges do legislate is well presented by both
Jerome Frank* 6p. cit.« and Norris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order.
(Earcourt, Brace and Company, New York* 1933.)
"
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very definition, confiscation*

To oppose this kind of confiscation

is the equivalent ©f opposing regulation*

It would take a hardy

individual indeed to seriously take such an entrees position*
Another important aspect of the police power seems pertinent
at this point*

General police power

the exercise of control over the

public health, safety, and morals of the citizenry

does not depend

for Its potence or impotence upon a confiscatory clause*

It la a well*

established principle of constitutional law that compensation need not
be paid in such cases even though damage Is done to the property through
the exercise of control*

That is the way "necessary® confiscation is

handled under the general police power*

But in public utility rate

eases it is widely assumed that there is no confiscation at all* "Necessary®
confiscation is just as important in the regulating of utilities as in
control under the general police power.

And such confiscation is to be

justified upon the same grounds* This justification is the doctrine of
1
infirmity* which states that every social relationship
entered into is subject to the law of the land, which law includes
prospective regulation in the public interest, as well as past legislation*

1 The writer became acquainted with this term while sitting in
class under Professor Eliot Jones at Stanford University* Although the
term Itself is not often used by lawyers, yet "No rule in constitutional
law is better settled than the principle that all property is held subject
to the right of the state reasonably to regulate Its use under the police
power mm*n 11 An. Jue* 100f*
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The thesis of sash doctrine is that whatever financial relationships
are destroyed, the action of the government does not obstruct choice
because the individual must be presumed to have understood the situation
at the time of entering into the contract*
of the very imposing name it bears

This thesis is the inspiration

congenital infirmity, meaning a

weakness at birth*
the clause in the Constitution forbidding retroactive
legislation

has gone far to make

and was no doubt intended for that

purpose — « that document a negative one.

The only check to this

tendency has been the development of "infirmity in the general welfare*
as a working policy of control*
element in our Federal System.

This development is the basic positive
2
As such it is vitally significant. If

businesses could not be declared subject to regulation after their
inception, democracy would be at the mercy of a dynamic economy*

To

avoid confiscation it would be necessary to predict the trending
shift of & business from a private category to a public category. This,
on the basis of the complexity of the problems involved, is a manifest
impc ssifcility•

1

Article 1, Section 9* Paragraph 3*

2 The third category of utility suggested by Chief Justice Taft in
1923 consists of businesses whose owner "by devoting his business to the
public use, in effect grants the public an interest In that use, and
subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest .
Such businesses become public after their inception. Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522.

xzz

Briefly ©unsnarlzing, then, regulation is not a single
necessity but two* the first i© that of correcting evils that have
arisen in the pastj the second is that of preventing evils from
arising in the future*

fhe former necessitates confiscation, which

Is justified la our constitutional system by the doctrine of congenital
infirmity (police power),

The latter does not involve confiscation,

following from the fact that, under our governmental organization, no
individual can be confiscated by an action he has knowledge of before
1
he enters into a contract.
This situation would apply to all
application of "infirmity0 to utility regulation.

Furthermore, as a

practical proposition, someone must decide, in each case coming up for
adjudication, whether the decisions shall reflect emphasis upon the

2
future or upon the past.
Before embarking upon the next phase of this discussion it
might prove helpful to emphasize the interrelationship between the two
environmental developments presented in this and the preceding chapters,
Kent arises from inelasticity.

Capitalization is the institutional

process by which business maintains a high degree of elasticity despite

1 Technically, of course, it must be. added that our philosophy
of law also implies, as a necessary accompaniment, that government must
accord Identical treatment to all persons similarly situated,
2 Note the extreme quantity of energy, time, and money spent
and being spent on trying to establish a dollar value for the aid given
to various transportation agencies by governments and others over the
past 150 years. This problem is being given almost as much attention
as other problems combined.
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The prime function of the two preceding chapters mas to
deaonstrate the two principal ways to which the economic environment
has altered in such a way as to make less precise and less useful the
ideal regulatory adjustment outlined by the supreme Court*

The growing

qu&litetivaness of the environment caused by the inelasticities of
productive factors* and by the necessity of recognising a time dimension
In the exchange process Is the environmental development principally
responsible*
It will be the purpose of this and the succeeding two chapters
to demonstrate that this dynamic element in the environment need not
have destroyed at all completely the earlier regulatory technique* thus
the categories set forth by the courts have a considerable elasticity
with vhich to meet changing circumstances,
course* unlimited*

This elasticity is not* of

Beyond a certain point of stretch the categories

themselves most give way*

Furthermore* beyond a certain point in

regulation it became the interest of the regulated themselves to break
gown the framework of control*

The farther regulation must go the

stronger both of these strains become,

% e of the basic rassifloations

of the following discussion is the indication of increasing strain from
both of these sources*
As an introduction to the potential elasticity of regulation this
chapter on the residual problem in control is essential*

The principal
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residuality involved is fair return.

Fair return &a here considered

la not to be thought of as a percentage of some nebulous fair value,
but as the concrete sum in dollars resulting from applying the percent
age to the value. Students of utilities are more and more inclined to
«
agree that it is this sum that is the important item rather than either
.

the percentage or the value to which it is applied*

Simply stated fair

return is the fund out of which residual factors are paid, or the netineome-fumd remaining to be distributed after contractual payments have
been made to other factors*
Economic rent, it mill be recalled, may be either contractual
or aon-contractual. If non-oontractual, Its relation to fair return Is
clear*

the greater the residual, the greater the economic rent received
1
by the residual factors*
On the other hand a reward (rent) may be contractual*

ho

contractual reward can contain an economic rent if it is bought and sold

2
in a market*
rent*

Such a reward could be capitalised to the exclusion of

But, whether capitalised or not, the existence of rent Is predicated

upon net income* or surplus* If any factor receives an economic surplus

1 This refers principally to common stock* The rent in a
particular case, may be positive or negative* The meaning here is that a
larger residual will minimize negative rent, and maximize positive rent*
2 This statement simply indicates why a contractual reward con
taining rent is Impossible in the capital market, while possible in the
labor markets* Either factor, however, receives a rent only under the
conditions outlined below*
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it doss so by virtu* of the economic power It exerts over the business
suit hiring it*

Beoaoaic power 1* net income.

for

amount capable of forcing & business to operate at a

bn*

to m

lb feebur can contract

I h w uo business faotor oft* receive for any length of time a

reward greater than opportunity cost while it* employer 1* receiving
U a i tin* opportunity eoit.

it folio** that if the total residual

Income 1* made, tferough regulation# equivalent to opportunity costs
me factor could contract to receive a rent.
The conclusion indicated from this analysis Is that economic
rest does not appear originally in the hands of a factor*

It appears

first a# income to the business (accounting) unit* and is then

a

distributed to the component factors on the basis of economic poser*
The significance of the process through which this is true will be the
subject natter for the remainder of this chapter*
hot the least interesting phase of the subject of fair
return# considered as a sore or less independent item in the rate~makli^
process# is the paucity of literature in the field*

This fact is

1 Loss here means any act of elreumstanees less favorable than
another available alternative* This explains the fixed
variable expenses
situation during depression years*
% The writer is net aware that any other writer has ea^haslsed the
isportane* of fair return as residual income* Such m analysis has been
briefly approached# however# on at least one occasion* horgan# Charles S*#
Pff” 1**4*" *"*
"«• »»"*»« Bblltfcl**. (Houghtan-Kimin
Company# Boston# 1923*}
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particularly noteworthy in view of the plethora of expository
jnaterial centering around fair value*

In the period since the “fair

return on fair value" mandate was first announced, there have been
only two standard| full-sized works purporting to consider fair return
1
aa a major item, the first, chronologically, is actually one of the
better contributions to the theory of valuation*

the author uses the

book as an avenue for advancing quite convincingly the doctrine of
reproduction cost*

Fair return is considered primarily through

statistical interpretation, although the author does advance a
suggestion for determining the return* the other book, that of Professor
2
Vu, is devoted to fair return in railroad regulation, and again
valuation is the principal esphasls, only a minimum of space being
devoted to fair return as such*

It is perhaps significant that

Professor Wu also takes occasion to throw his influence with the eost-ofreproduction advocates*

He, too, offers a brief statement as to a

theoretical measurement of fair return*
Other writers have given attention to this matter, Seldom
however, is fair return given an independent status} a non-parasitic
raison d 2etrg> It could be argued, and vigorously, that fair return

1 Smith, Melson Lee, Fair Rate of Return jn Public Utility
(Houghton-Mlfflin Company, Mew fork, 19217)
2 Mu, Shao-Tseng, Railroad Valuation and Fair Return* (University
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1930.)

xaa

was never meant tb stand alone as representative of any final fict
X
la regulation. Certainly the "rule of rate-making" would load
support to such a contentIon*

But the same argument would deny to

valuation the^independemt existence it has universally enjoyed for
four decades.

Tho general practice of deciding on the ajaount of

return and then converting this amount into a percentage to suit what3
ever valuation meets the approval of the majority of the commission,
is not carrying out the mandate of "fair return on fair value1* in a
realistic manner.

Pennsylvania has little cause to be proud of the

universal n7% regardless of circumstances," which her Commission used as
4
a rule through two booms and two depressions.
Two of our strongest
Comissions, likewise, have little cause to be proud of the fact that
they have "gotten by" with original cost valuations, when they were

1 Smyth vs. Ames, 169 U.S. 466. In this landmark case the Supreme
Court appeared to give parallel Importance to return and valuation. At
no time since has the court repudiated this implication•
2 An observer could not but be increased by the extended treatment
given fair value in court decisions (or public utility texts), as
compared with the little attention given fair return. Thompson and Smith
note two important cases In 1937 with more than 100 pages on the subject
of value, and seven pages dealing with fair return. fiR. elt*. p. 349.
3; P«d*rgaet, Willia* A., Puhj^c Ptllltiee and
Appleton-Century Company, Ha. Xork, 1933*)

P.^

. (D.

4 Ho as, Joseph R., Pupil o gtiHty Regulation In Pennsylvania.
(On!varsity of Pennsylvania Press, Philadlephla, 1939.)

m
i

«bl*

« only by liberality la the return allowed.

Xm sfcori*

whatever can he said against the rule of regulation* It cannot he
accused of ixopartdality.

It does not condemn either of the ooaspanloa

components to a permanent sateOlitic position.

a

Here It la proposed

to accord fair return Its "place in the eon" by considering It a* the
basic reaIdeal in a situation In lahich residuals are of paramount
significance.
The lack of analysis of return would he underst&ndable If it
sere not such an important part of the cost of utility services.

It is

axiomatic that most utility services require large amounts of fixed
capital.

But the exact relationship between this fact and fair return has

mot made as deep an Impression upon students of regulation as It must if
the significance of fair return is to he more widely recognised.
The specific studies that have been made on the subject of
capital turnover in the utility industries conclude that this rati© is
3
approximately eight to one.
Stated differently this means that annual
gross revenues equal 12 1/2 percent of total investment; and that the

1

Thompson and Smith,

olt..p. 349*

2 This should not be interpreted as implying that fair value is not
the most difficult element, interpreted from a technical viewpoint.
Certainly when a decision hinges upon an estimate of how much it would cost
to build a similar plant over the next two years or so, and depreciate It to
a condition analogous to the present one, no Mnlml&ailon of the task Involved
should be indulged.
3 Bureau of Business Research, University of Illinois, Standard
vin&nelal Ratios for tfaq Public Utility Industry. (University of Illinois
Urba^*Illia©la* 1929)

utility f e w i w i in income the equivalent of its assets every eight
years • Let us assume now that such & composite utility is allowed
a fair return of 6 percent* We will further assume that fair value and
1
investment are equal.
Sueh a utility would have to have an operating
ratio of 52 percent in order to make Its allowed return*

Thus

of

gross revenues would be necessary for the reward of investors, etc*

And

in the above illustration 6 percent, historically, would not be a
liberal allowance at all*
In practice the modal operating ratio is not 52 percent*

The

2
actual figure is 72 percent*
for this discrepancy*

There are probably a number of reasons

First, many utilities fail to earn a fair return*

It might be added that many do not need to earn a fair return — - in the
legal sense —

to maintain excellent credit*

Too, if is possible that

the above study has placed the capital turnover too high* bther
3
writers hazard estimates considerably lower, and more in line with the
calculated operating ratio*

A superficial glance at a number of

financial statements selected at random — * admittedly unscientific, but
perhaps helpful for the project at hand *— indicates that the operating

1 It should be noted that reproduction cost would not be used in any
event if it were greatly in excess of investment* In the latter case the
percentage necessary for fair return would be greater for the same reason.
%"• Business Research
Bulletin,
' -3

op

*
'

*

cit*
»

See Thompson and Smith* op, cit.* p. 83.
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ratios in the study cited are much more nearly representative than
the figures given for capital turnover.
But the point is not vital at the moment*

Enough has been

said to indicate the importance of capital costs in measuring resourceexpenditures for utility services.

Through a comparison with other costs

the significance of fair return becomes even more apparent*

Depreciation
1
and maintenance amount to roughly 15 percent of gross income*
This
figure would approximate that for a utility with a capital turnover of
5, with 90 percent of its assets depreciable, and assuming a composite
asset life of 25 years*
utility customers.

Taxes represent another important cost for

But they fail to even come close to capital costs in

magnitude*

In 1939 the electric light and power Industry paid 16*3 percent
2
of Its gross revenues to various governmental units in taxes.
The
2
comparable figure for the Bell interests for the same year was 14*1 percent*

A fourth item in utility costs is labor, running all. the way from 20 to
2
45 percent of gross. Thus, it is unnecessary to pursue the thought
further.

It is readily apparent that fair return Is a most Important

cost, and that inaccuracy and misunderstanding may result from its neglect.
It would be grossly misleading to infer th-.t the Idea of cost
minimization is a novelty In the regulatory process; or that the everyday

1 This is the percentage used by the Securities and Exchange
Commission as a norm in its analysis of the financial structure of a
utility.
2 These figures are given in Thompson and Smith, op. olt.*
chapter V.

decisions of the various regulatory bodies take no cognisance of this
principle*

Quite the contrary would be more nearly accurate*

But It

dw*ld not be misleading to say that the cost aspect is often so camouflaged
beneath precision detail that its sigaifieaiiee is not Immediately
apparent*

Sroa etudeata of public utility problems are sometimes vague

in their emphasis upon costs*3' ihis fast is to be explained, no doubt*
by the feet that this particular approach is taken for granted, rather
ttsaa to any assignable ignorance of fundamentnls*

However, regulation

of any single industry In a "competitive1* eooneny has two obligations__
both atanaslng froa and comparable to the individualistic system for which
regulation has been selected as a «mh&tibUta§

fhe first obligation is to

secure the oomnedity Involved for the ©ensuiaer at a price equivalent to
costi the second is to take whatever steps have been authorised in the
public interest to keep these eeste as low as possible*

this dichotomy

of problems has been treated more or less In detail earlier# as the
Peebles of correlating rights and responsibilities in a society that
considers equality an important concept*

yyon this point forward the

problem will be made acre specific* proceeding with discussion of fair
return somewhat independent of the broader social philosophy of which it

1 Bryant end german* elements of Utility Rate Determination ,
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, Hew York* 19^0*) Chapters XV - XVII*
2

Bohling* Burton S., Competition. *a& Monopoly In Public Utility
(University of Illinois, Urban*, Illinois, 1938.) Chapter III.
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Is an Integral part*
The foregoing facts may at first seem commonplace and
irrelevant to an attempt to set forth the economic principles of
fair return*

But they serve as an introduction to the real heart of

the regulatory problem—

the problem of securing a necessary service

in the most economical way, i.e., at lowest total r©source-expend!ture
1
consistent with the quality of commodity demanded by the public. In
solving this problem it is highly important to note that It does not
center upon the cheapness of any single item in the expense (cost)
account.

Rather it must involve giving to every item that attention and

that care that will result in the lowest composite total costs.
In order to exemplify certain features of this relationship, we
will refer to some of the typical Issues that come before commissions
in actual cases.

First, assume a utility, operated with average or

above average efficiency, with operating expenses of $1,000,000.
of the items included will be large, some small*

Some

Bany, probably the

majority, of these items will be obviously in line with competitive
prices, and thus will need little specific attention*

But perhaps the

President is receiving a $50,000 annual salary, and, due to estimates
of efficiency by the Board of Directors (of which the President is
probably a member) a $25,000 bonus has been voted —

1

Behling, loc.cit,

and paid by the
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company for the three years preceding the present hearing before the
Ctasslsaleii on the reasonableness of rates.

Katurally the utility will

wish to include both the bonus and the salary as legitimate costs of
operation,

the Commission oust make a decision on the point.

If it la an

alert Commission with adequate authority, it will certainly refuse the
Inclusion of the bonus, and probably would lop 10 or 20 thousand dollars
off the salary itself.* After making the appropriate remarks about
"protecting public interest",

and "good faith on the part of the manage*

■mat," the Commission will conclude the hearing by allowing the utility
a 6jC return on its value.
Such decisions are quite common, and they are widely heralded
by public Interests as placing a firm hand upon soulless corporations,
while the Commissioners commonly point to such decisions as an example
of its savings for consumer.

But it is quite proper to inquire if the

ease is really ended there*

Hote, for example, that the President has

received an "illegitimate" wage for years previously, and he may receive
it again.
1
expense*

The Commission has only refused to let it be included as an
If he does receive this increment, and the fair return has

been set at a point that either ten cents a share will have to be taken
from the common dividend, or surplus accumulation cease, then the

1 This weakness In the armor of much of our current regulation
has been treated by Barnes, op. cit.. chapter XVIII.
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Commission has a further reckoning ahead*

For next year it nay happen

that the utility will need to refand a bond issue, or expand lie
operation* through the sale of stock*

Bfciea that time comes, it may be

suggested, the Commission is not aliening the securing of expensive
capital, but is merely agreeing that the President should have had his
$25,000 after all*

And precisely because those bonds or that stock east

more on this particular occasion the fair return next time sill have to be
higher to maintain credit standing*
public?

Bor much, then, was f*saved" for the

A second excellent question would be this oust If the utility

did pay, and continues to pay, an excessive salary to its executives
without impairing its ability to secure capital, what is the probability
that, either before or after the rate case, the rate of return was too
high?
Another, more complex, situation suggests itself*

Assume this

time a utility that desires to set aside 3 percent of the cost of its
physical plant for depredation*

Assume further that that is the amount
1
needed to state operating expenses correctly*
But the Commission, not
adequately schooled in economic matters, decides that the proper charge
should be 3 1/2 percent, and so orders*

One-half of one per cent on

2
physical plant does not appear to be a particularly large error*

But

1 Depreciation expense is here considered solely as a device to
accurately calculate operating expenses* For an elaborate justification of
this approach see Mason,
cit*
2 The assumptions here include a common stock issue amounting to 2 0
of total e&pital, a six to one capit&l-turnovar ratio, and a 90% depreciable
property ratio.

W6

it would amount to roughly %% annually on tho common stock.
would be paid out in dividends la sons jurisdiction*

This

In other

jurisdictions it would be forced into a top-heavy reserve and night
tend to build up common stock equity (and general credit strength)
in that way.

Whichever happens, the public is obviously paying too

much for its current services, for building up credit in this way is
probably not the cheapest method possible.
let us suppose that five years after entering its original
order the Commission notices the above error*

Again, a decision must be

reached on a method for rectifying the error, for certainly the
continuation of such a condition would be an injustice to the public*
The wrong might be righted in one of two waysj to make a correction only
for the future, or to attempt to adjust the past overcharges as well* If
the former course is adopted the overcharge to the consumer can not be
rectified at all —

and probably the exact amount of the damage cannot

be calculated, though it would probably be somewhat less than the
3 pereent of gross indicated by the exact arbitrary to operating expenses.
If the Commission decided to make the correction retroactive
it might follow a coarse of "immediacy'1 or of "gradualness"t i.e., it

1 Lindheimer va. Illinois Bell telephone Company, 292 U.S. 151*
The Supreme Court here dealt with precisely this type of situation,
illuminating rather forcefully the inadequacy of present-day regulation In
specific instances.
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might order a single write-down entry for depreciation reserve| or it
might extend the remaining net hook coot over the remaining service life
of the property. If either course la followed, and fair return is not
altered, the common stockholders are given an unearned increment through
either dividends or surplus*

thus, after the discovery of the error

as well as before, the investor benefits at the expense of the consumer,
unless adjustment is made in fair return*

The thought occurs that perhaps

the gain to capital will be given back to the consumer through lower
demands the next time the utility asks for money*

But if the capital

market is at all competitive the exact opposite will be the result*
Because the gains were only incremental and unexpected, their very
uncertainty (for the investor reasons they might have gone down as well
as up —

which would certainly have been the case had the assumptions

been different) causes them to be discounted against an issuing corporation*
One more example will be noted*

The charge has often been made

that Commissions have been too liberal in the percentage they allow as a
fair return*

Let us assume that in a given case this Is true*

(In using

the term "liberal" the base is considered to be the amount necessary to
overcome the resistance of investors, who could spend their money or
inve&it elsewhere*)

Investors, taken compositely, are willing to part

with their money on a 6 percent basis, and the Commission In fact permits
7 percent*

But the investor has already contracted with (or purchased

coiaaon stock from) the corporation on the basis of a 6 percent "resistance,"
which resistance cannot be altered by any declarations of a public body*

m

An alert investor who receivea such & windfall, or sees it placed
in a surplus as a protection he had not anticipated when he made
his purchase, and connecting this fortuitous circumstance with the
arbitrary action of public authority, is not apt to consider the
situation permanent*

Far from lessening his future resistance, such

generosity could easily stiffen it, because it Is so easy to assume that
the same public authority could just as easily have taken an opposite
arbitrary stand*

Thus the consumer is charged more not only because of

the generosity of the Commission, but because this same generosity leads
to aa uncertainty that is further held against the utility when it next
1
seeks out the investor to secure additional capital.
Xt is scai/eely an opposing argument to suggest that since
commissions always lean in the direction of liberality, that the Investor
will be more favorably disposed toward public utility securities for
this reason.
is error.

As a matter of fact liberality is a misnomer.

A truer name

For the capitalisation prodess eats up increments and absorbs

decrements without substantial regard for the benevolent attitude of
public utility commissions. Actually benevolence is a regulatory
impossibility.

Both plus and minus deviations from truth are capitalized

apainat the corporation.

The only result of liberality is discrimination

between present and future security holders.
These few illustrations, chosen from the dozens that might
have been included, all point in one direction.

1

See Morgan,

cit.

Fair return can not be
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considered as a cost by Itself| neither can any other expense be
treated as a law unto itself, without considering the resultant
effect upon every other cost,

the important fact is the total, the

composite picture of all resource-sacrifices.

Nothing is to be gained

from a saving In one If a consequent burden is placed elsewhere • Indeed
it is probable that all such shifts create an unnaturalneas In the
operation of the regulatory process; an unnaturalness that stakes the
1
resultant burden greater than the earlier saving.
It Is not an accident that common stock has become the

residual share in profit-taking.

No more is It accidental that fair

return has been given the residual position in the machinery of
regulation.

Obviously in the absence of guarantee, and given the presence

of risk, there must be some "last* factor.
economic life, capital plays that role.

In the American way of

But because it is in this

somewhat inferior position it can not necessarily be neglected. For
in the last analysis its very Inferiority of position makes its demands
all the greater, and its retributions all the more severe.
In addition to the very close interrelationships between
fair return and all other items that make up the expense account, it
seems equally clear that the above statements make even more apparent the
inherent fallacy of discharging a duty to the public by making extensive

1

Bauer, o£. cit.
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calculations as to value, while only paying lip-service to
fair return*

fhe valuation problem doee not even touch the delicate

situations Involved in rate-making#

Fair return

as an amount, not as

a percentage <— * is at the focus of every one of such situations*
Technical valuations can be vastly altered without disturbing economic
relationships*
touch*

Fair return is extremely sensitive to the slightest

Only by the most careful attention to fair return as the

element in the entire process of regulation can Commission control
keep abreast of a dynamic situation.
This point can perhaps be mad© clearer with reference to
an actual decision made by the Public Service Commission of Maryland,
one of the older and better respected regulatory Commissions*

The case

in point is the very famous United Railways and Electric Co. y. West.
Here was involved a street railway in a declining market situation*
It had survived the rising costs of *$orld Wat I with a five cent fare*
But after the war, still an integral part of the transport system of
Baltimore, it requested an increase in its fares to improve a serious
financial situation*

In 1924, it was awarded a six cent fare*

The

company had suffered so long, however, from an inadequate rate that by
1924 even six cents was scarcely helpful*

So the company requested and

received commission approval of a seven cent fare*

But by the time

approval had been secured, the local market had become so saturated with
rival transport facilities, both of a public and a private nature, that

1

P.U.B. 1926 C, 441 and 280 U.S* 234.
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the company was obliged to request a ten cent fare, as had many other
companies In the country under substantially similar conditions*
The Commission flatly refused to allow the increase*

In its

1926 decision it promulgated two principles upon which its disapproval
was based*

First, the street railway was an absolutely essential portion of

the community's transport facilities*
over in the decision*

This fact was emphasized over and

Second, the Supreme Court had ruled that the charge

for the services of a utility must never exceed the value of the service
1
to the consumer*
More than eight cents, the Commission felt, would
violate this principle*

Therefore the fare allowed was an eight cent

2
marlmum*
So attempt will be made here to hazard a guess as to what the
Supreme Court meant in 1393 when it first began making reference to the
term "value of the service to the public.11 Suffice it to say that the
court, while never forthrightly denying the principle, has never applied
it (or permitted its application) in the manner proposed by the Maryland
3
Commission* In 1929* when the instant case reached the Supreme Court for
final adjudication, the court rendered its decision without making "value
4
of service" an issue.

1 Smyth x* Ames, I69 U.S. 466, was cited as authority for this
anomaly,
2

P.U.K. 1926 C, 441.

3 The present view of students of regulation on "value of service"
as a rate-making criteria is excellently stated by Thompson and Smith,
op* cit*, pp* 260—262*
4

280 U.S. 234*
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But the point that is to be considered here is the basic
principle of economics involved*

In any system of price relationships

it Is universally agreed that the economic importance of any good or
service to a community can only be measured by the price it is willing
to pay to secure the benefits*
importance is always direct.

Thus the correlation between price and
The Maryland Commission, in the Street

Railway Case, was holding out for an inverse correlation.

Actually,

if the railway services were completely indispensable in 1926, and in
all probability they were, no price could be too high, the charging of
which would result in no more than a 11fair” return.

An eight cent fare

would not have produced a return recognized as fair under any set of
supportable assumptions • Note, in this connection, that the Commission
acknowledged that the company could not make a fair return under the
1
1926 order.
There are a number of pertinent conclusions that might be drawn
from this land-mark decision.
limited.

Those treated here will necessarily be

The Commission assumed that it was performing a valuable service

for the public.

In that the Commissioners were undoubtedly sincere.

But

it is almost incredible that the Commission could suppose that it was
performing an economic service in such a non-economic manner.
In all fairness to the Maryland Commission, it should be stated
that it had noted several times prior to 1926 that the capital structure
of United Railways and Electric Company was In need of reorganization.

1

P.U.R., 1926 C, 441.

Perhaps rate order was intended to ferae the concern into bankruptcy.
Bat public interest would always be served more adequately by forcing
a reorganization before the credit of the company becomes irreparably
iapalred.

It is probably to the point to note that even though the

Supreme Court did permit the full ten cent fare, the eoiqp&ny went into
i
bankruptcy shortly thereafter and was reorganised in 1935*
If, then, a regulatory Commission can and does render opinions
and orders at variance with economic fundamentals, what are the
consequences of its action?

5®a might assume a case where the concern

involved was not thrown into bankruptcy proceedings.

Obviously here

would be a clear example of resultant credit impairment, and consequent
difficulty in overcoming the resistance of investors the next time capital
is needed.

Thus fair return in such a case would necessarily be higher

in the future, and rates correspondingly higher than would be necessitated
otherwise.
But if the Commission can force rates low enough to
precipitate foreclosure, the though arises that perhaps the above result
can be avoided.

(It goes without saying, of course, that such an order

would be Illegal.)

Bo Commission, however, or no series of Comaission

decisions, can alter the fact that a failure in any industry is a token
of risk to the investor.

Bot only will such a failure be held against

the particular company, but the whole Industry must partially share in the
discreditxQsnt.

1

And, as if that were not enough, such cases are discounted

Moody,

SsmSi

1936.

iu

against all regulated Industry, for rightly or wrongly depending
on the individual case, such misfortune* are laid at the door of
regulatory bodies,

It is very probable that in any reorganisation a

number of individuals lost money.

But it is highly inprobable that

utility customers get their services even as eheaply beeause of those
feu losses.

Whatever disagreements there are still among theorists on the

problem of interest, it is almost unanimously agreed that risk is a part

3L

of capital cost.

to get a more general picture of the problem involved

ue need only pose for ourselves the question of hou much cheaper capital
might now be secured if no money had ever been lost in the stock market.
Such influences are tiny when taken separately, but they loom large in
the aggregate.
Thus far this chapter has been more illustrative than
analytical.

But the relationship to the theory of regulation la close.

The problem of regulation is not many problems*

It is only one*

business unit is not a series of separate and Independent facts*
one fact *— with a series of Interdependent aspects*

A
It is

The one problem

and the one fact can both be subsumed under the concept of fair return*
Fair return, far from being a legitimate item to relegate to a minor
position, is a basic point in regulation*
A brief glance at the textbook material in the field of
regulation should emphasize the fact that too often regulation has wholly

1

Knight,

pit*

us

1
missed this crucial point.

Particularly is this true with reference

to the question of valuation. It is seldom recognised that no concern
a
can be confiscated through valuation alone*
Equally true is the
statement that no concern can be confiscated by fair return calculations
3
in and of themselves.
But after the concern has paid its bills for the
year, it either does or does not have enough to provide compensation
for the residual factors of production used by the enterprise* If it
4
has too much or too little, the factors receive economic rent*
If
there is just enough the factors receive no rent and regulation has been
5
successful.
Only part of this confusion, however, is caused by the fact
that we have a tendency to view things as parts rather than as wholes.
Another portion arises from the traditional understanding of corporation
finance.

We live in a dynamic society.

That being the case, businesses

make profits some of the time and losses some of the time.

Capitalism

1 Thompson and Smith, o p . clt. This volume is merely typical. The
authors simply treat fair return as one factor related to the rate-making
problem.
2

Bauer,

op

. £&>

3 P>Ad.
4 Too little return, of course, is a negative rent made technically
possible by the fixity of capital and the capitalization process.
*> The intimate relationship between fair return and valuation Is aptly
discussed by Bauer, gg. elt.
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could not have survived the dynamic necessities of the past had not
some way boon devised *— through legal categories
profits and losses equitably,

to distribute

this distribution necessarily took the

fora of priorities as to claim against the corporation*

the relationship

agreed upon between priority and risk was the inverse relationship so
familar to students of corporation finance $ the higher the priority, the
1
lower the risk; and the lower the priority, the higher the risk*
It is at
once obvious how difficult it would have been to create a satisfactory
money market if no claim-bolder knew from one fiscal period to the next
how his risk would be rationed on the next dividend date*
If the parcelling out of risk had been left to private
enterprise, furthermore, it would have represented a violation of one of
our most sacred ideals — * that of non~arhitrariness —
resting capitalism upon an insecure foundation*

in addition to

The aim in capitalistic

finance has been to distribute risks by classes, not by individuals* To
have given the owner the privilege of deciding such an issue for himself
would have been to pave the way for all manner of personal diacriicinations
a
not consistent with the fundamentals of social philosophy*

1 Edwards, G*W., The Evolution of Finance Capitalism* (Longmans,
Green and Company, Hew fork, 19387)
Z This is not to say that certain discriminations do not persist
even under a system of legal classification* See ^avis, Jerome, Capital*
Ism and jta Culture. (Farrar and Rhinehart, New fork, 1933*)

Bisk in enterprise eight have been rationed in either of two
ways.

First, it sight have been distributed in such a way that each
X
class of d&isMiolders would proportionately gain or lose as dynamics

altered operating conditions*

Second, classes might have been given

absolute superiorities and absolute inferiorities in distinct and
certain ways*

Basically, the second alternative describes the choice

actually made*

Bondholders are not paid proportionately with stock**

holders*

They have an absolute claim on earnings up to the amount of

their intersst-daim*

Bondholders do, however, share proportionately
£
with bondholders, if earnings are less than intersst-claims*
The phenomenon of profit and loss makes clear at the outset

the inevitability, however risk is parcelled out to elaim-holders, of
the existence of a residual risk*

A residual risk is to be defined as

that risk born by a elalm-holder for the reason that no one else is In
a legal position to bear the risk for him*
only upon earnings —

Concentrating for the moment

to avoid unnecessary complications — ■ each class

of claimholders bears the risk of the corporation not having a net r»*renuc
sufficient for paying dividends*

A low-risk class of holders —

bondholders—

bear no risk up to earnings equivalent to their own interest payments*

1 A claim is defined as a certificate of ownership, unaccompanied
by physical control of the assets represented. Types of claims are
differentiated according to distance from physical control under certain
circumstances«
2 The process of apportionment within a single class is an
intricate one, still In a stage of evolution*

14S

tom tamings is not a risk up to this point for tfa* bondholdiog
company group because there exists a class which is legally compelled
to boar this rlsik for thorn* The same thing can bo said of tho
low-risk el&ss of stocky if tho stock has boon divided into several
classes.
tho strategy of the system followed by American corporations
1
was dictated by financial expediency.
Saving, under capitalism, is a
planned activity*

Thus it represents a definitely considered view

of the future as a condition precedent*

Before making a commitment an

investor must make calculations that would be impossible unless the
2
relative risks were known in advance. Thus the business expediency
involved is that of overcoming as much resistance on the part of investors
as possible*

Some savers want only a little risk* Others will assume
3
larger quantities*
The job of those in charge of the corporate financial

policy is to sell to each potential investor the type of claim that most
appeals to him*

The over-all result of meeting this expediency is “cost

1 Davis, John P., Corporationsi
(G.L. Putnams* Sons, Sew York, 1905.)

Their Origin and Development*

2 Absolute risk, of course, can never be known*
refers to the knowledge of how much risk Is to be born
of holders — how much worse conditions can get before
to the investor making the calculations* Absolute risk
residuality*

Relative risk
by high-risk classes
payments will cease
Is the fact of

3 It need not be emphasized that the money market provides compensation
in the form of higher yields for greater risks*

U9

of capital.11 The batter pleased every investor is the cheaper the
capital factor can be acquired by enterprise*
if total risk were a known quantity year by year, risk
would still need to be parcelled out, although every type of risk could
I
be aade perfectly definite, rather than being partially residual. But
total potential gain is virtually infinite.

Total potential lose, no

flatter what the law may say, amounts to the quantity of capital invested.
Actual gain or lose will always be between these two extremes in any
fiscal period.

Legal rules promulgated in advance of operations, therefore,

could never parcel out risks in any precise manner.

Law has thus been

forced to compromise between the necessity of formulating rules for the
future and the impossibility of assessing risks accurately.
inevitable result has been the residual risk.
process is over-conservative —

The

If the pro-parcelling

figuratively speaking —

the residual

risk is highly paid; if under-eonaervative, the residual risk is poorly
paid.
Historically common atock has been the residual risk. Fair
return in public utility regulation includes payments to all groups of
clalm-holders.

Herein lies a fundamental confusion of thought.

Since

common dividends represent the residual legal claim it is difficult to

1 Professor Knight has popularised the view that a sharp distinction
can and should be drawn between calculable unknowns (risk) and non-calculable
unknowns (uncertainty). Thus corporations must parcel out uncertainty and
risk. Op. elt.
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elserly in mind the feet that In & regulated industry the

entire fair return take® on the qualities of e residual sum*

If

ether expenses increase# total revenue remaining the sas*# fair
return aust shrink*
decrease*

the opposite must result if other expenses

Obviously such a regulatory catch-all 1® as necessary as

the legal residual*

the two need® arose from the sane source

the

impossibility of aeourate prediction*
Sot only do these two residual® have a common origin# hut
they have an identical function*

Each in a somewhat special field ha®

the delicate duty of distributing profits and losses# within the Hadis
set by the total operating conditions*

The equity of the legal residual

depends upon the distribution of risks between classes of eX&lsHholdsrs#
the equity of the economic residual depends upon the distribution of the
product of industry to the factors contributing to this product*

Equity

here# as always# contemplates the distribution of rights as compared with
responsibilities throughout society*

Equity In assessing residuals thus

has virtually the same content as the concept of regulation*
The legal residual refers to distributing income m
parts of the capital factor*

between

The economic residual refers to distribution

as between the factors in general* Interpreted broadly no distinction
2
need be made between the two*
If understood each in the context of the

1 Capital leverage makes this particular error loom larger at
times* Fair return# as a residual# rewards both creditors and owners* But
owners have a residual claim# while creditors do not* Thus the fixity of
the claims of creditors makes the(entire residuality of fair return impinge
upon only one reward*
2 Actually the law does provide that labor shall be paid before
bond interest# thus contemplating much more than the capital factor itself*

other, regulation can be mad© more nearer eom»sttsttraie with actual
economic society*
Economists have been most insistent upon their classifications
of the factora ©f production,

the traditional grouping ©alia for four

factorst land, labor, capital, and management.

The l&sbHaamed is
1
considered to be the residual factor, according to theorists* It is
tele factor that is principally reimbursed through fair return* the
function of regulation is to eliminate economic rente from this return*
Since rents legally belong to whoever is In a position to claim them,
since they always appear first as income of the business unit, and
since they are capable of being capitalised fully the moment they are
distributed, the regulatory problem Is seen to be a difficult one.
Economic rents do not always appear as residuals, and, of
course, residuals do not always represent economic rents*
however, rents are contained in the business residual.

Typically,

I’he specific

problem of regulation insofar as these rents are concerned is to dearly
separate factor opportunity costs from economic rent and keep the latter
from arising* fur once they arise regulation can not redistribute them
without confiscation, sometimes confiscation of a third party having no
connection with the collection of the original rents being Involved. For
rents that do sot arise as residuals the regulatory problem Is still to
keep them from arising, for if care Is not taken regulation may have the

1 Froman,
git*, chapter XXFIX. This reward for management
is the traditional "profit11 of the orthodox economist*

% n

result either of falling to eliminate a rent at its source only
to hare it appear later in the re8idualy or of causing a negative
rent at the souree only to have it reappear later in the form of
higher opportunity cost for the residual factor*
Every decision of a commission, particularly if an
important one, produces some impact upon the operating structure of
the business involved*

If this impact clearly (and only) reflects

circumstances outside the control of either the commission or the
company, regulation has done all that it can do*

It sometimes happens,

however, as witness the typical examples delineated above, that the
action of the eeamlssloa serves merely to shift the impact upon an
operating area less well fitted to absorb it, but a different area than
would have been affected In the normal course of operation*

Such a case

creates a "regulatory residual1** different from the operating residual
heretofore considered, and usually undesirable in actual practice*
This chapter has been concerned with showing fair return as
a residual of residuals*

Any control designed to destroy an economic

rent, unless it takes into consideration the total effect of a decision,
makes fair return a regulatory residual consistent neither with logic nor
operating efficiency*

The two chapters immediately following will have

as their purpose the task of demonstrating how fair return could be
converted into a regulatory tool consistent with the dynamic developments
within the economy, namely capitalization of economic inelasticities*
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CHAPTER VI
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF REGULATION

Thus far this dissertation has been frankly theoretical
in that general principles rather than specific cases have been the
emphasis* However, in order to complete the integration intended in
this work, it is now necessary to consider sons of the practical
ramifications of the theoretical analysis*

The purpose of this and

the succeeding chapter will he to suggest a few shortcomings of present
regulation in terms of the preceding chapter, and to outline the changes
in regulatory technique required to implement the ideal implicit in
American social philosophy in the light of the environmental developments
discussed earlier*
It must be emphasized at the outset that criticism of regulation
is only partially Justified* If by merely altering somewhat the approach
of regulation to the larger problem of philosophy regulators could
actually make the ideal realizable then studied criticism would be the
logical end of a work such as this*

It is characteristic, however, of

dynamics in society that the original ideal becomes less desirable as it
becomes more difficult*

Stated in terms of regulation this statement

means that a more realistic approach to the problem by regulators can
result only in a more complete control of businesses regulated*

Hot only

is this prospect an undesirable one for those regulated, but it has some
appearance of illogicality to regulators In the Ught of the decreasing
significance of the industry dlasaificatlon originally promulgated by the
courts*

For the present, attention will be focused away from these latter

m

considerations, and criticism of regulation wtll be predicated upon
the degree to which tho ideal pattern of regulation la still desirable.
Boat students of public utilities reeognti&e certain defects
X
in the methods presently used in determining fair return*
Moat of
than* criticisms center about the problem of valuation, even though
many writers candidly admit that too much emphasis in given valuation
a
and too llttla given fair return*
Nonetheless there have been notable
attempts, among academicians at least, to outline an objective basis for
return determinantion; thus making fair return more realistic by today’s
3
standards.
Unfortunately, however, these writers typically begin their
analyses with a peculiar type of assumption! one probably made necessary
by their rigid observance of dose relationship between value and return,
but which can redly only serve to oast sharp doubt upon the ultimate
results obtained*

The assumption referred to is the use of the concept

’average9 as a practical approach to the problems of control.
k representative example of the use of averages and the possible
error to be derived therefrom, can be had by further reference to

X for one of the most studied criticisms of present-day methods see
the results of a study by the Hate and Research Department of the federal
Communications Commission in 193d with reference to the proper return for
the bong lines Department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
These reports can be had only through the Commission in plaaographed form.
Other works of criticism are too numerous to warrant any attempt at a
complete list.
Z Both Nelson lee Smith, &&» sit*, and Wu, gg. cit*. bemoan the neglect
of fair return and yet devote the bulk of their books to valuation technique
and valuation theories. These two authors are selected as examples, because
their works are the only ones purporting to deal comprehensively with fair
return.
3 For the fullest account of m objective alternative to current
regulatory technique see & Bill J& Inset ££& Prudent Investment gajift. s£
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1
Professor Smith** analysis of return.

So suggests dividing tho

valuation into too equal porta; o m represents bonds, tho other
stock.

to tho ofl»unt representing bonds shell be applied

the goirg

rote demanded by bondholders; to that representing stock shall be
applied a rate one half of one per cent higher, ee the average relation*

2
•hip between bond and stock yields.
the significant errors permitted by this type of analysis
hinge upon the feet that it implicitly necessitates a number of allied
assumptions shich are really untenable in effective regulation.

The

first of these assumptions is that always present when averages are used
for jure than description*

Certainly few if any utilities correspond

precisely to the average as to capital structure*

To regulate all

utilities as though the same capital-cost conditions prevail universally
permits a preliminary injustice to all speeulatlvely financed utilities**
3
with no distinction between cases of laxity and economic necessity; and

& &*ts Regulation* Report of Commission on Revision of the Public Service
Commissiona Law, Sew fork. Legislative Document No. 75 of 1930, pp.411-422,
prepared by James C« Bonright os a part of the Minority Report of
Ceosdssioners Walsh, Bonright ,and Adle. This document Is particularly
worthy of careful study as a comprehensive attempt to give return an
independent status in the regulatory process*
1 fig* clt*« chapter VII.
2 Professor Wu begins his analysis with a similar assumption and
decides upon a similar technique.
3 To penalise a utility with high fixed charges, and whose bonds
and stock mast both offer investors a high y eld to induce them to assume
the risks involved, after permitting (in a sense) the incurring of the
tophsavy indebtedness, is to punish the child after laughing at its
misbehavior. And certainly capital costs will be forced up for the future
by inflicting the penalty, but regardless of the wisdom of this method
of regulation as a general principle, adjustment must assuredly be made In
favor of those utilities which have high fixed charges because economic
conditions forced them to issue bonds, and those whose managers were
interested merely in financial leverage.
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permits unwarranted cxtravaganes to conservatively financed corporations--without distinction between more good judgment in financing and excessive
pact mornings*

Furthir, the tendency under such a syaim

of regulation

would probably bo to gradually force the arbitrary capitalisation upon
the utilities* regardless of the economic wisdom of such financing i»
particular eases*

And not only would this method violate the canons of

economy* but It would in addition be contrary to the legal injunctions
of the courts* the final arbiter in regulatory matters*
Supreme Court of the halted States has insisted that
1
considered on its own merits*

Repeatedly the

each case be

A second untenable assumption to be found in an arbitrary
etock-bond ratio* is the assumption that the time of the inquiry can be
disregarded*

An average prevailing: ratio pertaining to utilities over

the years is not helpful in arriving at a proper return for a given
utility*

Historically* for example* the Hew England Telephone and

Telegraph Company has financed Itself with funded debt amounting to
30 per cent of total capital at a cost of 3*19 per cent*

Southern

California Edison* with 45 per cent of its capital represented by bond s,

1 Willcox x* Consolidated Gas Co«* 212 U.S. 19$ Lincoln Gas Co*
X* Lincoln* 230 C«S« 256$ Galveston Electric Co. X* Galveston* 258 0*3*388}
Bluefleld Electric Co* x* Commission* 262 U.S. 679} United Railways
X* West* 280 U.S. 234* The following Is a typical statement from the fourth
of tts cases above cited at page 693* “...this Court**.held that the
question idiether a rate yields such a return as not to be confiscatory
depends upon circumstances* locality and risk* and that no proper rate can
be established for all cas0s***n

3.57

secured that particular capital at a cost of 4*95 pear cent. At the
extreme end in conservative finance stands Pacific telephone and
telegraph with only 15 per cent of total capitalisation funded*
company secures Its debt capital at a

this

cost substantially lees than the

parent company, the figure for P*t. and T. being 3.56 per cent*

let

Boston Edison, with more than tides the proportion of its capitalisation
funded, has secured its debt

capital at a ccst of 3.52 per cent, or .04
1
per cent cheaper than P.T. & f . thus there would seem to be no
necessary close correlation between the else of the bond ratio and the
cost of funded capital*

Obviously there is a correlation but the

variations from the mold so set will, in specific instances, vary so
significantly as to completely vitiate the use of an arbitrary ratio
both as to actual ratios and their corresponding costs to say nothing
of the widely different effects of particular bond ratios upon the cost
of common stock.
A third misconception implicit in the

arbitrary stock-bond

ratio technique of utility regulation is a misunderstanding of the
purpose of regulation*

If our only Interest in placing public service

companies under state supervision were to accept and reflect whatever
course utility managements wished to follow, arbitrariness tempered

1 The percentages quoted were computed by the Rate and Research
Department of the Federal Communications Commission. For the method of
computation used see The Problem of "Rate of Return.*1 June 15, 1936,
pp. 159 ff*
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with generosity sight be as adequate an approach as any*

But in

such a case regulation would have but little raison dHtrc. Such
seams to be the result of the policy followed by tbt Pennsylvania
Commission for 21 years, a policy allowing the

same identical rate

of return to all utilities regardless of local conditions and without
1
consideration of the state of the business cycle.
the aim of regulation however, runs much deeper.

We desire

our utilities to operate, not under whatever conditions may occur to
managements regardless of purpose, but the most economical conditions
possible toward the end of producing the public utility service.

Any

regulation with a justified existence has always in the foreground the
view of economical service, and is constantly considering the problem of
economising still further.

Any regulation that neglects this aspect,

is not functioning to the fullest of which it is capable.

This aim of

economy should' be m t first by managerial initiative, second by
Commission guidance.

Thus the Public Utility Commission should be In a

position to observe, suggest, urge , demand —

in that order -- with

reference to economy of service.

1 Rose, Joseph R., Public Utility Regulation in Pennsylvania.
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1939.) Bote the follow
ing pp. 62-3. "The Commission had occasion to fix a return in approxi
mately 148 cases during this time. Every type of utility was involved in
these eases, electric, water, street railway, natural gas, sewerage and
others, but in every case with little or no discussion the Commission
found that 7 per cent was a fair return."

The facts about capital economy are sketchy and hard t®
obtain.

But enough are available to fully demonstrate the inaccuracy

of a frosen, artificial, regulatory mold. In March, 1932, the moat
economical form of capitalisation consisted of 45 per cent bonds and
55 per

cent stock.

of 55 per cent bonds.

In March, 1935, the

most economical form consisted

%

March, 1937, the most desirable bond ratio
X
cent, while in 1940 it had again risen to 55 per

had fallen to 45 per
2
cent.
The comparable figure for October, 1935, was 0 per cent j and fcr
3
October, 1936, 30 per cent.
Surely no single ratio could be acceptable
even for six months; and a "standard11 that must be subjected to a send-*
annual change is illusory indeed; tfiile if unchanged it could only be
positively injurious• Either the

standard would become the actual, to

the detriment of the consumer; or the standard would exceed the actual
(in bonds), to the detriment of the consumer; or the standard would be
less than the ectual, also to the detriment of the consumer.

The ohly

possibility of non-injury to the consumer would be the extremely rare
instance where economic conditions caused the actual ratio in a particular
case to coincide with the standard as adjusted at the time of

1 Federal Cossnunicationa Commission, og> clt.. p. 151 * For
method of computation see pp.105 ff*
2 Rational Association of Railroads and Public Utility Commissioners,
Proceedings, 1940, Report of Committee on Corporation Finance.
3 Federal Common!cations Commission, pp. cifc.
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1
ill* Inquiry.
the abort

criticism, though prompted by and adaptad to

tho suggestions offered by Professor Smith, la not to be understood
a
at containing any but a genera1 connotation* Dr* Smith** mark it
ealy typical ©f the approach most ®&amriX& encountered} an approach
peculiar to thoee who endeavor to treat fair return somewhat apart from
3
valuation — with the exception of thoee indlvidnale Vho seek to guarantee
1
5
stock dividends, and those who seek a more scientific basis*

1 It la not meant here to create the impression that fair return
in a particular ease should conform to the Ideal situation of tbs moment}
but to actual conditions that have, through regulation, been made to
conform as nearly to the ideal condition as economically feasible*
2 S e * fit. It is only fair to recognise that the author would
permit deviations from the norm* the following statement appears at p*X?$«
”?o suggest that the current yield basis cm which the securities of a
given utility sell be used in determining its fair rate of return is not
to argue that each utility be permitted to set standards for its own
regulation, nor Is it to abandon the concept of a long-run norm* The current
yield indicates merely the necessity of short-run deviations from that norm
in particular: cases if the credit of the utility is net to suffer*11 It
would seem that any fcrm of regulation that adds to the multitudinous adjust
ments necessary In any case, is not the most desirable system to adopt*
3 In addition to those jveviously mentioned see Raymond, W.Q.,
ghat is Fair * (John Utley and Sons, Mew fork, 1913.)
4

Bauer, £&» d t .

5 donee and Bigham, gg* d t *. and Bernstein, E.M., Publie
polity Sfeta Making aqd the Price level. (University of North Carolina
Press, C h a p e l H m , 1937V)Pp. 153 ff.

1&

In faot the technique under discussion is but a refinement of the

X
procedure adopted by Public Service Commissions almost universally,

2
even though lip-service is paid to scientific methods*
that a Chairman of the

Pee fork Commission was once asked how he

arrived at a ‘'rate* of return*
to the

It is said

He replied that he merely listened

testimony of experts hired by the parties concerned, went home

and had a good night's rest, end came back the next morning with the
proper percentage in mind*

The Eats and Be search Department of the

Federal Comainications Commission has tersely summarised the situation
3
similarly.
The errors enumerated as consequent from the assumptions
illicit In 11average1* regulation, stem from a common source} the
paramount necessity for adopting some definite point of departure. All
activity predicated upon the future must consider as certain sons
fundamental concepts that have not been precisely proved.

This element

of uncertainty is characteristic, not of public utility regulation as
such, but of any normative approach to social problems.

But the

working—certainty that must supplant actual uncertainty for purposes of

1 With the possible exception of Massachusetts, Her technique
is a bit difficult to describe, and there is soms dispute about its
actual working in practice. But basically the Commission endeavors to
keep the price of securities at par. For details see Barnes, Irston R,,
Public Utility Control in Massachusetts, (lale University Press, New
Haven, 1930.)
2 For a further statement on this point see Pegrum, D.F., Rate
Theories of the California Railroad Commission- (University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1932.)
3 <&• cit-# P* 7
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decision la tha assumption or assumptions that represent tha paint
of departure tor regulators*
If it ho granted th&t

aasai^tlon (uncertainty) la necessary

in regulation, the question of what constitute* a proper assumption
becomes of paramount significance*

The objections voiced here to ifee

typical assumptions of writers on regulation canter around the thought
1
that the assumptions are illicit.
They are illicit because they largely
fail to relate closely to tho underlying philosophy of regulation*
It seems obvious that the only type of assumption that could be
justified in regulation would be an assumption concerning the prevailing
social philosophy*

All manifest ©utworkiogs of social control must

be

2
supplemental or Qomplement&l to social philosophy*

Really no assumption

is necessary, save the original one applying the pertinent parts of social
philosophy to the

specific problems at hand*

The pertinent part of social philosophy here involved Is free
will, or the right of choice.

Unless regulation theory uses choice as

a starting point, the results are apt to be vague and confusing, if net

1 This statement is, of course, a serious indictment. Most
past treatment of regulation has focused upon the average concept in some
fo»*
2 Social philosophy will be taken to mean the equation of rights
and responsibilities within the social structure* Social control is the
enfor cement of this equality*
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contradictory• For with any other starting point regulation theory
loses sight of who is being confiscated or what of vqlu* is the object
1
of regulation controversy*
Free enterprise in our society comprehends
above all the right to devote self and property t© particular enterprises,

2
subject to certain limitations, which limitations must be known in advance*
The confiscated personality is not a business concern, but
an individual*

The object of value that regulation theory decides (on

the basis of social philosophy) to either protect or not protect, Is an
expectation of income*

Ho assumption not essentially Individualised —

apart, thus, from the individual status of the corporation in courts of
law —

can fail to contradict prevailing philosophy*
Most Innovations in the field of fair return— ' notably

3

in the instances cited in the preceding pages — « fail in this regard*
Xt can be stated rather optimistically, however that the current trend

1 Eegulation through averages, for example, makes the problem
of confiscation completely impersonal, a result wholly incongruous with
our ideas of social justice* Just as law may never coerce an individual
except non-arbitrarily, so may it never coerce without regard to individual
rights and responsibilities* See Jones, and Blgham, £&* ©it**pp.278 ff*
for a frank recognition of this factor as it relates to fair return*
2 This is a reference to the constitutional prohibition against
retroactive legislation* Thus once more the extreme importance of this
clause in the Constitution becomes evident*
3 Kota how wide of the mark some suggestions do dome* dee
Jesting, Joseph, "Public Utility Hates on Heproductlon -*• A Cost of Service
Principle,9 Journal of Land and Public Utility Economica» Volume 17,
pp* 138 ff., May, 1941.
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is toward a batter understanding at this point.

One outstanding

aacaog}!* of improved technique came very close to bels^ Incorporated
1st© basic legislation in' Haw York.

This latter exaiqplc will serve

somewhat as a guide to further examination of specific possibilities in
the direction of individualising fair return in harmony with social
philosophy.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this and the following
chapter to outline three steps leading toward more realistic regulation.
To a degree these steps depend only upon a limited amount of rethinking
on the part of commissions.

To some extent, however, these steps hinge

upon a further extension of jurisdiction*

As fundamental as have been
4

seme of the legislative additions to commission powers in the past decade,
this latter prospect should not be an alarming one.
Before outlining specific proposals a few summary observations
m&j be helpful to the

reader.

Fair return is considered here in terms

of economic cost, or rights equal to responsibilities.

Furthermore It is

taken for granted that the principal element in fair return must inevitably

1
The most recent is Coffman, Paul B., “The Direct Approach to
the Fair Return Question,« Public Utilities Fortnightly. Folums 30,
Number 5, pp. 277 ff; Number 6, pp.35 ff*
2
Report of Commission on Revision of the Public Service
Commissions Law, New York, Legislative Document 75 of 1939* PP* 411*422.
3
See Bonbright, James C«, Public Utilities .and the Rational Power
Policies. (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1940.)
4
Fear a rather complete analysis of changes in regulatory authority
during the depression see Proceedings, National Association of Railroads
and Utilities Commissioners, 1936, pp.360-402.
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X
be the attraction of capital, cat opportunity cost*

Difficulty

frequently arises from a not unusual attempt to sake fair return
tbs entire problen of regulation, instead of holding it to its more
United (residual) sphere*

The fact that fair return is an accounting

residual makes it almost logical to consider it in terms of every aspect
of regulation not otherwise handled*

But the attest is not helpful*

Fair return is residual because of its technical nature, not because
commissions consider other factors first*

Thus every factor considered

at its incidence leaves less of a problem at the residual level and
rewits in a much more equitable and convincing process*
In the actual operations of a business, economic rentals
may be one of two kinds*

They may be either contractual or residual*

Contractual rents result from a factor *a ability to take advantage of
a discontinuity in opportunities, enabling it to reap a surplus reward
above opportunity costs.

Residual rents are those rents that are

technically correlated with capital costs and accrue to individuals
unexpectedly as the future unravels itself into the present*
Contractual rewards form an element In individual expectations*
That is, they are subject to advance capitalization*

Residual rewards do

not form an element in expectations in the same way*

These latter rents

1 Although the Hate and He search Department of the Federal
Communications Commission enumerates various considerations, it doss give
principal emphasis throughout to the problem of securing capital*
Op * cit*
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are subject only to speculation in advance*
distinction are important.

the consequences of this

Contractual rents are opposed to the

assertions of pure competition, but not to the philosophy Of choice*

Residual rents in a regulated industry are opposed to both the assumptions
of competition and social philosophy*

Contractual rents can be controlled

by the establishment of certain specific checks*

Residual fants can toe

controlled only by the general check known in utility regulation as
1
control of fair return*
If residual rents, or profits, served in any way to lower
cost of utility service to consumers, It would be loss imperative to
minimize them*

But these rents may toe either positive or negative and are

just about as likely to be one as another.

Since either result causes a

change la the over-all expectation surrounding the particular Income
involved, its effeet must be to alter the cost of capital, and thus becomes
of vital significance to regulation*

Whether positive or negative (since

in either case the opposite would have been just as possible) the effeet
will be to engender a more speculative capitalization than without the

2
particular instability*

1 Residual rents and fair return are not synonoraouo terms* Rents
are simply an element found in return under certain circumstances* See
Morgan, Charles S., op, d t *
2 The term speculative capitalization is not used here in its
orthodoat sense* Graham and Dodd, $£, cit* * Fart II* Here it means that
the expectations surrounding a given Issue of claims in the market has
become more uncertain* This usage is related to that of Graham and Dodd,
although not identical*
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A positive residual m a m an tmder~«apitallccd probability,
A negative residual M e n s an ovsr-eepitelised probability* tiibsr,
separately or collectively, means that a probability has besom less
probable, less certain.

Sine# only the certainty contained in a

probability can be capitalised, the result ©f over * or under-capitallaatlon east be to loner the pries of the security and raise the capital
cost to the utility.
The first step necessary to make regulation c&nform to these
principles of modern economy is to make return the test of reasonableness*
this Is already a basic canon of regulation, although rarely recognised under
present technique.

The cotarts are willing to stake return the test of

reasonableness on the side of confiscation; it is equally important to
h a m seas such gauge on the side of extortion.

Within Halts, meaning

when rates become so high that even the housewife knows she is being
robbed, return is reduebd when it reaches a certain absolute celling*
Bui In the large number of cases where fair return is 1 or 2 per oent
lower than the actual return, no o m takes the trouble to make complaint.
On the other side, however, when actual return falls below fair return,
utilities iB»diately petition for higher rates*
It is probably within the power of the average commission to adopt the
suggested

standard, if ever and whenever the utility begins to receive
3b
wore then a fair return,
but in actual practice attention is only rarely

1 Re toe Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation, F.tl.E. 1731 A, p.132.
Here the Railroad Commission originated m investigation on its own motion
because it felt the Coopery was realising returns in excess of those
considered reasonable. By silence at least the feder&l courts seemed to
approve this technique • 289 0.8. 287*
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1
given to slightly excessive returns.

In fact, there m y be

significant examples where exactly the reverse is the case,

California

and Massachusetts have long been considered courageous in that they
have dared decide rate eases by using historical cost or a slight
variation thereof as the rate base,

let it is commonplace to hear it

said that these commissions have been successful in keeping themselves

2
out of the courts by being generous as regards fair return,

California

gains additional favor with her utilities by adopting an undepreciated
rate base for purposes of valuation. Other commissions have similarly
loaned over backwards in trying to avoid unfavorable (or merely
troublesome) litigation.

At present there is no consistent check upon

this prejudice to consumer interests. Some states have experimented
3
with a Peonies1 Counsel to prosecute in the interest of the public. If,
however, sow system were inaugurated to make the return actually
received prime evidence of rate reasonableness, this legal tool would

1 hew Xork and Pennsylvania, through the accounting divisions
of their Public Serviee Commissions, in 1930 undertook an investigation
of the actual returns currently received by the electrical utilities
under their Jurisdiction, The great majority were receiving returns in
excess of 10 per cent, at a time when 8 per cent was the return most
commonly allowed by commissions in actual rate cases,
2

See Pegrum, o&, clt.. and Thompson and Smith, o&. oit.

3 For a brief description of the Peoples1 Counsel and its
work see Thompson and Smith, o p , clt,, pp* 210-211* See also Prendergast,
o p , clt,» PP* 297-300,
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be unnecessary ^

even granting It a certain usefulness under present

conditions •
It has been argued, arti convincingly, that the consumer is
protected against the above

type of encroachflwnt. Chairman Prenderg&at,
1
of the Mew York Commission takes this view as indicated by the following*
As a matter of fact, the interests of the users of public
utility services are competently defended. In bringing
rate eases before the commissions, cities are represented
by their corporation counsels and by special counsel
if such are deemed necessary. If a case Is worth the
bribing, certainly a city is justified in engaging
competent counsel and competent experts, and certainly
It can provide funds to do so.

In part the above is a strong argument,

In answer to that part it will

only be stated here that in those eases where consumer rights are in
no danger of violation, no change in this regard need be enforced.
But on the other hand the above argument seems to partially miss the
entire point at issue.

The crucial question is really not whether there

are theoretical avenues of protection for consumers, but whether in fact
regulation does operate so as to best fulfill its prime function— assuring
the economical performance by private concerns of public functions j not
whether present methods are good, but whether they could be improved.
On this latter point, the evidence seems dearly in favor of
seam form e€ the technique here suggested.

The experience of the

Pennsylvania Commission cited above should be sufficiently revealing as
supporting evidence. Consumers have no protection through regulation
■ectly. Chairman Prendergast unequivocally states that he conceives

1

Ibid.
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of & regulatory commission as a quasi-judicial body, as distinct
tvcm a "prosecuting agency.n
In addition to the fact that regulation tends to be one-sided
In practice, public utility control needs an automatic check for yet
another reason.

Eate cases are but spasmodic at best*

Oemnlssions are

supposed to set rates for a reasonable time in the future by using
for data the faots of the period just ended.

Chairman Proudergast feds

that this period may well be five or six years, but only if prices remain

2
unchanged.
3
follewss

Howard Dozier has expressed this difficulty quite well as

A rate schedule desigened to produce an average
reasonable rate of return at a time when earnings can
be expected to be high is unreasonably lew and vice versa*
Failure to give sufficient recognition to this funda
mental fact is responsible in no small degree for our everrecurring rate cases. In the absence of a working agreement
between the public and the utility, the duty of a ratemaking body is to fix a schedule of rates and keep it
fairly stationary, not to fix a rate of return and keep it
fixed.
Hr. Dozier cites a significant example of the results of present policy
in this regard*

In 1922 a commission adopted 7 per cent as the fair

rate of return for a certain utility.

As is the custom in such cases

the Conaission analyzed probable operating expenses, added 7 per cent

1
2

oit.* p. 29d*
Ibid.

3 "Present Reasonable Hate of Return for Public Utilities,11
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics. Vol. IV, pp. 235-236.
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on fair value to the figure thus obtained, and fixed the rate schedule
to produce that gross revenue.

During the next three years the rate

schedule produced a return of 10 per cent, 1$J per cent, and 11 per cent*
Apparently "if 7 per cent in 1922 was reasonable, then 17i per cent was
X
reasonable in 1921..."
and the "...rate of return applied in 1922 should
have been about 3 per cent In order to have resulted in the schedule of
rates at which the regulatory body evidently was aiming...11
There is little to be gained by multiplying instances. Examples
are legion*

If return is to be used only in fixing rates, then consumers

oust resign themselves to expect

rates to be "correct" only once over a

period of years, aid that as taxpayers they will be involved in expensive
litigation whenever the utility feels that return Is too leer* if on the
other hand fair return could be used as a mure dynamic tool of regulation,
as a test of reasonableness as well as a proof of unreasonableness, utility
regulation could be much enhanced in the direction of our over-all philosophy*
The foregoing considerations have been primarily concerned
with the economic aspects of the problem posed.
also repay analysis*

However, legal aspects will

In the first place, on what grounds can a consumer, or

a municipality as representing consumers in the aggregate, enter a prayer
for l»«*r rat.a exc.pt £n the
profits?

tfaat the. utility A& ffikljqg exce l. *

The answer that will first occur to a thoughtful reader is

"value of servlde."

This principle of rate control is as old as Judicial

2
review of utility regulation,

althotgh for forty years it was scarcely

1

Ibid*

2

Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co* y. Sanfiford, 164 U.S. 573*
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mentioned by consumer-conscious commissions. Than in 1929 and the
years immediately following '•value of service14 was eagerly sought as
so avenue toward lower rates*

the Maryland Commission used this

concept as an argument to keep street railway fares low in Baltimore,
1
only to be reversed by the Supremt Court*
In 1932 the Wisconsin
Co— nifrsion endeavored to substitute ”value of serviceN for ”cost of
service*4 as the proper rule of reasonableness, and set with the sane

2
result in the courts,
genuinely doubtful that

except more emphatically.

At present it is

the ••value of service” principle could stand

another court test as a legal injunction in regulation.

Its only

usefulness is concisely summarized by two authors as fellows#
...Tala* of service is n& help, a t i ^ a i i Prt-aary standard
SL reasonableness j&£ pricing o£ utility servlcaa...value of
service plays an important part in the setting of specific
rates.•.Thus, value of service is distinctly subordinate and
supplementary to cost of service as a theory of particular
rates and is never acceptable as a general theory of reasonableness of rates?
The obvious conclusion is that avalue of service,” despite Its hopeful
origin and ambitious revival, is no legitimate ground for consumer
coflg>laint*
The next thought that interposes itself Is that of consumer
confiscation.

It would seem ttut if one party to a bargain is subject

1

United Hallways & Electric Co. v» West, 200 U.S. 23^*

2

Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission,

287 W.W. 122*
3 Thompson and Smith, g&* clt.* p. 262*
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to confiscation, the e a » principles should apply to the otter, 2h
the earliest eases, indeed, the w r y wording ©F Supreme Court decisions
w « w to imply that

the pt&lle ie la felly ae aeute danger of

confiscation ae the t&lllty cea$&$f*

For example, consider the following
*

taken fro* Justice Harlan'» opinion in Beagan $. Earners1 loan and Trust Co.*
"The equal protection of the laws...forbids legislation, in whatever fora
It any be enacted, by which the property of one individual Is, without
compensation, wrested fnsm bin for tie benefit of another, or of the public. **
Or consider the majority opinion in Covington & Lexington Turnpike head Co.

2
v« dandfords

°A state enaetiaent...that will not admit of the carrier

earning «ueh s

m m m a m

m

*&&& sU Mi® < & m m itonaiw. 4& iast l& j&

to the

therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment
3
of the Constitution of the United States.* Even in the Heforaska
4
Maxietnm hate ease the sane idea runs as a thread throughout the entire
opinion*

The following Is typical of the language used;
It ean&ot be assumed that any railroad corporation...ever
supposed that it acquired...the power to construct and
maintain a public highway simply for its benefit, without
regard to the rights of the public. But it Is equally
true that the corporation performing such public services. *•
have rights that may not be invaded by legislative enact
ment In disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the
protection of property*

1

154 U.S. 362.

2

164 U.S. 578.

3

Emphasis added.

4

169 U.S. 466.
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These paragraphs ware written many years ago#

By now it la well

known that, whatever other significance these statements may have
pertaining to regulation, the Fourteenth Amendment Is not the correct
explanation*

In short, a public utility consumer cannot be confiscated#

Brutal as it may seem, and though apparently inconsistent with the basic
premises of regulation, the courts and commissions have decreed that
since the customer is not forced to buy (in the way that the utility
X
is foreed to sell) he has no constitutional protection#
The latest
available decision on the point was handed down in 1937 by the Alabama
2
Supreme Courts
It would follow, as a logical result of the theory ad
vanced by the city, that a subscriber who has no invested
capital at stake, but only a desire for a lower rate, and
dissatisfied by the schedule fixed in the law by his rep
resentatives in the legislature, could appeal to the courts
to have the law nullified, and a new schedule of rates
established by the Judicial branch of our government, and thus
have the courts9 judgment in a purely legislative matter sub
stituted for that of the law-making body.
The position as here presented seems sound#

let, if utility

regulation is predicated upon the public nature of the business, consumers
must have some recourse#

If they cannot claim confiscation, and if

“value of service4 is lost to them as a defense, then the suggestion
that return be used as evidence of rate reasonableness is even more in need
of adoption#

1 Bauer and Gold, Public Utility Valuation# (The Macmillan Company,
Hew fork, 1934*) Bryant and Hermann, Elements of Utility Rate Determination.
(The McGraw-Hill Book Company, Hew York, 1940.) Spurr, Henry 0#, Guiding
Principles of Public Service Regulation# (Public Utilities Reports, Inc#,
Washington, 1926#)
2 Birmingham V# Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Go#,
176 So# 301.

in
Am early ** 1876# in Mum* V. Illinois, Chief «testie* Wait*
1
set the standard for such & procedure*
la countries where the eomaoxt lee presells# It has
been customary from time Immemorial for the legislators to
declare shat shall be a reasonable compensation under such
circumstances# or# perhaps sore properly speaking# to fix
a maximum beyond which any charge made would be unreasonable,
finis It is not for the courts to point the way.

It has been their

custom la the past to leave the state legislatures to their a m devices
as far as innovation is concerned.

Possibly legislatures and commissions

have been too much concerned about the confusion that the Supreme Court
has allegedly made of valuation# and too little concerned over other
possible remedies.
However# an opening wedge has been driven.

In 1940 the Federal

Power Commission ordered the Natural Gas Pipe line Company of America to
reduce its rates# not by a certain amount# but to yield a certain amount
of revenue.

In 1941 an appeal reached the federal district courts where
2
the Commission was upheld.
The court dwelt I m g on the fact that the
return actually received has always been the Indicia! test of rate
3
reasonableness.
A few more decisions by commissions similar to this
decision of the Federal Power Commission will go far in the direction of
more objective regulatory technique.

1

94 U.S. 113

2 Natural Gas Pipe line Company of America et.al. £, Federal
Power Comaiseion et. el.# 38 F.U.K. (U.S.) 2$?.
3 For similar though less positive statements see Los Angeles
Gas & Electric Corp. g. California Kailroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287#
and Lindheimer y> Illinois 8*11 Telephone Cospany# 292 U.S. 1$1*

a m

rat

mmxQM* &sma:s o r b io tu tio b (mmmwm)
The one suggestion thus far advanced would & M little to the
effectiveness of regulation taken alone*
more smooth and continuous*
forcing the cost of

true, control would tend to be

But rate changes would be more frequent,

regulation yet

higher.

The triangular relation

between utilities, the public, and coaasiosions could tend to become more
strained*

Actually this proposal savors strongly of the service^t-cost
X
and slldlng-soale techniques, thoi^h savoring much more strongly of the
a
$
disadvantages thereof, than of the advantages*
To add stability to th»
rate structure it is necessary to go further and consider a more cosiprehensive
approach*

Thus the second step to be offered here is that

the ownership

of assess earnings —

defined as earnings over and above those considered
4
fair under existing technique — be made to reside in the consumer $ not

1 Service-at-oost and slldlng-scale methods can be defined in common
as any system of regulation that endeavors to establish close correlation
between managerial efficiency and the level of utility rates (or profits
depending on the viewpoint)*
2 The most vital disadvantage is centering attention upon return, rather
than allowing full recognition of the significant interrelationships Inherent
in the utility industry*
3 These can be summarised in brief as insuring that consumers shall
pay no more than coat In the accounting sense, not necessarily in the economic
sense*
U A third step, to be outlined later,
of determining fair return and relates that
But it is important to emphasise that these
vastly Improve utility regulation under any

deals with the specific problem
problem to the two preceding steps*
two, if Inaugurated, could
system of return determination*
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to bo regularly withdrawn necessarily, but to perform an Important
function as the clastic element in regulation —

a function now being

1
inadequately and erroneously performed by commission generosity.
This second suggestion might at first seem revolutionary.
But logic, at least, will support the view her® taken —

although the

innovation does seem to be somewhat more dependent upon legislation than
the first proposal.

At all events two examples should serve to illustrate

both the economic and legal principles involved.
The first of these examples is the Black River Telephone
2
Company,

In 1929 this Company filed new tariff schedules with the New York

Department of Public Service, effecting a general increase in rates. Certain
of the towns affected by the new schedule filed complaints with the
Department.

After considering the pertinent facts the New York Commission

allowed, in part, the increase asked by the Company.

However, several

significant facts were brought to light in the minority opinion of
Chairman llaltbie and Commissioner Burritt.
a stock dividend of 50 per cent.

In 1924 the Company had paid

In 1925, 1926, 1927, 1920, and 1929

respectively it paid 10 per cent, 16 per cent, 18 per cent, 18 per cent,
18 per cent cash dividends on its common stock.

In addition, in 1929,

it added more than 434,000 to surplus after the payment of dividends and

1 The significance of this elasticity element can be demonstrated
more convincingly later in conjunction with step three.
2 Re Black River Telephone Company, P.R.R., 1931 C 26, Mew York
Department of Public Service*
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a H charges upon revenues,

At the time of the inquiry the Company

had a corporate surplus equivalent to 20 par cent of Its entire
capital,

the minority also found that If the revenues actually

received under the m m schedule as approved by the majority should be
#11,000 less than anticipated, the Company could meet all charges, pay
IS per cent dividends on outstanding stock, m d add #15,000 to corporate
surplus.
The situation above
if it be

described is not a wholesome one, at least

granted that utility service should reach the consumer as

economically as possible.

At the time the Black Elver Telephone Coc^any

first began to plow back Its earnings the Kew York Commission had ample
authority to initiate action on its own motion to reduce rates to the

2
proper level.

Had the Commission done so year by year the net result

would have been the same as though the ownership of excessive earniigs
3
had rested with the public over the same period, and the legal outlook
could thus be no different.

As worked out in this particular case, both

of the principles of regulation thus far mentioned were violated} not

1

Ibid,* pp, 51-5^•

2 As early as 1914 Hew York was a pioneer in the modernisation
of her regulatory authority. Of course, once the ,fvalue” of the
property is enhanced by reinvestment, the present rate-making rule
demands Its recognition.
3 If rates were to be set — as one possibility — on the basis
of value minus reinvestment, it is probably not desirable to have too
large a surplus accumulated. Such a process would penalise one genera
tion of consumers for the benefit of another. The proper criterion as
regards slsse of surplus might be that necessary for equalisation.

m

only was the rate of return given no significance In determining rate
reasonableness* but past overcharges were permitted to become a permanent
"value*.
The second example is perhaps the more significant of the
two* although less spectacular.

The amounts involved are larger* and the

STommission involved is one that many years ago laid down the general
principle that consumers should not be charged high rates because of
reinvested earnings* where such earnings were not the result of withheld
2
dividends.
The company involved was made the object of a complaint in
3
1931.
Later the Commission instituted proceedings on its own motion as
4
to rates and practices of the utility. This case was the final disposition
of the motion of the Commission.
The San Diego Company had had a virtually unbroken dividend
record.

Its bonds had a Triple A Moody rating*

Its financial position had

1 If surplus is reinvested in necessary utility property* only
the consumer who paid the original excess is injured* But If any of the
reinvestment finds its way into valuation without being reinvested in useful
property* all future consumers will be injured as well. The proposed
technique would be principally useful in obviating the necessity of making
such costly determinations at the expense of the taxpayer.
2 The California Railroad Commission,

See Fegrura* o&. eit.

3 City of San Diego v* San Diego Consolidated Gas & Electric Co.*
7 P.U.R. (S.S.) 443.
4

Ibid.
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never been questioned• And, particularly, it had been adding to its
earned surplus account by upward of $100,000 annually for well over a
dosen years,
assets*

the total account amounting to roughly $ per cent of total

In the proceeding under discussion the commission allowed an

undepreciated rate-base, as is its custom, depredation reserve amounting
at this tins to about $7#500,000, or about 15 per cent of total assets*
2
Thus, approximately 20 per cent of the total valuation consisted of
3
depredation reserve and surplus* If, under such circumstances, a
eonaissiom concentrates rigidly upon cost requirement a in deciding upon
the amount of return required (as the California Railroad Commission
A
claims frequently to do) no serious error could result* But in view of
the fact that preceding and during the depression the company found it
possible to make annual and substantial additions to its surplus, the

1 Although the earned surplus account is often only an omnibus
term for all surplus and many reserves, the Ban Diego Company keeps its
accounts in accordance with rules laid down by the California Commission*
2 Like all valuations of the California Railroad Commission this one
closely approximated original cost*
3 It is not necessary here to give a detailed account of the theory
behind an undepreciated rate-base coupled with the sinking-fund method of
accruing depreciation* Suffice it to say that the method assumes that
a close enot^h adjustment has been made in rates to give consumers annually
the benefit of the lower depreciation charge* If such an adjustment has in
fact not been made, the consumer is doubly the loser* The advantages of the
method are clear in theory, but It doss place upon regulatory bodies a
precarious responsibility*
4

Pegrum, gg,. cit*
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facts of th» case seam to indicate that th© attempt was ill-adapted
to the deaired end.

this fact is driven home even more sharply to the

observer when it is recalled that the company in 1934 had been under the
direct^surveillance of the commission six times in the preceding eight
years.

Thus, again* both of the regulatory canons have been imperfectly

observed at best.
If these two items were merely isolated instances they would
cause no legitimate concern.

But analogous situations are common*-

place.

In the telephone industry 8 per cent of total assets is represented
2
by "unappropriated11 surplus.
In the traction industry almost 8 per cent
3
of total equities consisted of surplus and reserves.
While in the
electric light and power and gas industries about 5 per cent of total
4
equities represent surplus and reserves.
These figures may seem immaterial
when taken as bare percentages.

But rememberiig that these same equities

are the data of public utility valuations* 5 per cent can add substantially
5
to utility service bills*
In addition* the above figures are averages*

1

7 P.U.R. <K.S.) 443.

2 Woody’s* Public Utilities* 1940. The Federal Communications
Commission alone among the Federal regulatory agencies* under whose
supervision most of the telephone industry keeps its accounts* permits a
generalized surplus account. But It is well known that earned surplus is
an important item in this industry. See 292 U.S. 15*
3 The Sources of Public Utility Capital. Bulletin Ho. 20 Bureau of
Business Beseareh* University of Illinois Press* Urbana, 1928.
4 Unfortunately these figures are not broken down for close scrutiny.
It is not even stated whether or not the "reserve11 item includes depreciation
reserve. Logie would say not. The percentages are given with that
assumption.

5

Bureau of Business Beseareh* gg. clt.
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taken from a group of utilities at random, many of them having deficit a
which ware deducted.

Recognizing these as somewhat unnatural situations,

the true picture might be drawn more strongly.

In addition many
1

valuations have been tempered by considerations of reproduction cost,

and

in view of the fact that reproduction cost (when used for valuation
purposes) is always higher than original cost, the percentages quoted
appear even more conservative.
In this, as before, the legal perspective is a prominent
consider at!on • In all the annals of corporation law in general it has
been assumed that ifeatever found its way legitimately into the hands of the
corporation could legally be used for any proper purpose.

In the public

service corporation, however, there arises an initial doubt as to the
propriety of the automatic

relinquishment of funds as soon as they are

clutched in corporate fingers.

This doubt has occasionally found its way

2
into courts as the "doctrine of implied trust."

As such it has had an

Interesting and confusing history.
It must be recognized at the outset that there are many
different kinds of surplus, or stated more accurately, surpluses from
many different sources*

Some of the major sources of surplus are as

1 This factor for the past fifteen years has been much less of a
factor than commonly supposed* The typical method, revealed by an
examination of decisions of commissions, is to use some previous valuation
with subsequent additions at cost*
2 For a comp1st© discussion of implied trust from the standpoint
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Locklin, D.P. Regulation of
Security Issues
t^e Interstate Commerce Commission. (University of
Illinois, Orbana, 1926.)

u$

follows* together with the attitude of tie Interstate Commerce
Commission toward their capitalisation as reported by Professor
Locklins
(1) the writing up of aesete to correspond to a higher
reproduction cost* the Commission properly* although not
invariably* allows such surplus to be capitalised if
capitalisation doee not thereby become greater than fair
value •
(2) the inclusion among fixed assets of intangible values*
such as good will or going value, the X.C.C. apparently
disapproves the capitalisation of this surplus.
(3) the writing up of the accounts due to appreciation
in land values, the Commission emphatically frowns upon
the capitalisation of such a surplus.
(4) the inclusion of depreciation or other reserves in the
surplus account. Obviously such a surplus should not exist*
let alone be subject to capitalization.
(5) the reinvestment of earnings, the Commission has given
little attention to this problem* and has never commented at
length. In general the capitalization of such stttplus is
permitted.
While important questions of policy hinge about each of the
above possibilities* the

legal doctrine of implied trust applies only

to the last* and then only in the case of public utilities.

At best

it is a delicate situation* for reinvested earnings may be the result
of excessive rates or nonpayment of dividends.

Certainly there is no

legal or ethical Justification for denying to the corporation owner
ship of the latter.

In fact utility services could be rendered much

more cheaply if there were no such thing as non-payment of dividends.

1 £&* git., pp. 145 ff.
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But with reference to the surpluses created by excessive rates, as
noted previously, doubt arises.

Regulation seems to be In the anomalous

position of being legally able to prevent such a surplus from arising,
but with no power over it once formed.
Very early in the history of regulation in Massachusetts, the
Board^of Gas and Electric Light Comaission endeavored to insert implied
trust

into its scheme of control.

But the Board was promptly short-*

circuited by the Massachusetts Supreme Court which held that the Company
sight capitalise

the cost of all additions to plant without regard to

2
the source of the funds used.

the general policy of regulation in

Massachusetts at presort is to maintain equivalence between capitalization
3
and investment, which would imply permission to capitalize reinvested
earnings.
Pennsylvania has had a similar experience.

At present the

only pertinent stipulation regarding stock dividends contained in the
4
Pennsylvania laws is that a part of the surplus must remain capitalized*

1
By way of definition implied trust may be said to be the
principle that all revenues in excess of a fair return on fair value are
held by the utility only in trust for rightful owners— in this case the
consuming public.
2 Fall River Gas Works v. Board of Gas and Electric
Commission, 211 Mass.529.

Light

3
Barnes, pp. clt.. p. 127. However, see Re Lowell Gas and Light
Company, P.U.R. 1933 A, 4©0.
4
Rose, Joseph R., Public Utility Regulation 4a Pennsylvania.,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1939, p. HI*
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In New York the issuance of a stock dividend by a public
service corporation under the jurisdiction of the state commission
X
is not legal,
but apparently this rule is not directly related to
the doctrine of Implied trust*

And it appears that the doctrine does

2

3

not figure in the regulatory laws of Illinois or Maryland,
Thus only
4
California, among the stronger of the utility commissions, has made an
effort to follow an implied trust policy*

This rule was laid down by

the California Railroad Cosmission in the first published volume of
5
its reports to the effect that no return was to be allowed on property

1 Baldwin, Donald C*, Capital Control in Hew fork* George
Banta Publishing Company, Uenasha, Wisconsin, 1920, pp. 135-134*
2 Kneier, Charles M*, State Regulation of Public Utilities ip
niittttifl- University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1927*
3 Burke, Henry G*, The Public Service Commission of Maryland*
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1932*
4 Wisconsin can of course not be omitted in any discussion of
the stronger utility commissions* The Wisconsin rule as to the purposes
of security issues, as in many states, is that stocks or bonds may be
Issued to reimburse the corporate treasury for improvements secured from
earnings*
5 Geo. A Legg v. the Nevada County Narrow Gauge Railroad and
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 1 C.R.C, 11* See also
3 C.R.C. 1212, and 4 C.R.C* 570*
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1

built by revenues from excessive rates •

It has bean noted earlier

that the policy of the California Commission may not be so sound in
practice as it appears in theory.

However, this policy has never been

overruled by the courts*
the entire legal question of implied trust must be
2
considered unsatisfactorily settled at best*
But the economic question
is certainly not so simply disposed of as the following statement implies*
“The regulatory commissions are justified in refusing permission to issue
stock dividends to capitalise an earned surplus only if the property
3
acquired therewith does not increase the Company1s earning power*“
Indeed, as long as such a treatment is accepted as true, the problems of
4
regulation will remain just that far from solution*

1 This policy does not exactly vest in consumers ownership of such
property, but it does have the same general effect*
2 The lower federal courts have made the specific decisions
unanimous in the negative* See Garden City v* Garden $ity Telephone, light
& manufacturing Company, 236 Fed* Rep, 693* The Supreme Court has never
ruled on the point*
3 Wilson, Herring, and Eutsler, Public Utility Regulation* McGraw-Hill
Book Gos^any, Hew York, 1938, p. 246*
4 Note the following statement by Joseph B* Eastman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission 67 X*C*C* 1$6t “It is not a sufficient answer to this
doctrine to say that the property acquired from surplus Is owned by the
carrier, for the rights of ownership are not absolute, but limited by the
dedication of the property to public use and the circumstances of such
dedications* Nor is it enough to say that the surplus might have been
distributed to the stockholders at the time it was earned, for the public
might well have declined to acquiesce in rates producing excess income if
that income had not been used for the improvement of the property* “
R,H.Whitten in his Valuation of Public Service Corporations
(as enlarged and revised by D*F* Wilcox, 2nd Edition, Banks law Publishing
Company, 1928) takes the view that it is impossible to return excess
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The, preceding analysis has not been predicated upon the
assumption that consumer ownership of surplus (over and above a
fair return) is an innovation impossible of achievement.

What has

been predicated is that whatever steps are taken in this direction
probably must come through legislation, rather than from a more firm
and definite stand on the part of commissions.
Actually there is a quite conclusive precedent for legislation
of this nature.

The most significant body of this precedent is to be

found in relation, to the recapture clause of the Transportation Act

i

of 1920#

and the Supreme Court opinion pertaining thereto.

a

The

recapture clause, it will be recalled, permitted the Interstate Commerce
Commission to fix a proper fair return for carriers as a whole. Whatever
3
any one carrier received above this fair return was to be divided one-half
to the carrier and one-half to a commission revolving fund, to be available
for loans to other carriers.

That part of the excess retained by the

earningsto those who actually paid them.
Such an argument begs the
entire question. To permit a small injuryto stand in the way of
correcting a large one is certainly not objective. The built-Ap surplus,
regardless of ownership, would benefit all consumers — past and present.
The only other way such a surplus could be accumulated (other than by
consumer contributions) would be by assessment of stockholders.
Such a
policy has its points but it is an entirely different question.
1

Section 15 A, 41 Stat. La. 4881.

2

Dayton and Goose Creek R.E. Co.

3

Originally 6 per cent —

United States,

later 3 3/4 per cent.

263 U.S. 456.
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carrier was to be kept in a reserve until it should amount to
5 per cent of the value of the carrier’s property, after which the
1
carrier was authorized to use its share for any lawful purpose* But
most significant of all its provisions Is the declaration by the act,
Z
even as approved by the Supreme Court, that the carriers only acted as
3
trustees for the public as regards all revenues exceeding fair return#
The Court reserved the right to decide when a specific prayer could be
brought as to whether the shipper or the general public should be the
beneficiary of the trust*

The full implication of this decision

probably lies in the fact that if the ruling authority may legally take
one-half of excess earnings, if —

in truth —

excess is a public trust,

there can be no constitutional bar to the declaration of a 100 per cent
5
trust*
Such a step was in fact taken by the city of Laredo, Texas*
On December 15, 1931, this city enacted an ordinance fixing gas rates for
the city, and provided as a condition of the bond posted by the company

1

Paragraph 18 of Section 15A*

2

262 U.S. 458*

3

Loc. d t *

4

Ibid*

5 This is not a defense of the particular aptitude of the re
capture clause for carrying out its purposes. Details of regulation
will naturally be altered as experience points new ways*

m

i
involved*

that the Company should refund to th© city for the benefit of

consumers any excess of rate# collected “over and above the rates and
©hargee that shall be finally determined to be a fair and reasonable return
epee the value of its property used and useful in supplying natural gas and
natural gee service to the City of laredo,"

When the company later appealed
a
its case to the courts* the issue of recapture was not raised.
It could appear that the real problem is not one of forcing
courts to recognise the validity of an implied trust* but to urge
legislatures to recognise the advantages of creating a statutory truat

to serve the seas purpose.

It nay at first seem strange that the court

system stands ready to approve legislation on this subject but sill not
tolerate direct action by a commission*

In theory* however* the position

of the Judiciary is perfectly sound.
It is a basic fact In capitalistic organisation that m
investor cannot be confiscated if he knows the rules of the gams before

1 For details of the franchise see United (las Public Service Co.
£• Texas* 303 U.S. 123.

2 1M&.
3 Thompson and Smith* o p . clt,. pp. 377-37®* cite Board of Public
Utility Commissioners g, Sew fork Telephone Company* 271 U.S. 23* as
an effective bar to the “streamlined” regulation here suggested. Perhaps
they are right in concluding that the Sew Jersey body was urging & more
defensible economic position than the court* But there Is a great deal of
difference between “confiscatory1* rates to absorb an excessive depreciation
reserve* and the recapture of excess earnings* Economically the latter
offers a much more basic (economic) approach, although the former is an
important problem.
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he makes a commitment • These rules apply to the specific facts
surrounding particular investments,

XT one of those facts Is a

maximum return of 2 per cent on original cost of plant, the over-all
expectation will simply dictate a lower value for the investment* If
one fact is a statutory trust imposed by a legislature, that fact will
be incorporated into the general expectations of investors, and
investment value will be affected accordingly*
The situation is otherwise if a trust Is created by
Commission action*

Such an act confronts an investor with a circumstance

he had no reason to anticipate*

It la productive of a situation In

which an individual finds himself possessed of an investment value
procured according to terms that would not have been satisfactory had
all the facts been known*

Briefly, such action taken by a commission

directly abrogates choice by obstructing the operation of free will. Such
a result is confiscation in our society*

Thus the courts have reason

to distinguish between legislation and administrative decision in this

2
regard*
The third and final step to be suggested here, by way of
conforming commission procedure to the necessities dictated by the modern

1 Bote that both the recapture clause and the Laredo case represented
specific legislative action* Of course a consistent commission policy can
be anticipated by an investor, but there is always the initial confiscation
when the policy is first Inaugurated*
2 See Schechter Poultry Co* x* United States, 295 U.S, 195*

xn
economy is the asst extreme of all* m a t is more to the point, perhaps,
this suggestion is the most isqportant.

Xt involves a "formula" for the

automatic determination of return*
Ifflaodiately it will be urged that a "formula” for calculating
fair return is prlaa facia unconstitutional*

As authority for such an

objection, Vest x* Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company will be cited*
There is, however, a vast difference between a rate-fixing formula, as a
general proposition, and the use of a peculiarly weighted group of index
numbers for calculating valuation.

In the first place, the theory behind

the Maryland Commission's system was quite dubious, and,

what is most

pertinent for our study, the court did not object to the formula as such,
but only to its results in the particular case*

In fact the court

considered the greatest defect in the method of valuation used to be the
fact that it permitted the utility "to claim to the last dollar an increased
value consequent upon a sudden and precipitate rise in spot prices of

2
materials and labor?

Xn that connection the court pointed out that the

owner of public utility property may not "pass on to the public the risk
3
involved in a general decline in values."
Xn short, the judiciary did

1 295 9*3. 662* Xn this litigation the Supreme Court disapproved
a valuation based on a series of index numbers • Most of the remarks of
the court were directed against the use of these index numbers as a
"rate-making formula*"
2

Loo- cit.

3 hoc, clt* The court obviously recognized that this rate de
termination would have to do for a number of years, and therefore must
be better than a guess.
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that this method had neglected certain important factora*

It thus

can not he conclusively stated that the court will reject formulas on
a
principle, even though it did reject a formula in 1933*
The reasoning of the Maryland Commission in reducing valuation
to a weighting of price indices is so important to our general topic
that it must be further analyzed*

The aim of the Commission was H o give

to investors an investment dollar of constant purchasing power; that is,
3
exchangeable dollars invested in place of present exchangeable dollars*11
To thus assume that valuation, or any other single factor in
rate regulation, can or should be held responsible for the basic problem
of pries fluctuations in regulated industries is to miss the point of
regulation theory*

Control has an over-all purpose to minimize the cost

of utility service to consumers*
an initial justification*

Any policy contributory to this end has

Any policy not contributory to this end has no

1 In a strong dissent Justice Stone Interprets the decision as
not facing the substantive problem of confiscation, but concentrating
on the procedural problem of method* The Commission had allowed a set
of rates that would have produced somewhat more than 5 per cent on the
valuation of the district court* The court had specified 6 per cent as
the ■rtnirniia return that would avoid confiscation* Clearly, then, the
majority had faced the substantive issue even though the point was not
stressed* Whether 5 per cent was or was not confiscatory is not to be
determined here*
2 See Virginia Law Review* November, 1935, PP* 73-83; and Harvard
Law Review* March, 1938, pp. 835-893* Perhaps the controversy on this
point can only be dissolved by another case* It is unfortunate that the
Supreme Court is frequently ambiguous on some really important points*
3

295 C*S* 862.

m

such Initial justification*

This fact the Court wisely recognized

la outlining the defects of the Commission*s procedure*
It could probably he demonstrated that a rate-making formula
is both desirable and inevitable*

Obviously rate-fixing must follow a

set of principles if it is to be accurate and just*

Principles, by very

nature, set forth the reasons for making one type of determination as
against another type* These reasons are by definition formulae, though
they may not be embellished with all the precision of mathematical
calculation*

Almost by definition a formula means the application of
2
reason, while no formula means arbitrary regulation*
Xn addition to being inevitable a formula for purposes of
fixing rates in regulated industries is also desirable*

Definiteness

of approach not only gives regulators a staff to lean upon, but it furnishes
the public utility investor with a basis for his calculations*

^conony

as to fair return necessitates securing capital on as favorable terms as
possible*

Thus the investor must be approached with terms he is in a

position to appreciate*

The most basic of these terms is knowledge of the

1 Loc. cit* All this is further explanation of the substantive
nature of the approach of the majority* The fact of confiscation is not
without time dimension, although the immediate result is an important Item*
2 "In fact, it is quite impossible for those concerned with so
difficult a problem as rate making to avoid the use of a more or less
definite formula*H Bernstein, £2* cit,* p* 121*

x%

rules of the game*

With these clearly stated, capital can be obtained
1
such more easily than otherwise.
In fact there is very little more,
•loner lines involving fair return* that a commission can do to assure the
economical acquisition of capital.
The element of uncertainty surrounding a public utility
security has two sourcest first* the normal uncertainty that troubles
every economic organization in a dynamic society; second* the uncertainty
that accompanies the possibility of adverse commission decisions lowering
net returns*

From whichever cause* uncertainty is the basic fact that
a
raises the cost of capital to a utility enterprise*
It is a longrecognised fact* by commissions and courts alike* that the second type
of uncertainty should be avoided by prohibiting what is known as "arbitrary*
3
action by commissions*
But it has not been universally agreed as to the

1 "One of the prime requisites of a flourishing economic develop
ment is that those who take initiative and assume responsible leader
ship shall know what to expect * and shall be able to count on the con
sequence of their own acts and those of other persons with whom they
have dealings.1* Clark* og* cit.» p. 143*
Z Unexpected high returns and unexpected low returns affect
the capitalised worth of an investment by making it speculative* Speculative
capital invariably is more expensive to the utility than non-speculatIve
capital.
3 This follows from the legal principle that no individual is to be
treated except as a member of a class* If regulation follows a pattern*
thus* the investor (theoretically) can apply the principles involved to
his own ease*
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role regulation should play in avoiding (or permitting) natural
uncertainties that tend to disrupt investor calculations.

It is in

this sphere that it is thought a formula ©an be of greatest value.
It has been urged of late with increasing frequency that the
basic investment uncertainty resides in the residuality of net income
1
particularly common stock income, thus the common stock contract would
be a logical beginning for an attempt to minimize uncertainty*
The conmon stock contract customarily carries neither maxi
mum nor minimum return.

Thus almost all uncertainty Inherent in the

enterprise rests with the commcr* stock investment as residual.

This

uncertainty is present within the limits of sero per cent and infinity
in the abstract situation, and between zero per cent and, say, 30 per cent
in the concrete utility world.

If this uncertainty could be concentrated

into & smaller range, utility capital could be secured for less over-all
2
cost.
The specific regulatory innovation to complete the list
of three offered is that all contracts for capital be made to carry a

1 Jones and Bigham, op. clt.i Morgan,
Investment Bill, op. cit.

ojd .

cit.8 Prudent

2 "...But this factor of uncertainty must be eliminated for
the future if we are to exercise workable rate regulation. The rate of
return must be equally definite with the rate base for effective public
control,*1 Bauer, o£. cit.. p. 255*

X9&

X
maximum rata of return,

It la probably unnecessary to outline the

mechanical detalla of such a proposition,

Aa to euch details the

writer will accept the procedure suggested in New York*a Prudent

2
Investment Bill of 1930.
Xn equating rights and responsibilities, cost and prices
■net be matched*

Ultimately this requirement means that economic rents

are not to be collected by the factors of production*

In the capital

market investment valuation is a process of equating expectations to
changing market conditions.

The problem of fair return centers on

preventing this process from bringing to persons economic advantages
apart from legitimate expectations*

flIn the issuance of all such

securities, there are always fairly certain assumptions on the basis of
which investors contribute capital to public service.

The natural basis

of determining the return would be according to the expectations of the
3
investors at the tl— they bought the securitiesg In no other way can
factor sacrifice be equitably adjusted to consumer sacrifice*

X Of course, a minimum rate of return could not be fixed unless
accompanied by an outright guarantee* The residual claims must have some
element of residuality, with which to buffer altered circumstances.
Guarantee of common stock dividends is not Contemplated here,
2 For convenience the reader may refer to Barnes, 1,B*, gases,
on Public Utility Regulation. (F,S, Grofts k Go,, New York, 193®*) Pp•4&7
ff*, for a reproduction of the pertinent portions of this document*
3 Bau*r Gold, PubUa Utility Valuation & £ PfflEPftfM St Sa&& SSBliai*
(The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934*)P* 16. Emphasis supplied.

Present procedure 1argely follows th® above outline only
as to bonds and preferred stock,

Xn the e©mmon stock field, however, a

new Issue requires, not only that the expectations ©f new investors be
satisfied to meet the requirements of a con5>etitive capital market, but
that eadLsting^holders must also be allowed to participate in existing
expectations*

In terms of return requirement the present proposal of a

maximum return to common stock would operate in favor of consumers in
time of rising expectations, and against consumers in times of falling
expectations• But in terms of reducing uncertainty, the plan would operate
2
in favor of consumers at all times*
The consequence of current technique m y be summarily
illustrated*

Consider a utility corporation with $1,000,000 common

stoek outstanding, issued at a time when investment value was calculated
at ten times average annual dividends (yield of 10 per cent)*

How the

company finds it necessary to raise more capital and discovers that, all
things considered, the eonBon stock medium is the most efficient method
of raising additional capital*

However, the management finds that the

general level of expectations is now 11 per cent rather than the 10 per cent

1 Jones and Bigham, o£. cit* pp. 27& ff. This selection also
m & criticism of the Bauer proposal, which is not fundamentally
different*
2 See Braudels1 separate opinion in Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 0*3, 276, for
an excellent critical background for these statements*
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X
accompanying the original issue.
Here this an issue of bonds, or even preferred stock, no
concession would be necessary with reference to original holders.

But

with cooBon stock the usual practice is to simply reduce the amount
of "unissued capital stock,14 and increase the amount of Mcapital stock
outstanding*11 Xn all stxch eases the old participates on exactly the
sane basis as the new*
3
The proposed plan would operate differently.

The original

holder would be left with his original expectations (in so far as earnings
were adequate).

The new holder would participate in the new expectations,

Heither would be confiscated.

Neither would receive any factor rentals

(positive or negative) as a part of return*
It is clear that the above is not passive regulation. However,
today* s capitalism is beyond the point where we can be assured that charges
to consumers can be reduced by determining a per cent as fair return. It
would be necessary to regularize and cumulate dividends on common stock.
Reinvestment of earnings would probably have to take the form of stock
dividends, and made never to exceed the accumulated dividend coming to
stockholders ,

1 "For the future, we should be perfectly clear that we cannot escape
the amrket requirements in obtaining capital, We must pay the interest or
rate of return that will be required. But, let it be equally clear that
this does not require, at any point, a readjustment of return on past invest*merits* It applies only at the time the funde are obtained," Bauer, Op .cit.,
p. 250.
2 Xn many cases, of course, the old holder and the new are Identical
persons. The current technique, however, Is no more defensible because of
this faet*
3

Jones and Bighorn, g&* cit* Bee also Prudent Investment Bill*

o p .cit.
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The ©uilias of fair return here set forth does not provide
an incentive for better entrepreneurship*
there ©an be no incentive.

But that does not mean that

To let return be flexible to the extent of

rewarding good management is to take the position that common stock
dividends are wages rather than a return to capital,

Suppose, for

example, that the president of a utility owns 5 per cent of the common
stock of his company*

% y should the other 95 per cent of the stock

receive 1 per cent higher dividends merely because the company wishes
to express appreciation for good entrepreneurship? A company that has a
1
good president should pay him extra, not the common stockholders*
Actually regulation is endeavoring to get away from executive
control over the stock of corporations.

It has been found that executive

2
manipulations of capital structure have been a frequent result.

Regulators

should examine very carefully any technique that divorces the executive
from capital structure.

There is no good reason why an executive should

look upon dividends as his remuneration for efficiency.
There are other and more legitimate incentives for good
management.

There is, for example, the incentive of comparative workmanship*

1 Incentives are excellently treated in Morgan, op. cit. The
view here presented is similar to the one outlined by the above author.
Above all Morgan feels that profit should not be the criteria of
efficiency in a public utility industry,
2 Part of the task of the S.£#C, in regulating security issuance is the
elimination of these eases.

An executive knows, and he knows that cortain other people know, whether
or not he is doing a good job*

% b h a set of coa^parative statistics

regulatory commissions themselves can determine this within fairly definite
Unite.

There are many entrepreneura who take a genuine pride In their

accompliehaents *

1® fa*1 to© narrow a view of entrepreneurs in

general

and one warranted only in part «■— that they are motivated only
a
by monetary rewards.
In addition to the above, executives move within a highly
competitive environment, and stand in a very favorable competitive
position*

The more clear-out the competitive position,the more obvious

are opportunity costs in a given case*

And the more obvious are opportunity

costs, the more clearly visible are economic rents when they appear*
If an entrepreneur feels himself to be abused, he may offer
himself to another group of stockholders*

In many cases it will be to

the interest of utility customers to prevent this transfer of employment*
Xn such a ease his salary will need to be raised to remove the temptation
to quit present employment * If he feels he should be allowed to

1 This is a comparatively new field of regulation* The Federal
Power Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce
CoHilssion, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission are all actively interested in this phase of social
control*
2 Thor stein Veblen, o£. cit** did much to popularise this
point of view* Bore recently, however, the struggle for power has been
given greater weight as entrepreneurial incentive* Burnham, lames, The
Revolution* (The John Day Go*, Inc., Bew fork, 1941.)
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participate in profit*, he may a m * to a non-regul&ted Industry*
again hie salary can be raised to rernove testation*

Here

the feet that

rents occur in other industries is no argument for their a H m m m in
publie service industries*

This is not, of course, the sane as saying

that other-industrjMrents do not affect "necessary* costs in regulated
industries*
In short, there is no cost coining under the heading of
necessary that cannot be provided for better than by a deliberated flexible
retuns*

fair return is residual as the legal equivalent of an economic

fact and is therefore not a "catchall*1. A direct charge is always to be
preferred to an indirect one*
The idea of an average return is not m w in regulation theory*
1
MoCb writers of repute recognize this need*
There is an Important relationship between average return
and the present suggestion of limiting dividends on common (and preferred
if necessary) stock*

Under present technique, an excess revenue above

fair return can be paid out of dividends*

These surplus dividends have

the effect of causing speculative flurries in capitalised expectations*
These flurries, as indicated earlier, cannot result in lower capital costs,
but always in higher capital costs*
It should be clear, then, that expoctational-tlme-disaension
can only be enforced through dividend controls*

It Is scarcely an

1 The best presentation can be found in the JPgudmk Xwr9f)tm)t&
m i l cited above*
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argument that many concerns do make a more
to regularise dividend payments.

op

lass consistent effort

Such concerns would not be injured

by the contemplated regulations, while consumers and investors of other
concerns would be positively aided*

In this way a final step could be

taken in the direction of waking regulation conform more nearly to the
regulatory ideal despite the environmental changes making precise control
more difficult*
The legal aspects of this third and last suggestion for
"streamlining" regulation are both interesting and instructive* Casual
thought would seem to dictate that a maximum dividend on common stock
would be contrary to the governing rules of the day*
contribute to this thought*

Two factors

First, the present opposite practice is

widespread and firmly entrenched*

Second, it Is manifest nonsense that

a law would punish & corporation for not making a profit, which would
follow if maxi mum dividends were treated in the same way as bond interest*
However, the legality of a certain activity must begin
with an examination of the sovereign power that sponsors the particular
activity under consideration*

"It is universally recognised in this

country that legislative authority is essential to the creation of a
1
corporation* * Thus we must look to the law of the land to discover

1 Frost, Thomas 0*, Incorporation and Organisation o£ Corporations*
(little, Brown,and Company, Boston, 1906*) Second Edition, p* 10*
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the details of this creation.

For If a corporation must look to a

law for its very right to be, it must assuredly look to this same law
^
_
1
for its subsidiary right to be one thing as contrasted with another*
Perhaps the best approach to the indicated analysis would be
the analogy of the preferred stock*

Although a legal distinction can be

made between bonds and stocks In this regard, the case for a distinction
between two stocks is much less clear.
rights and duties,

A bond is the collection of legal

likewise a stock is a collection of legal rights and

duties.

But the two sets of rights and duties are sufficiently different
2
to justify distinction.
The next question is not so easily settled*

It has reference

to the distinction between preferred stock and common stock* True, each of
these is a collection of legal rights and duties.
have a source car sources from which they spring#

These rights and duties
If the source Is the

same in the two eases, there is no reason why legislation could not legally
fuse the two in the way indicated.
Stocks reeeive their basic sanction from common law.
do likewise*

Bonds

But the common law does not make a stock a preferred or a

1 Chief Justice Marshall, Dartmouth College Case. "Being the mere
creature of law, it (the corporation) possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as
incidental to its very existence." U Wheat. 51S*
2 A bond stems from the old common law of debtor-creditor
relationships. A stock has origin in the common law of ownership. That is
why present legal-residual technique is rooted much too deeply to be
caeually altered. It is most significant to note, however, that the above
distinction has nothing to do with incorporation as such.
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eosmon stock*

It makes these sliqply stocks*

* preferred or e seamen east
dearly by William ?» Granges

^*at, then, makes a stock

The answer to this question 1® given most
*lt should be emphasised that the

preferred stockholder will ret no special right or privilege unless It is
written Into the charter, and, on the other hand, he will not be excluded
from any of the rights enjoyed by a common stockholder, unless It Is so
1
provided.n
Sow If a stock becomes a preferred stock only through a
charter, and if charters are obtained only through the exercise of the
Z
sovereignty of the state, it must follow that a common stock Is turned
into a preferred stock by a grant of the state.

If, then, a state can
3

turn some stock into preferred stock, it can do the same with all stock.
Our question has now basically delimited Itself*

$e began

by asking if the prevailing legal system could enforce maximum dividends
upon common stock*

It now seems that this could result from legislation

differing only slightly from that now in operation*

X Corporation I^JL tSSL %TA°S£g S M &i£2S&£££« (®»« Ronald Praaa
Company, lew fork, 1935V) P* 215*
2 A cession stock is a common law certificate of ownership* A
preferred stock is similarly a certificate of ownership but dressed in a
modern garb*
3 A corollary of this Is that, obviously, by merely changing the
n**# of a circulating claim, one cannot alter its substantive content* All
of the stock of the Great northern Railway Company Is preferred stock* Yet
It has ail the residuality that normally accompanies common stock*
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Fundamentally and realistically th© corporation© themselves
JBSE&& ®«t.

"Where corporations are not restrained by their ©barter©

they may adopt all reasonable modes in the execution of their business
1
which a natural person might adopt in the exercise of similar powers1*,
it does not follow that legislation may enforce any arrangement that may
be entered into voluntarily fey the parties concerned.

In this ease,

however, the arrangement coniejspl&ted lies wholly within the sovereign
authority.

Such a situation is m

a legislature decides to act.

open door to legislation if and when

Thus the law need not depend upon voluntary

action.
The author is under no illusions about destroying residuality
by the simple expedient of changing the law.

Residuality is an economic

phenomenon that has no connection with legal technicalities. The thought
Imre is, and this thought can well be re~emph&sic©d, that the three
suggestions offered here, taken in conjunction with each other, can serve
to reduce the effects of the inevitable residuality of modern business
organization, and minimize the confiscation Inevitable in regulation of
this organization.
It seems pertinent at this point to draw together the thread
of discussion of which the past three chapters are only a part.

This

analysis of ways in v&lch regulation could be modernized Is, after all,
only intended as a point of departure for a contrast to the actual

X Supremo Court of Missouri, 47 Mo. 425*
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technique of modernising control to bo presented in the following chapter*
Regulation of return ia the residual regulatory act*

It is

rebidual for precisely the same reason that fair return itself (capital cost)
is residual,The control problem is to make the legal facts cons!stent with
the pertinent ecoaosdc facts*

This Is the focal point of regulation*

The choice that a government makes in deciding the extent of
regulations to impose upon a utility is not Mto confiscatatt or "not to
confiscate"; but how to confiscate*

Any correction of a past injustice

(failure to equate rights and responsibilities) can be made only through
the process of taking away that which was gained unjustly.

This type of

control is confiscation because it cuts across the lines of choice* or
violates the free will upon which the society is predicated.

This is an

important problem of regulation* although it is not the problem of fair
return*
The problem of fair return grows out of the necessity of
confiscation in the regulatory process*

Starting with the assumption that

confiscation is undesirable* fair return control is principally dedicated
to the minimization of confiscation* making it as little necessary as
possible* and making its Incidence as little felt as possible*

Minor

confiscations* ill-chosen* can be as violative of philosophy as major
Confiscations * carefully selected*

Unnecessary confiscations (in the

sense thvt a similar result could be obtained otherwise) are still worse*
Thus the problem of fair return is to keep confiscation to a bare minimum
(necessary)* and to apportion necessary confiscation in an equitable manner*
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The present technique of regulation is to utilise an
arbitrary percentage of value as fair return, without relating it in
absolute amount to investor expectations• Such an approach would not
be serious but for the fact that if the return allowed is greater or
less than an economic fair return, the difference is capitalised as
negative or positive rent against the consumer*

This Is precisely

shat regulation alms to avoid*
To better the over-all approach to fair return, suggestions
were made*
ness*

The first involved making fair return the test of reasonable

Standing alone this technique would serve only to keep rates

fluctuating up or down according to whether the utility was earning less
or more than a fair return*

It would, however, prevent over - and under-

returns from being capitalized against the consumer*
The second suggestion is intended to make the first more
concrete and practicable*

Specifically it is to provide that all excess

earnings be held in trust for consumers*

Carrying out this suggestion

would provide a basic autoaaaticity in rate regulation*

The net result

of this automaticity would be to provide for the operation of the first
suggestion over a longer period of time*

Xn short, it would allow the

advantages of making fair return a test of reasonableness, but would
operate against rate instability*
The third suggestion strikes much more at the heart of
private enterprise than either of the first two*

It provides for a

limitation of capital return through maximum dividends*

From this point

regulation would permit a very wide executive discretion in fixing rates
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on the basis of actual economic condition, while at the same time
predicating control upon the exacting time-dimension business sphere
into which the economy has evolved •
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It was somewhat arbitrary in actual cases which group would be so
dasignaled,

the degree of arbitrariness that developed provided a

rough measure of the degree to which rights and responsibilities
eould not be equated through the simple technique first enunciated
by the courts*
Xn regard to the scope of regulation as well* inelasticity
made the sharp line of demarcation.less clear*

Inelasticity is a

phenomenon attaching to a greater or lesser extent to all business rather
than being limited in effect to a few industries*

Fixed cost and

tendency to monopoly — -the two principal inelasticities —

and a

consequent •unequal1 relationship to the public is characteristic of the
steel industry or the automobile industry in the same way (if not to the
same-extent) as of the utility industries*

Even within the utility

category itself the influence of this fact has been felt in that today
there is much less homogeneity than fifty years ago*

there is very

little, for example, that is comaon between the distribution of milk and
the distribution of electric light and power*

Tet both industries are

classified as utilities before the law*
The development of capitalisation, too, contributed its
share to both the lllogic and the impossibility of the original adjustment*
With respect to the extent of regulation the Intention behind the concept
of confiscation was thct whereas utilities could legitimately be regulated
intensively yet a limit was to be imposed*

Hence a certain operating

result was postulated as representing an exact equation of rights and
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responsibilities*

As an economic formulation predicated upon a somewhat

outdated conception of property, the regulatory tool fashioned to produce
the required result —

fair return on a fair value *—» was reasonable*

With a high degree of development in capital markets and a redefinition of
property, the strictures against confiscation lost much of their effect
iveness in protecting regulated industries from an excess of control*

A»

a consequence regulation was found in need of modification*
As regards the scope of regulation, capitalisation had wide
spread effects*

With the realization that once intensive regulation was

legitimized business organization was to a degree at the mercy of society
the classification of an Industry as a public utility became a matter of
grave concern*
of inflow*

Yo longer could confiscation be defined as a given level

Bather it became a reduction in the level of inflow to a

person or a concern*

Since one of the primary purposes of regulation was

to correct for the future an undesirable situation that had arisen from
the past, extreme hesitancy necessarily characterized the actual designation
of an industry as a utility*

At the same time, interpreted in terms of the

entire pattern of change involved here, nuch of the significance of the
utility category in regulation disappeared*
This summary of the Impossibilities and illoglcr introduced
into the social control picture by two basic environmental developments has
not endeavored to Isolate the ramifications contributing to impossibility
from those contributing to illogiw*

This has been deliberate*

It could

not be too strongly emphasised that these are two Interrelated ways of
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viewing the 9a m thing.

Social philosophy Is built within a framework

bounded by both the undesirable and the impossible*

Thus society as a

i W * and individuals in particular are oriented to the desirable as
partially defined by the possible, end to the possible as partially defined
by the desirable*

This suggests and again emphasises the very significant

fact that social philosophy is both oause and effect*

In the present

context philosophy as cause dictated an adjustment that was possible and
desirable.

As effect philosophy developed into a somewhat different ssold

as various social changes made the indicated adjustment loss possible and
less desirable*
To tills point attention has been focused upon philosophy
as cause, and upon modifications of the economic environment*

Equally

important non is the problem of translating these modifications into
philosophy as effect*
Basically philosophy as effect has been altered in two
says*

First, modifications have been instituted in shat may be called

negative regulation, both as to scope and extent; while at the same time
there has developed what may be termed positive regulation. In the
following discussion of these modifications in philosophy the greatest
detail d l l be reserved for treatment of changes in negative extent of
regulation, since it is at this point that utilities as such are principally
involved*
only*

The development of positive control will be discussed in outline

It will be remembered that the function intended for the
public utility concept was to separate through use of a reasonable
principle those businesses that could be intensively regulated and those
that could not.
p*ablie interest.

The principle used in making this determination was the
Industries

in such a position with respect to the

public that they could substantially alter consumer alternatives (monopoly
price and discrimination) are to be regulated*

Others are not.

After a certain amount of experience with this adjustment*
however* it became evident that the symptoms contributing to the need for
regulation were possessed by utilities to the exclusion of other Industries
only in degree,

taay industries to some extent began to show a tendency

to monopoly and joint cost very similar to that shown by the utilities.
Since it was unthinkable that the utility category be materially
broadened in the face of an underlying bias against regulation* some way
had to be found to dose this growing gap between the intended results
and the actual results.
the search for e compromise approach was* of course*
directed in large part by social philosophy.

The ideal economic

organisation contemplated by philosophy was free competition precisely
equating rights and responsibilities.

The problem posed* thus* was that

of fostering the competitive norm for non-utilities without intensive
regulation.

The solution decided upon was the enforcement of competition throdj*

legislation such as the Sherman and Clayton acts* and through numerous
lass' comprehensive controls imposed by both the Federal Government and by
the several States.
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Bnforcement of competition, although reducible to a single
pattern as to purpose and method, taken three distinct forms*

£ach

foapa is designed for a specific type of violation of the competitive
norm* and endeavors to restore the norm in a manner commensurate with
the departure from the norm*
The first type of violation is that of expansion by a single
concern until it is sufficiently large to control significantly the
output of an entire industry and hence to control prices to the public*
Such a concern is able to exert a larger degree of power over its
environment than can be reciprocated by the environment*

Ihe resultant

inequality society endeavors to formally correct by the expediency of
9breaking up9 the concern into several operating units and thus increasing
the degree of coe$>etltion»
So obvious Is this type of violation that business men normally
sought to organize with a greater degree of subterfuge*

Thus a more

typical case is the concentration of power through agreement rather than
through outright monopoly by a single firm*

This procedure Is commonly

referred to as 9combination in restraint of trade9, and the defense by
formal society is to be alert to simultaneous action by ostensible
competitors and to prevent a recurrence of such action by

appropriate

measures*
While philosophy does act to limit activities in the above
two directions, it at the same time recognizes that such limitations
can be carried too far*

A large part of individualism, for example, has

come to be concretely associated with high production and low cost*

To a
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certain extent largeness in industry assures this result.

Too much

breaking up of large concerns, therefore, would be in Itself a violation
©f the mass-production principle*

And, as can be readily perceived,

achievement of a golden mean in this case must be extremely difficult*

A larg

part of individualism has likewise come to be associated with stability in
industry, for poverty and inequities occur from economic fluctuations*

It is

quite generally agreed that to a certain extent combination, by avoiding
destructive competition and consequent bankruptcy, may help to prevent
the extreme degrees of fluctuations*

Here too an excess of control is

itself a violation, and the entire situation is too complex to permit of
the easy establishment of a mean*
The third type of violation of the competive norm is through
& technique commonly referred to as unfair competition*

Here unreciprocated

power develops not by too little competition but through the use of a variety ,
of competition that is deemed by the philosophy to be ’unfair**

Thug an

individual may not tell exaggerated falsehoods about his competitors1
product, although he may refer to his own product as superior to the entire
class of competing products*

Likewise an individual may not make

preposterous claims for his own product, although he is permitted a certain
amount of ’puffing* of his product*

Finally, an individual may not use

violence or coercion In any way to destroy a competitor’s business or
build up his own.
It la clear from the above that in extending regulation
to the noz^-utillties both the direction taken and the restraint exercised
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by control were carefully dictated by social philosophy*

This double

action by philosophy is essential to the creation of a reasonably
Integrated adjustment.

Unless integration is achieved in large part

disturbing contradictions arise that gradually near away the substance
of community*
Despite this obvious struggle for integration, the extension
of the scope of regulation does result in a large element of inconsistency*
As control is expanded the freedom dimension of social philosophy is
correspondingly sacrificed.

It is true, of course, that the sacrifice of

freedom is rather directly in the interest of the equality dimension of
individualism.

However, the existence of inconsistency is an important fact,

further reference to which will be made in greater detail at a later point*
It follows from the above analysis that the principal
modification of the scope of regulation had to do with the extension of
control to non-utilities.

This development would itself have destroyed

much of the significance of the utility category.

Another development

parallelled this one, however, and contributed to the same result.
consequences of control —

confiscation —

As the

became more apparent there

appeared a greater reluctance on the part of society to thus classify
an industry*

This reluctance stemmed in part from the logic of the situation,

and in part from the resistance of vested interests to the extremes of
control*

Due to this reluctance semi-utility controls were placed upon

certain industries as a substitute for placing them in the utility category*
As a consequence this category tended to lose even more real social meaning.

Utility regulation as such m s much mere directly affected
by modifications in the extent of regulation than by modifications in
the scope of regulation.

These industries were, after all, the industries

which had folt regulatory restraint In the greatest degree*

therefore

ehangee haring to do with extending the scope of regulation could not
but affect such industries only slightly.

Adjustments haring to do with

the extent of regulation, on the other hand, necessarily had to be in
the nature of retreat*

For this reason the utilities themselves sere

most intimately concerned with these adjustments*
Modifications In the extent of regulation took tee primary
directions*

In the first place, the precise approach contemplated for

controlling the rate level m m modified} and In the second place, the
equally precise approach contea$>lated for controlling the rate structure
see modified*
To properly equate rights and responsibilities In terms of the
rate level It is essential that* (1) the total entity representing the
business be capable of precise definition} (2) that the flow of rights to
the business regulated be capable of precise Comparison with the competitive
norm} and (3) that only conditions Identical with those defined be actually
allowed*

The principal tool developed to accomplish these three interlocking

ends was ’fair return on a fair value1*
Of the two sides to this concept the fair value side has
received by far the greatest amount of attention.

Had it been the universal

disposition of regulators to follow regulation through to its ultimate
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conclusions* this diproportionate emphasis might have contributed
serious result#*

Actually* of course* granting the above disposition*

a disproportionate emphasis could have been Impossible*

however*

since the disposition of regulators was not to universally pursue the
ultimate consequences of control the result can not be said to be serious*
Assuming rather a disposition to compromise* as is the basic thesis of
this dissertation* and the emphasis upon fair value simply stems from
that fact*

The same general compromise results could have been attained

through elasticity of either fair return or fair value*

It happens that

the one selected as the primary source of elasticity was fair value*

A

reasonable hypothesis as to why this is so would seem to be that fair value
is the more vague of the two terms and hence the one most strenuously
called into question by interests opposing regulation*
Throughout the history of modification of regulation fair
value has represented some value between polar approaches — * reproduction
cost and historical cost*

The academic defense of reproduction cost largely

hinges around what has been called the competitive analogy*

Thus it is

argued that in good times if business in general is earning a high return
so also should utilities* and vice versa*

The academic defense of

historical cost maintains on the other hand that consistency and continuity
in regulation demand that a fixed value be adopted* and that the only
proper fixed base is historical cost*
It is interesting and significant to note that no large group
in our society has been consistent in its interpretation of fair value*

m

Property interects defend historical cost when value* are low and
reproduction coat when values are high*

Consumer interests# on the other

hand# defend historical cost when values are high and reproduction cost
shea values are low*

Even the Supreme Court# which fact should really cause

surprise# has vacillated considerably# giving more weight to reproduction
cost in times of high values and more weight to historical cost in times
of low values*

the only conclusion# it would seem# that could validly be

drawn from this pattern of inconsistency is that fair value is a fulcrum
for use in adjusting social philosophy to conform with existing conditions*
the means by which it Is so used is through polar definitions by
opposing parties# within a sphere wherein philosophy as currently applied
is producing a basic inconsistency, the resultant compromise being in lieu
of open conflict*
Fair return# although never as important a factor in
regulation aa fair value# has had a similar history*

Xt# too# has been

used much store to furnish an elasticity to regulation (with a pretense in the
direction of objectivity) than to add precision*
The forces operating to produce flexibility and compromise
in the treatment of fair return are again the property owner on the one
hand and the consumer on the other*

Fyoperty owners plead for a high rate

in prosperous years# while consumers plead for a low rate in prosperous
years*

Property owners advance the thesis that fair return should

fluctuate# idiile consumers believe it should be stable*

$ith these two

forces in operation it is not at all surprising that actual practice is
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somewhere between the variability that would characterize the utility
without regulation and the inflexibility that would be characteristic
of regulation if the earlier adjustment had been rigidly adhered to*
In that original formulation by the courts, it will be
remembered, there was eontesqplated a single degree of economic power
over others and a situation in which rights were known in advance.

On both

of these counts and disregarding the operation of the business cycle
the philosophy probably demanded a fixed rate of return as well as a fixed
valuation.

That this was a reasonable demand is more or less attested to

by the fact that prior to 1900 the business cycle was much less of an
all-pervasive feature of our economy than today.
However, with the development of cyclical fluctuation as an
economic problem of the first magnitude, the fair return adjustment became
isoediately more complex, and the forces on both sides became eommensurately
more insistent.

The situation for regulation was a difficult one.

On the

one hand technical adherence to the philosophy would have still demanded
an inflexible return.

This is true since the capitalization process had

developed to a point where it was quite capable of adjusting actual dollar
returns to the state of the market.

On the other hand, regulation could

not place Itself in the position of seeming to confiscate by denying the
existence of the business cycle phenomenon.
Stated in terms of previous analysis, the crux of the
development of the cycle as a major factor in economic life was the growth
of a much greater degree of dynamism than assumed by the philosophy, coupled
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with a leaser degree of business adaptability to dynamic conditions*
It follows that & degree of inelasticity developed that the philosophy
could not cope with except by itself giving away somewhat in the process*
This the philosophy did do through compromise and through a lesser degree
of control than was originally contemplated.
It perhaps needs r©emphasis at this point that the principal
compromise in rate level was fair value rather than fair return#

Despite

this fact, however, control of fair return does exhibit interesting and
revealing usee in the interest of elasticity in regulation#

Pennsylvania,

through her regulatory commission, adopted 7 per cent aa a fair return for
all classes of utilities under all types of circumstances for a period of
more than twenty years following the first World War*

During this period

there were numbers of cases of Pennsylvania utilities earning far more than
7 per cent#

The California Commission, long recognized as one of the

stronger of the State Commissions, has been upheld In historical cost
valuations because of a deliberate policy of liberality in fair return
allowances#

Many other regulatory bodies through sheer Inactivity implicitly

provide for returns amounting virtually to whatever a utility can earn for
long period of time#
The Supreme Court has contributed to this tendency in
regulation by frequently referring to a ’zone of reasonableness ** Thus a
situation as in the diagram below is approximated. What the court possibly
Extortionate Rsturn
A
\

I
|

Zone

Confiscatory Return
^
----------------------------- :
_________ ik_____

ha* la mind la adhering to this ‘aoae* la that the real problem of
defining return la legislative*

Following from this- %he courts will not

substitute their judgment within the Halts indicated*

However, regulator®,

confronted by a complex situation and conflicting forces they can resolve
in no other way, have tended to seise upon this device as justification for
a policy that is not at all precisely worked out in terms of the earlier
applications of philosophy.
A final way In which control over the rate level has been
modified is in the direction of what has been called ‘paternalism* in
regulation, or the demand for special consideration by the utilities in
times of economic depression,

this demand began with a sisals endeavor to

solve the problem of an average return for regulated industries In the
face of violent ups and downs in business fortunes*

is regulation expanded

in extent, the need for an average return was intensified, and the claim
became virtually one for a guaranteed return*

this last, of course, was

never contemplated by the ideal, and compromise on this score evolved because
of the seme general changes in the environment that resulted in the various
other modifications of the earlier approach*
This semi-paternalism —

typified In railroad regulation

by specific legislation requesting the Interstate Commerce Commission to
consider the revenue needs of the carriers in determining rate levels
indicates a somewhat new emphasis in control*

From a pattern of restricting

property in the Interest of the public, the environment has evolved until
the obverse technique Is required in some instances of protecting property
in the public interest,

this technique is dictated by the equality
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dimension of philosophy Just as is property restriction#
It has been emphasised that return can not be actually
guaranteed through regulation as long as the competitive norm is used
as a guide.

But if the utilities are by definition so important to the

public that they must be controlled, it follows that they are important
enough to be kept operative even under adverse economic circumstances*
At this point negative control begins to merge into positive regulation*
this merger and some of its major consequences will be discussed at a
later point in this chapter*
Attention is frequently called to the fact that in the prowess
of adjusting regulation to the facts of the environment compromise has
typically operated in favor of property*
result, would not be compromise.

Technically, of course, this

However, this appearance of greater

power In the hands of property is the result of the technical organization
of society in America in greater degree than from a substantive difference
in power.

The original bias of social philosophy in America in favor of

property dictated that property interests would become the status quo* or
the vested interests*

Emphasis upon equality —

as the growth of

property inelasticities produced inequality — * resulted primarily in taking
away a portion of the freedom dimension of philosophy interpreted in terms
of property rights*

Thus it happens that the forces of equality endeavor

to restrain the forces of freedom, while the forces of freedom resist
restraint*

The power of the forces of equality is demonstrated by the fact

of regulation and measured by the degree of regulation*

The power of the

forces of freedom is demonstrated by the fact of compromise and measured

224

by the degree of compromise.

Therefore the fact that Compromise favors

property ie no more significant in assessing the forces operating than the
faet that regulation ie typically in the interest of non-property
interests.
it was emphasised earlier that in the process of adjusting
to the demands of the present environment alterations in the

scops

of

regulation resulted in & loss of freedom through bringing Into the sphere
of control certain (aspects of) non-utility Industries.

It is now clear

that this loss of freedom is paralleled by the attainment of a lesser
degree of equality than might have occurred through a process of altering
the extent of regulation.

These two developments are doubly parallel in that

both stem from the same necessity of modifying the application of social
philosophy and both types of modification are equally consistent with both
the older ideal philosophy and the current philosophy as modified.

In short

both are caused by a change in philosophy and result in further changes in
philosophy.
Ho specific mention has been made to this point of the
concrete nature of modifications in the rate structure.

Before doing so it

might be helpful to emphasize once more that the issue here is not nearly so
fundamental as in the case of the rate level.

It is of much less

significance to a utility whether or not it is allowed to practice a degree
of favoritism among its customers than whether or not Its total return is
equal to eonpetitive returns.

Contrariwise, although the matter of
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favorttism ie of isportanee to consumers, they h a w never organised them**
selves to the took of pressing any precise demands*

In addition, if

favoritism is hold to narrow limits the difference that a #$» cents a month
more os* loss sill make to the average consumer is relatively slight*

thus

the lack of precision in rate structure, although not contemplated by the
original adjustment, Is of lesser importance to society at largo*
the principal modification of the ideal in so far as rate
structure is concerned stems directly from the technical difficulty of
accurately separating indivisible asset infloss into particular outflows and
the consequent larger expenditures for regulation that would be required to
do so* Sines fired cost is by definition such an important characteristic
of public utilities it was thought rest appropriate to set forth a few
relatively simple rules of consumer classification rather than to attempt an
elaborate assessment of rights and responsibilities for each customer*
the rest typical tool, through the use of which this failure
to measure inflow and outflow with all accuracy was Justified, was the
*value of service’ concept*

thus value of service and cost of service

provided supplementary approaches to the problem of fixing a scale of rates*
This technique can be exemplified by reference to the structure of taxi fares
in Washington, &«€•
say, 30 cents*

A single person riding from point A to point B will pay,

Two persons riding between the m m two points will pay

20 cents each, or 10 cents*
in the case of both tripe*

For all practical purposes the cost Is Identical
let if receipts for both trips erectly equal

the total coat of both the single passenger has been charged less than cost
while the two passengers have been charged more than cost*

Bven so the system

does provide the elementary Justice that, on the one hand, a single individual
should pay less than two, and, on the other hand, it does not coat twice
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as much to e w i y tbi too*

In utility regulation 09 long as {figuratively

speaking) w r y single pasasofsr Is charged the same assount sod every
group of iso passengers la charged the same amount greater precision Is
not required*

Indeed, in many eases, a far lesser degree of accuracy is

deemed satisfactory*
Apart from the technical difficulty of actually tracing
costs to consumers, however, the value of service codification plus
cossaisalott Inactivity does contribute to m
the current

eeaprosiise.

additional understanding of

In the first place in the regulatosy activity

required for real precision in rate structure there could be entailed #
degree of interference with private enterprise that it has been in the
interest of property interests to resist*

Since the facts of the case

sere such that the interference might very possibly be di^proportionately
great in view of the results, this resistance has been effective*

As a

consequence regulation simply shrugs its shoulders if some few, on the
basis of value of service, pay more than cost for service received.
In the second place, public policy sometimes uses the
value of service principle to further lie own ends*

For certain groups

of the underprivileged society frequently requires the furnishing of essential
service at lees than cost.

If, in other words, this group would forego

purchasing an item if cost ie charged, society will charge less than cost,
if it is in the public interest ( as determined by social philosophy)
that the service be furnished,

thus water supply is frequently city-owned

in order that health in the community may be protected*

This type of

activity, of course, merges quickly into positive regulation, which subject
will be presented in come detail shortly.

This concludes discussion of the two phases of modification of the
negative type of community action

restraint or formal control,

the scopa

of regulation was modified to permit control of non-utility activities,
Simultaneously the extant ©f regulation was modified to demand a lesser
intensity of control*

The first of these developments resulted in lesser

freedom in the interest of greater equality, while the second resulted in
lesser equality in the interest of greater freedom*

Thus, contrary to the

earlier philosophy which assumed identity between these two dimensions of
individual! am, a newer philosophy developed from the first in terms of which
these two dimensions were assumed to be in the main consistent —
no longer identical*

although

Formal control was altered to conform with this new

philosophy, the direction of the control and Its specific content taking the
form of a compromise between the two dimensions at their periphery.

In

consequence the norms used for control purposes continued to be basically
the pre-eompromise norms of free competition*
In addition to modification of negative control, however, a second
great development followed close behind*

This was the growth of positive

control, or the exereise of positive responsibility through the instrumentalities
of social control*
°ne of the most important ramifications of social organisation Is that,
under

circumstances, the predicates of the organization are such that

the power of the group need be exercised only against a peripheral few who seem
to develop anti-community tendencies*

Within the framework set and with this

degree of protection it is presumed that the individual can live his own life
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i& %he community.

In a society such as ours, where great emphasis is

placed upon free choice, spontaneous social organisation mould implicitly
assume that the individual can and mill make proper choices if the
peripheral few that would restrain choice are controlled by the organised
sight of the group*
The basic prerequisite to spontaneous free choice is the
existence of good, available alternatives from which to choose.

Thus for

free choice to operate in the direction assumed it would have required an
essentially neutral environment for each individual —

an environment in

terms of i&ich every individual would have equal opportunity.

It is not

necessary for the working out of this principle that every individual have
equal capacity, only that virtually every individual have sufficient
capacity to make favorable choices in a non-coereed (nettral) situation.
In terms of modern capitalism a neutral environment would be one in which,
to state only a few of the more obvious requirements, no individual would
be involuntarily employed at less than a living wage, one in which no
individual would be undhly under the economic influence of another due to
concentration of wealth in the hands of the latter, and one in which the
social situation would permit a ‘full* life for every individual.

Under

these circumstances, of course, the individual could make choices consistent
with the ideal.
John E. Commons had discussed this aspect of individualism
and developed what he has termed fthe empty concept of the will formulated
by John loeke.*

Thus when the Supreme Court was insisting that the will of

a corporation and the will of an individual were equivalent Professor Commons

explain* that

the empty concept of the will has been carried to its

extreme point* In one sense this analysis is incisive and revealing.

*t

would probably be more practical for present purposes* however* to think
of the will aceordiztg to locks as a quantitative will in a quantitative
or neutral environment* and the will according to earlier dourt decisions
as a quantitative will in a qualitative (non-neutral) environment.

thus

what Professor Commons calls an empty concept is really the failure to
adept the older usage to the newer situation.

Such adaptations

take time.

By 1900 the United States had made only a beginning toward this end.
The extreme to which the older usage was carried can best
be illustrated by reference to employer#s liability oases.

The courts

insisted that ®n< individual decided for himself whether or not to work
in a dangerous occupation.

Therefore if he were injured it was as a result

of exercising his free will.
held responsible for damages.

As a consequence the corporation could not be
It made no difference* of course* if the

individual eould find employment nowhere else.
Hot only does reference to this situation illustrate the
use of a quantitative concept of the will in a qualitative situation* it
illustrates also how qualitative the environment had become.

With the

development of the huge corporation and the branding of it as an
individual* with the increasing concentration of wealth and power in fewer
hands* and with the growth in scale and intensity of business depressions*
the economic environment in the United States ceased to be neutral and the
concept of the will in use was necessarily modified.
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by the organised group through force the underlying

norms of

In the first place, where basic conditions of life are

3

m

the social philosophy lot* some of their significance in tors* of the
total group.

Instead of norms typically predicated upon tbs broad baa* of tha

entire society, norms toad to bs predicated upon th* narrow baa* of th© alas*
in power, and as such ar* vary possibly unsatisfactory to th* groip not
in power.

this Is not, of course, to rule out completely th* element of

eenpromiae in control*

Eathar it is only to superimpose another element

th* element of ee^romls* to assist In an understanding of certain
conditions in current society.
this shift from society-wide norms to single group norms
©an easily be illustrated.

The norm for utility regulation has always been

'fair return on a fair value* defined in the average ©as* a* the competitive
return, or th* socially approved return,

how when regulation by government

extends beyond the periphsra of industry, the return under competition
a norm —

is much less helpful*

as

In the extreme case the government could so

act that the n o n in use would be far different from the cos^etitlve none.
For example, as a part of the program to guarantee basic
conditions of life, the government has entered the capital market*

A

prospective owner of a home may borrow from the government at a rate of, for
example, 3 per cent rather than from a private company at a m a h higher
rate.

This entrance of the government naturally affects the private capital

market directly.

In addition, however, there is s6m* reason behind the

selection of 3 per cent as the government rate.
on the part

*f that reason is a belief

t the group in power that 3 per cent 1* the socially acceptable

rate of return (and it will no doubt have some such basis) there is nothing
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to prevent this rote from being made the ’fair return* for regulated
enterprise —

nothing, that is, except whatever spirit of compromise

exists, and the resistance of the opposition.
The second significant ramification of the tendency for
norms to shift where power is the rule is that these shifting norms are
the concrete framework of social change*

This framework may be the

framework of either evolutionary or revolutionary change, depending upon
numerous internal, external, and historical factors affecting a particular
society*
Korins may quite conveniently be termed conservative norms
(status quo) and liberal norms*

The line-up behind these norms will be,

obviously enough, the vested Interests favoring conservative norms and
those dissatisfied with the status quo favoring liberal norms*

The

dissatisfied seek to educate the group in terms of the new norms while the
vested interests endeavor to educate the group in terms of retention of old
norms*

In addition, both groups exert as much pressure on the side of their

respective norms as can be justified by the current state of compromise. In
this contest situation the vested interest;; has the advantage of inertia,
while the dissatisfied have the advantage of dynamism.
Any such struggle as this between two basic factions within
a group will normally proceed through a giving way in part of the jgta&ug&ug.
If this giving away proceeds with nearly as great a rapidity as the pressure
of dissatisfaction grows peaceful eh&nge results*
this variety.

^ost social change is of

Particularly does this result seem to characterise social

change in America*
In the American scene conservative norms are the protection
of property, property rights, free enterprise, freedom*

Liberal norms, on
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th* other hand are the guarantee of good alternative®, economic security.
Since approximately 1900, and especially since 1930, conservative norms
have been giving away before the increasing pressure of liberal norms*
If this trend continues without too extensive a complication from ^rld affairs,
peaceful change based upon (although not wholly characterized by) compromise
sill continue to be the rule*

External pressure in the present him world1

environment can have serious internal manifestations.
It is important to emphasize here that social change is not a
smoothly continuous process.

Thus development will be characterized by

spurts and reactions on the one hand and a sort of secular trend on the
other • At any given moment of time the status of change can be roughly
determined by a compromise of current norms with historic norms and with
the trend in norm evolution,

Utilising this tool for analysis of the status

of change in America it seems likely that the immediate future will witness
a slight reaction from the spurt of liberal norms between 1930 and 1910, and
that the trend toward security will continue*
One final ramification of th© development of positive
control will be briefly discussed,

this type of evolution is an important

syapton of the disappearance of basic community.

And, what is most

significant, as community begins to break down the stage is set for still
further disintegration.
In a society fundamentally characterized by common values,
individual and group acts are universally comprehonsible and universally
approved. In a society, however, where there exist side by side so to
speak two sets of vhlues, individual and group acts hose a large measure
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both of comprehensibility and approval*

Even compromise adjustments are

*©re readily understood than when two struggling factions produce a power
adjustment that satisfies no one.

In eases where acts are not understood

they are interpreted as merely vicious by a large segment of society#

thus

at tines antagonism nay be aroused even where there is no real issue involved.
In this way conflict breeds conflict, and power tends to result in a still
further exercise of power*
It is in this kind of a situation that politics is elevated to
a position of increasing prominence.

With only, say, half of the population

to choose from group leaders have a greater difficulty selecting assistants
on the basis of both ability and value orientation.

Where stakes are high,

of course, it frequently is necessary to forego the ability standards to a
large extent.

Obversely, too, the group not in power interprets acts of

officials as acts of incompetence even when the difference of opinion is
basically one of values*

In this way the illusion of politics proceeds

equally with the practice of polities, and community is correspondingly
weakened*
With this discussion the presentation of the structure of
regulation modification can be considered complete.

In the next and concluding

chapter an outline of the entire history of control in America will be
presented together with a brief statement of the consequences for community
of the present status of the regulation pattern.
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found to contain no specific provision for regulation*

A number of

provisions were found, on the other hand, that limited auch activities
by government*
provision —
clause —

One of these —

the no-retroactive-legislation

was designed to protect choice*

Another — * the due-process

was designed to prevent inequality resulting from action by

government*

However, since at this early date there could be said to

be no real distinction between the two components of individualism. It
would perhaps be most proper to say that both of these provisions had
originally an identical connotation in the direction of rigidly protecting
the individual citizen from the government and preserving the status quo.
But regulation necessitates ohanges in the status quo and
restraint for individual citizens*

For this purpose it was necessary to

go outside the Constitution itself and bring in the extraneous principle
of the police power, or the common law right of a government to control
individual action in the interest of the public health, safety, and
morals*
The primary responsibility for steering the proper course
between due process and police power —
rested with the Supreme Court*

between protection and restraint —

In developing a cojqpromiee the court was

guided, not by specific standards already existing and in use, but rather
only by its application of the prevailing community spirit.

This does

not mean, of course, that the Supreme Court in any sense dictated the
regulatory adjustment*

The court do doubt represented the prevailing
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spirit quits accurately*

The emphasis intended is simply that the

adjustment was made without objective standards and that it was made
In large part by the Supreme Court,
the proeess of charting this eourse seems sinple in
retrospect,

A description of it takes two directions that we will here

call the horizontal and the vertical.

Horizontally* the permissible scope

of regulation was defined by dividing the police power into two parts and
by classifying businesses into two categories*

General police power was

developed as an incidental restraint of non-utility businesses violating
community values only in widely separated instances*

Fries control police

power* however* was developed as an over-all restraint of utility businesses
the totality of whose relationship to the public was considered to be a
potential threat to the community*
Vertically* the permissible extent of regulation was defined
in terms of the same classifications*

In the ease of incidental control

of isolated activity the Supreme Court provided no protection from the
restraint of law*
protection*

The classification itself was presumed to be adequate

In the case of price control for public utilities* however*

doe process (fair return on fair value) was instituted as a definition of the
limitations of government regulation*
These two dimensions of regulation —

scope and extent —

into the dlmu&sions of American social philosophy as follows*

fit

Freedom of

choice was assured by classifying Industries in such a way that only
a small percentage could actually be regulated as public utilities*

The

m

basis of the classification in turn was the actual or potential relationbbip batman th* business and tha freedom of ©hole* of eonsuowrs.

Thu*

tha government undertook to interfere with tha b&ala choices of industry
when and only whan industry was in a position to Intarfara with tha
basic choices of individuals.
Tha regulatory adjustment similarly operated to assure
equality of opportunity*

Tha restraint of government by itself in tha

interest of equality was demanded at an early date,

the process through

*iieh the government restrains is called just compensation and is based
upon 'fair return on a fair value* * Here the government a&ys in offset
that if a business is placed under strict control it is entitled to earn the
return it would have earned if it had been faced with a reasonable amount
of eospetltion.

Sines most business was presumed by the philosophy to be

competitive the norm used by regulation was naturally the rest of the
eeonoagr.

The result of this aspect of the adjustment was & situation in

whieh regulated businesses were allowed residual income (rights) equal to
that currently being received by ether businesses*
In all of this it is important to recall that theentire
adjustment represented a eoopremlse between the common law and the

Constitution*

The conflict between these two sources of control principles

was resolved primarily in the minds of

Supreme <*ourt justicesover aperiod

of one hundred years*

succession of justicesdrawn from every

The fact that a

comer of American life outlined a substantially consistent approach to this
problem in the face of the opposing concepts of police power and due process
without the aid of objective standards is strong evidence that the real

source of decisions could only have been the social philosophy of
the day.
It might be helpful to the reader to see the regulatory
adjustment schematically arranged*

Social Philosophy
'I/
•Supreme Court,
Common law

Constitution

Positive Approach

Negative Approach

Police Poser
4r of all Businesses
Control

Due Process
4s
As to incidental Hatters

Pricjj^Control

For Public Utilities Only

Choice Obstruction
4s
Bight Limitation

Just Compensation
-Equal Residual Bights
(Equality)
(FreedomJ
i

Community
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It will be recalled from the analysis In Chapter 1 that In
the philosophy of individualism equality and freedom wire treated as
identical in eonnotatien and meaning.

However, as can be seen from

the above discussion, with the first application of these two dimensions
of philosophy —* this application will here be referred to as phase one
in the history of regulation —

this identity began to disappear*

In

consequence equality and freedom became merely consistent with one another
rather than identical*
neither principles nor the application of principles is ever
static.

After a principle has been adopted it immediately begins to evolve

in a manner commensurate with the problems that arise In actual application*
Out of this evolution arises a new principle and so on ad infinitum. In
this way principles and their applications merge Into and become one
another, while at the same time evolving into something else*
After phase one in the history of regulation was well along
in development—

after, in short, the above categories of control had been

rather completely and precisely set forth —

America had to do & consid

erable amount of "living with*' the principles thus outlined*

During this

period these principles had to undergo a rigid application that resulted
in what will here be called phase two of the regulatory adjustment and
which will be described later.
The principal direction taken in the process of evolution was
a gradual dilution of the categories of regulation*

Thus the line of

demarcation between a public utility and a private business on the one

hand, and the line ©f demarcation between confiscation and non
confiscation on the other hand tended to break down under the pressures
to t&lch they were submitted.

It is these pressures and the resultant

breakdown of the precise pattern of regulation originally outlined that
provide background for understanding the current compromises in regulation.
In the first place it should be noted that broad social principles
are always vulnerable to attack.

In any attempt to set up pure—type

categories there must always be a territory between that may be conveniently
called a penumbra ©f uncertain classification.

When eases

come

up for

application of principles there are always ramifications of decisions not
wholly Integrated into basic philosophy.

Frequently one or more of these

ramifications has the effect of moving a part of the penumbra into the area
of solid classification.
doubt.

The result of this is a shifting of the area of

The typical evolution of this kind, thus, Is the enlargement of one

category at the expense of the others.
The penumbra itself would not be as certain to lead to
evolution were it not for a large amount of supplementation by a second
factor.

Unless men in society have all values in common and in hierarchies

of equal proportionate intensity there will exist in some degree conflicting
interests.

Since social principles provide an outline of the conditions

of Individual action, interests attach to every phase of a classification made
by a social principle.

Some of this attachment of Interest Is positive in the

sense that it depends upon a continuation of the classification. On the other
hand some of it is negative in the sense that the Interest is in the breakdown

of the classification.

The negative interest toward group principles

is a measure of the lack of integration in the ooxesnntby*
It xiood scarcely bo added, of course, that a negative Interest
w i n fix Its attention upon the penumbra rather than the solid classification*
The latter would be a direct attack upon the eoimmmity Itself and would
be dealt with accordingly.

Once the attention of a negative interest is

focused upon the penumbra it is only a natter of tfias until the lines
begin to give a little*

Particularly will this be the result if a

Supreme Court Judge has a bias in the direction of breakdown.
The above two factors can be simply summarised* Principles
of social action exist primarily as emotions and only secondarily as
rational purposes.

Whenever a classification begins to lose the support

of the emotions, rational minds will begin to find & way to destroy it*
And the process la cumulative.

As lines of demarcation shift the delicate

balance between interests is further disrupted and negative interest
tends to grow.

Thus, simultaneously, the classification became more

vulnerable and interest in its breakdown became more powerful*
However, these factors are only structural,

^he regulatory

adjustment here under discussion became vulnerable for specific reasons as
well*

These reasons are intimately related to the maturation of the

business process.

The first resulted from in increased inelasticity in

economic society, while a second resulted from the development of claims
as a basic property type.

Both of these consequences of maturing

capitalism helped to make modifications in regulation logical and necessary*
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Among the basic accompaniments of the development of capitalist
institutions has bean the accumulation of large aggregetleiitt of fixed
■and specialised capital, and the increasing specialisation of human
beings.

Both of these together have contributed not only to a more

dynamic economic situation hut even more to m
economic units to effectively meet dynamics*

inability on the pert of
the resulting inelasticities

produce economic Inequalities, or economic rents*

And, although regulation

was first extended to the utility Industries because Inelasticities became
flagrant at that point in the economy before they did at other points, this
inelasticity has extended itself in greater or lesser degree to all
businesses.

Thus the 100 percent ext,reuse to which the courts originally

took the industry classification process was necessarily weakened*

Thus

the utility category itself became less homogeneous, and semi-utility
controls were exercised in connection with non-utilities*
A aeeond environmental change has contributed to the specific
vulnerability of the early adjustment outlined in phase one in the history
of regulation*

As long as private property wae defined as holding for use,

it was logical to define confiscation In terms of the negative of just
compensation.

In such a case, if an individual used property for non**

community purposes the government could discharge its obligations to the
individual in taking the property by paying the monetary equivalent therefor*
But when private property came to be defined as withholding for exchange, and
value earns to be determined through a process of capitalisation, it became
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*ueh less logical to define confiscation in terms of the negative of
•fair return** Application of this definition frequently results in taking value
(property) from individuals nest involved In the aoiMoramunlby activity at
all, while those really involved are not touched by the preventive or retribu
tive measures taken.
The above discussion furnishes a background for an understanding
of the evolution of the categories of regulation and also suggests the
generalised outline of the directions taken by that evolution.

Before

attempting to describe specific directions, however, it would perhaps be
desirable to present the adjustments in regulation that could have been
made in Conforming to environmental change without disturbing greatly the
original pattern*

In this way a basis for comparison with the actual adjust**

jasAt will be available*
First and foremost, we would have retained the rather rigid
classification of industry into public utilities and non-public utilities*
In this way the coverage of regulation would have been minimised and a
mtim 0f spontaneous freedom allowed*

At the same time we would have

maintained the difficult distinction between priee control and incidental
control to implement the industry classification*
Second, we would have faced squarely the implications of compet
itive return in regulation despite an evolving set of capital relationships*
This could have been done through the steps outlined in Chapters 6 and 7
consisting oft (1)

ng fair return the test of reasonableness of rates

rather than adjusting the two only at a given moment of tiiaaj (2) establish
ing a statutory trust for consumers and owners to avoid the payment of

dividends out of excess earnings and to help pay dividends in years
when earnings were too low; and (3) providing a m x l m m return for each
eleiasnt of the capital contract.
The effect of these steps* with the Industry classification*
would have been a rather complete limitation of spontaneous freedom
in public utility industries.

Had the classification itself been

abstractly accurate there would have resulted a situation ofrequal
residual rights throughout the entire structure with informal control for
non~utilities just equaling formal control for utilities.

But as has been

emphasized, the classification was In part artificial rather than abstractly
accurate*

In addition spontaneous freedom was believed preferable to the

extreme of formal control*

With this last providing the motive and the

former providing the logic property interests began to organize a concerted
attack upon the penumbra of the framework of control*
As a result of this battle the actual regulatory adjustment
was substantially different from the adjustment just outlined*
first place, the classification Itself In part broke down*

In the

This breakdown

is particularly evident in regulation by the federal government* which
regulation has taken a more and more important role In the regulatory
scheme of things*

To an ever greater extent regulation extension is being

justified by general reference to specific evils of the status guo rather
than by a painstaking decision on whether a particular business is or is
not a public utility.

It Is precisely this breakdown

in regulatory

classification that makes it increasingly difficult to selectively define
a public utility*
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The result of this breakdown In the classification woo that
general police power norod up In the control scale, while price control
moved down the scale,

Thus regulation in the former instance became

aore pronounced than incidental} while in the latter Instance price
control became less rigid than it would Justifiably hare been made.
In the second place, the application of the confiscation concept
was substantially modified.

One process through which this modification

took place was that of defining fair value.

Although the content of fair

return has not substantially altered in the period in which it has been
in use, fair value has been given alternative definitions by means of
which Justice in regulation has become quit© elastic.

Thus even if the

implications of competitive return as such were rigidly applied there
would still exist a large modification of th© pattern of control
originally promulgated to carry out th© mandate of equal residual rights,
A second process through #ilch th© confiscation concept was
modified in application was the us© of a *zone of reasonableness9 that
effectively assisted in whittling down the extreme result of the rigid
maintenance of the original categories.

In fostering the ’zone* concept,

regulators have accoiqplished two related purposes.

By permitting a leeway

they have avoided much of the responsibility to which they would have
fallen heir had inelastic classifications been maintained.

Also, however,

by deliberately allowing a penumbra in the categories they have made It
easier for negative interests to stop the regulatory adjustment somewhat
short of its most extreme consequences.
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All of the Above modifications took place with reference to the
rate level of regulated business.

A similar development is in evidence

with respect to the rate structure. The theory of regulation demand© costof-aervice pricing- If interpreted consistently in terms of residual
rights cost-of-service pricing would leave the regulated business little
or no room for free bargaining.
if followed —

At the same time the industry classification—

would exempt non-utilities from price structure control* the

modification of such extreme applications took place in two directions.
First, by a set of rather extensive regulations aimed to foster fair
competition th© price structure of non-utilities was in part brought under
control.

Second, the concept ’value of service1 was introduced, tolerated,

and even furthered by the courts, providing a means by which utilities were
saved from the consequences of the original categories*

It should be added,

of course, that this last was very easy to justify since the fixed coat
structure of modern capitalism —
utilities —

particularly and significantly public

makes cost-of-service largely indeterminate.

Furthermore, as an additional variable in the direction of
bargaining rather than rigid price structure, the Supreme Court very
early introduced the principle that a regulated industry was entitled to
a fair return on its entire operations although not necessarily on each
phase of its operations.

This modification operated in two directions*

first, It provided for adjustments In cases where the public interest
seemed to dictate service at less than full cost; and second, it enabled
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th* regulated business to store successfully meet the challenge of capital
istic enterprise*

Both directions represented a clear compromise with

earlier principles*
The thesis advanced here with respect to the above
■edifications of phase one in the history of regulation is that in part
they represent a normal reconciliation of a principle to the technical
factors encountered by the principle, and that in part they represent the
use of technical facts by interest groups to effect a substantial realignment
of the forces behind the development of formal control in this country*
This realignment of forces provides the setting for an understanding of
phase two in this history*

To a brief discussion of this phase we will now

turn our attention*
Individualism, it will be recalled, is built around equality
and freedom as the natural state of man*
government — - spontaneous freedom —

It followed that a condition of

was the ideal social adjustment*

But

spontaneous freedom in the environment It produced tipped the scales against
equality*

This development aroused the forces favoring equality —

forces

that could not but have remained merely latent if spontaneous equality had
remained coincident with spontaneous freedom*
At first the assault upon freedom in favor of equality aroused
few opposing forces*

Gradually, however, as the threat grew larger the

forces favoring freedom were actively aroused in defense*

Eventually a

point was reached wherein the forces of equality and the forces of freedom
seem to have attained an equivalent strength —
the other*

each striving hard against

It is this point in the history of regulation that we will call

phase two, or the current phase*
If the sum total of human relationships in American economic
life can be diagramatieally represented by a rectangular area the original
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coincidence between equality and freedom can be pictured as follows:

Freedom

Equality

INDIVIDUALISM

On the same general basis
the current conflict between the two can also be pictured:

Freedom

Equality

INDIVIDUALISM

The intended ©aphasia, of course, is not that the groups
involved are constantly &t each others throats*
it can really be called conflict —
than basic*

the conflict — • If

is still largely peripheral rather

Thus there is no serious disapproval of the fact of

regulation, only of the degree of regulation in some instances*

like

wise there is no dispute as to the underlying reasons for regulation,
only as to the application of those reasons in certain specific cases*
There has grown up in America over the years a very sharp
line of demarcation in popular parlance between public interest (consumer)
and private interest* It may bo that such a dichotomy is helpful for
some purposes.

In other cases, however, it is very apt to be misleading*

True the consumer group is the largest*
Is toward the consumer*
public*

Very properly the basic orientation

But industry itself is likewise a part of the

And in a democratic nation where every individual is considered

important and where citizens have rights against the government It would
be arbitrary to define the consumer as the total public*
Speaking in general terms business organizations are the forces
favoring freedom, while the unorganized consumer and the only-recently
organized laborer are the forces favoring equality*
almost obvious on its face*

This alignment Is

The strong (organized) would logically favor

freedom*

The weak (unorganized) would logically favor restraint of the

strong*

The ancient quip •only he is conservative who has something to

conserve* is a more striking way of expressing the same fact*
In essence, then, what we are currently witnessing in the
relationships between government and business is the consumer and the
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laborer arrayed against the business man in certain marginal bat
potentially far-reaching issues.

And| considering that the ultimate

stakes can only be stated in terms of equality and freedom* It can not
but be concluded that the contest stems logically from basic philosophy*
Through the instrument of (fair) competition* businesses in America have
always been allowed to fight for profits.

Thus it would be quite illogical

if these same businesses were estopped from evincing interest in their fate
when competition is supplanted to an important degree by regulation*
This sounds* perhaps* much like pressure politics and a
justification thereof * In part that is a correct interpretation*
the most part* however* it is not.

For

For the real fact of the matter is

that the compromises now a part of the regulatory adjustment were written
there* not by pressure as such* but quite logically* and this as a result
of what might popularly be called the action of pressure groups*
The common understanding of the passage of & regulatory
measure Is that the affected parties merely fight restrictive segments
of the measure*

Mo thought is ordinarily given to how such a fight is

conducted* or to the fact that "fighting11* as such* is only a small part
of the procedure*
Xt is to be expected that a pressure group composed of
reasonably intelligent men would adopt first those tactics that meet with
the fullest approval of the public as a whole.
for* of arguing that &g. lnt.r.at

This invariably takes the
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of the people at large* Xt may at first be thought by the reader that this

m

is said facetiously at b#«t.

It is not*

There are eases where the

public interest is argued more effectively by a pressure group than
hy ths public itself*

It is true, of course, that public interest

arguments by pressure groups arc frequently extremely unconvincing
because ill-founded*

Ths important fact to note hers is that a public

interest argument Is not to be automatically discarded bfcause advanced by
a pressure group, and that a pressure group does not ordinarily resort
to 9lower9 methods to supplement the public interest approach ££ at til*
This last is added to the writer’s belief that there are many in high
pieces in America who prefer an honest compromise to victory through
trickery.

This view Is strengthened by the fact that there Is really

little evidence that current public policy —
powerful interests that it does —

involving the numerous

contains major instances of pressure

unsupported by a convincing logic of public interest*
All of this is not to suggest that there is no conflict
between the interests of pressure groups and the public at large*

It is

only to emphasise that arguments for legislation — particularly in a
democracy —

ere not spurious and false merely because they are advanced

by a person or a group who has an interest in the outcome*

The minority,

in the first place, has a right to try to convince the majority} and in the
second place, the minority argues frequently the majority viewpoint, or at
least a portion of it*
A specific *xmpl* may be helpful at this point*
ere a large vested interest in the United States*

The railroads

When regulatory measures

are under consideration their emphasis will be upon that part of the
declaration of policy calling for avoidance of destructive competition, mad
the part demanding a strong transportation system in the interest of
national defense*

Motor trucks, on the other hand, will stress ’inherent

m

advantage*, which policy largely calls for coat pricii^.

The characte

ristics of rail transportation are such that capacity operation is
necessary*

S w j r source of freight tapped by motor trucks and thus

taken from rail carriers tends to reduce the 'inherent advantage9 of the
railroad in carrying every ton of freight retained through increasing
average unit costs,

thus every ton taken from the rails by motor trucks

(or by air, for that setter) increases by that amount the susceptibility
of all other rail freight to loss to another agency.
In short, the railroad industry consists of such a high
percentage of fixed costs that a small margin of traffic means the
difference between profit and lose, or whether the railroad system —
oertala important segments of it ~~ can continue operating or not*

or

If It

be granted that the railway system is necessary on soy abstract basis public
policy can Justify leaning over a bit to keep the rail plant operating at
capacity.

In this case inherent advantage seems strongly in conflict

with other parts of our transportation policy.
The significance of the above example la that when policy
is belxdr debated the railroad "lobby” and the motor truck "lobby" will
both be present.

Both will emphasise their side of the case.

will be a compromise.

The decision

But cognisance will be taken of the position of the

railroads and the motofe trucks not because of the power these pressure
groups can bring to bear but because of the reasonableneas of the logic
on both sides•
Zt may be helpful at this point to distinguish between
•particular* logic and 'universal* logic*

Universal logic is that

situation in which the arguments advanced are such that all reasonable

men with th* earn* baste values (for example, belief to equality*
*£&•}

Hill reach th* saw* conclusion*

Particular logic* on th*

other hand* is thct situation in which th* arguments advanced ar*
such that reasonable men with th* same baaic values (although not
m t h th* same peripheral values) will reach different conclusion*
equally well supported*

The logic of regulation of transportation* a*

such* is universal to all men who believe in the American way of llf«*
Th* difference in opinion is not whether to regulate or not# but how
far to go in regulating*

On many points relative to this latter problem#

students can only produce particular logic for those with Vested interests
to advance in the process of evolution of regulation*
Where peripheral aspects of a large problem can be defined
only •particularly* rather than ’universally* it is characteristic of men
with eoanon basic values to compromise the peripheral problems.

The

spirit of compromise is no more than placing community harmony higher
in one’s scale of values than victory by resort to means ’lower’ than
the use of logic# particular though this latter may be*
regulation is compromise on a tremendous scale*

Transportation

Xt Is no wonder our

declaration of policy is said by many to be inconsistent*
To summarise the argument immediately preceding# the logic
upon whieh regulation is predicated stems from the valu*~ori*ntatlon of
interested parties*

A common value produces a universal logic# since

the value is the premise and the method is contained within the premise*
Variations of values produces conflicting (particular) logics# each

m

oriented to one special enqphasis at the periphera of value-scales*
The spirit of harmony that prevails where the basis values are held
in common produces a compromise between peripheral interests*

la

transportation regulation in America these forces have produced an
adjustment consisting of elementa that have to be carefully proportioned
in the process of control.

Stated differently, to be very certain that

the point is not missed, our current public policy Is not integrated for
the reason that there does not exist a unanimity of opinion on the
proposition that one particular objective must be held above all others
under all circumstances.
If this discussion were concluded at this point the result
would be an unwarranted emphasis upon complete harmony in the process of
government and an exaggerated denial of ’’politics” as distinct from
healthy argument*

Briefly, now, the problem of polities in regulation

will be explored.
What is normally called politics in government arises
from interest —

group or individual.

But it has been noted earlier

that not all activities of an interested group or individual can be
classified as political in the *undesirable* sense*

In the first place

interested parties do argue as much of the public interest as it is to their
advantage to argue*

And in the second place such parties are —

of the larger issues of regulation —

in terms

a part of the public Itself*

Our

task here is to seek out the practices of interested groups that can be
classified as political in the sense of being contrary to public interest*
For this purpose we will define a non-political decision

one made under the conditions that every interested ifonp
participates in the decision, and that each group participates in
proportion to th® extent of it® inter®at| that every argument pre-*
®«nt®d 1® & tru® argument* oven though not wholly oonoiotont with
other "true11 arguments; that every vote east 1® oriented toward th®
lose® itself rather than eon® irrelevant matter} and that the area
of fundamental disagreement is compromised.
th® problem of participation by the interested groups 1®
a problem of publicity and organisation.

Any gap in either organisation

or publicity results In an incomplete representation end thus ignore®
a portion of the total argument,

this result can be termed political

in the present sense* whether or not the failure in organisation or
publicity 1® the result of the deliberate efforts of other groups.

It

becomes political in a much more extreme degree If opposing interest®
block representation.
The stipulation that every argument be a true one is perhaps
the most usually violated in practice.

It 1® extremely difficult to

prove many contentions* until after the passage of considerable time* and
the proof i® often not clear cut even then*

On the other hand* however*

argument® that are too fantastically unreal are a dangerous tool because
other group® are always anxious to point up such thing®.

What is really

Important here is that political elements are not involved as such unless
an interested group attempts to establish coincidence between the interest
and pvfelie advantage where in fact no such coincidence exist®.
The requirement that every vote cast be oriented toward the
issue Itself introduces the most insidious element in political activity.
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Violations ©f this requirement may take any one of several forms.
First, it may take the form of bribery, or a vote oriented to the
reeeipt of extraneous reward unrelated to the issue involved.
it may take the form of charisma,

or a vote

Second,

oriented to faith in

another person rather than the problem at hand.

Third, it may take the

form of coercion, or a vote oriented to a fear of an artificially produced
misfortune rather than the immediate issue.

All of these represent a

situation in which maneuvering is substituted for debate*

In such a

situation a decision will be made placing too great an emphasis upon one
or a few segments of the public interest and largely ignoring other
segments.
The final requisite for non-political decision-making —
fundamental disagreement be actually compromised —
others.

that

is an outgrowth of the

If the other conditions are fulfilled this last follows as a

logical result.

This will not be true, of course, if every vote is cast

by a member of one out of two actively Interested parties*

In that case,

compromise would be minimized by the technical fact that one group must
win the vote.

Necessity for more than simple majority will increase the

degree of compromise, as will the existence of more than two groups.
A quite normal situation, however, is one in which the
active interests are a relatively small part of the total group voting.
This will be the case except in connection with the largest issues.

Here

the larger group that has no ulterior interests will compel a compromise
of the conflicting issues.

The obverse of this is the case in which the

larger group having no personal interest does not vote at all*

25*

1f this outline of conditions leading to political
decision-making seems to de-emph&size this type of ’legislation1
unre&listically in favor of its opposite, the writer will plead as
a defense the fact that non-political decision-making is so frequently
de-emphasized in popular discussion#

Whereas a typical approach has

been to throw all decisions of uncertain classification into the
political class, the present procedure is rather deliberately to throw
the uncertain category into the non-political class#

The result is a

more extreme position than the writer would take if the scales were not
already tipped so pessimistically in th© other direction.
Relating, now, the discussion of the last few pages to the
general problem of social integration, it seems desirable to present
the evolution of the regulatory adjustment in yet another way#
values are had in common —

Where

where, in short, a solid community exists —

the area of non-community interests (to be distinguished from anti-community
interests) is small, the sphere of government is correspondingly small,
while spontaneous freedom is large#

On the other hand where the area of

non-comnunity interests is larger, the sphere of arbitration of interests
is larger, while spontaneous freedom is reduced accordingly.
in phase one relationships obtained as follows)

Thus, whereas
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Interests

Regulation

Comaon
Values

Freedom

In phase two —
phase —

the current

the following relationships obtains
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minimum compromises and a more solid foundation for community is thus
built,

this foundation one# mors sinks to ths unconscious level and

relationships become more spontaneous.
She pertinence of all this to our discussion is that
the real threat potential in our present community rift is not the rift
itself bit the possibility that it sill become much deeper.

Blagrammat-

ically speaking it is the following situation that endangers a societyi

Out of that kind of a
situation totalitarianism may arise.

When action is necessary, but

impossible under existing organization, when the rift is so wide and deep that
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essentially nothing can bo accomplished* an upheaval Is inevitable.
If society can not be Integrated on a community basis it will
be integrated {as best it can) on a dictatorship basis.

Otherwise*

of course* civil war will ensue.
There will be attempted here n© prediction as to the
ultimate extent of the rift in the American economic community.
meh* however* should be said.

This

When a community Is effectively Isolated

a rift may proceed further without resulting in either civil war or
totalitarianism than is the case in a period of internationalism and
national insecurity.

The threat of outside domination makes a situation

intolerable sooner than it would otherwise be.
The second important implication of the conflict between
freedom and equality here delineated is that it is clearly a conflict
between property rights and human rights —

property rights on the side of

freedom} human rights on the side of equality.

In saying this it must

hastily be emphasised again that the line of demarcation is by no means
absolute*

The average proponent of freedom will readily grant much of

the premise of the proponent of equality* and yley versa. But both groups
argue in terms of the overlapping interests of the other* and no doubt
a great deal of such overlapping does exist.

Thus it is argued that

economic rents (profits) are necessary to assure the progress that results
in material betterment.

Likewise* and In opposition* It la argued that

the inequities resulting from untrammelled enterprise operate to reduce
economic rents.

In this way —

a way typical in this type of controversy ■

m

both group# focus their attention upon a part of the relationship and
argue tn terns of th# values held by th# opposition*
at firei glance it might seem that human right# are no#
being found after haring been lost for ©any years,

A m v o realistic

interpretation would seem to b# that human right# are now in danger of
being loot aft«r hairing boon tahee for granted for ©any years, Actually
thos# values that are moot secure in a community arc those values
that prevail at th# unconscious level.

As soon as it Is necessary to

consciously purse# a valuef the value has become insecure,

$hen a human

body finds it a###ssary to consciously pursue health, th# body meet b#
unhealthy*
As long as business in America regained traditionally small,
end as long as the land frontier persisted, (it will be recalled that
John Look# —

the famous English exponent of property rights — * assumed

throughout his philosophy that every family owned and operated a
small fern) human rights were never really in danger,
real land frontier has been disappearing#

For many years th#

today it has been estimated that

in the average manufacturing establishment an investment in machinery,
buildings, etc* of #5,000 per esployee is a prerequisite,

in the light of

this evolution it would be unrealistic indeed to claim that we are just new
finding human rights. Rather, the problem is that of redefining human
rights in a new world.
As evidence of the fact that human rights have always been
implicitly paramount, it is significant that when America first began to
adjust itself to the corporate form of business organisation the

corporation was defined as a person*

Begul&tory law has continued to

consider the corporation In that way.

It was* in fact# this development

that brought the problem of the human being into the focus of consciousness,
the law wee prone to match one person (corporation) against one person
(individual) and call it equality.

It Is only recently that a collection of

individuals has been allowed a status before the law equivalent to that long
allowed a collection of buildings and a various assortment of machines*

this

development is possibly the beginning of a concerted attack upon the legal
fiction of the corporate personality*

If so it can confidently be ejected to

continue until we have succeeded in thoroughly orienting the individual into
modern capitalistic society*
A third major consequence of ths rift in American community*
and the final one to be discussed here* is the apparent revolt from reason
that w d H characterise the social scene as a result* IShe** a community
is predicated solidly upon & single principle social relationships proceed
In logical conformity to the principle*

The faculty of attention of the

individual Is oriented by hie 'apperceptive mass' which is the community
principle*

Thus problems are Interpreted and solved in accordance with the

principle*

The facts upon which decisions are baaed are accepted because

there is agreement upon the frame of reference to be used*
But when, on the other hand, a community principle splits
into opposing factions* the solution of problems and the rendering of
decisions proceed on the basis of compromise rather than outright agreement*
Since each faction has a somewhat different frame of reference it focuses
its attention upon a different portion of the situation*

As a result

adjustments lose the appearance of following the pattern of premise and
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conclusion.

In short, government begins to look arbitrary rather than

reasoned*
Individualism was originally predicated upon reason* In
implementing what was intended to be *a government of laws not men* great
emphasis was placed upon principle.

In an environment consisting of

opposing forces actual adjustments will range all the way from the adjust
ment directly favoring one or the other of the forces to the adjustment
representing a precise compromise between them.

Principle Is thus lost in a

flurry of compromise, except, of course, in so far as the compromise Itself
can be considered a principle for analytical purposes.
In such an environment objectivity must be rare.

In fact

the individual who seriously attempts real objectivity becomes an object
of suspicion by all concerned.

Government is no exception to this rule. The

premium placed upon political activity makes it certain that every sizable
force will have its representation among public officials*

Thus the real

integration of government can never be found, under these circumstances, in
any isolated Incident of government.

Rather the Integration of government

exists only theoretically as a mental matching of extremes against other
extremes and thus arriving at what may be considered the mean approach of
government to its problems of adjustment.

Note, however, that to the

individual the important fact is not the mean approach but the approach in
the case at hand.

In the light of these facts it is not surprising that the

philosophy of absolutes has appeared to give away before the philosophy
of relatives*

No other practical approach

is possible when the community

that makes objectivity possible is substantially lacking.
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fhle irend, too, cam bo expected to aontinue until a
broader basis f&# agreemsnt on t m d m m m tala exists*

Until that time

one e m only «*ge patience with the apparent arbitrariness of everyday
adjustments

and understanding that these little incidents that seem

askew are part of a larger pattern of oonsproaiise —

a compromise made

necessary by an evolution that only the utmost in patience and understanding
can aptly integrate in a way consistent with human values*
Every social condition has its cent history, not only
retrospectively but prospectively*

the social condition in America

resulting from a split of philosophy into two parts is no exception* A
phase three in this history is already in the making*
called the Social Minimum phase*

this phase can be

the thesis of this compromise is that

government should take whatever responsibility is necessary to guarantee
every individual a minimum standard of existence while allowir^r
enterprisers freedom to have for themselves a higher standard to whatever
degree that standard Is consistent with the social minimum*
It must be emphasised that this adjustment does not destroy
the conflict*

But, of course, social conflict is not of such a nature

that it can be destroyed in one fell swoop by acts of men*

It can, to be

sure, be rather effectively covered up for a time through dictatorship*
A reel disappearance of conflict, however, depends upon a process of social
conditioning In the direction of successive compromises*
Already the fact of government restraint has been
universally accepted*

the provision of a social minimum requires in

addition government responsibility for full employment, as well as other

m

positive m m

creations through formal authority.

%

are now wall

along toward universal acceptance of thla stop.
These necessary directions for government action oat
the stage for future evolution.

For, to a largo extent positive control#

operate la conflict with negative controls.

Full employment depends la

tha last analysis upon the attitude of business* while government action
operates In part to adversely affect business attitudes,

thus government

must either minimise negative regulation or accept at first a lesser
responsibility for full employment.

Kither alternative adds up t© the

provision of a lower social minimum.
Meanwhile the forces of equality will also be actively at
work endeavoring to raise the minimum,

they will very possibly attempt

to bring about a higher minimum than le consistent with the optimum
mercies of positive and negative controls by government.
Fortunately* it Is easy to be optimistic.

In a society

that isprimarily cohesive* andin which war is not an imminent probability*
the forces of coaproiaise will normally triumph over the forces of
totalitarianism.

Zt is believed by the writer that these conditions

describe America* although by a narrower margin than is thought to be the
case by cany.
In conclusion* It seems proper to say a brief word on
the subject of freedom* particularly since the preceding pages appear to add
up to more government activity rather than lees.

When a child complains

of restraint by his parents one Is led to suspect that the child has strong
inclinations in disapproved directions. Similarly when a nation is subjected
to a large measure of control one can not but reach the conclusion that
disunity exists.
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Where eonB&unity prevalla and social action la spontaneous
freedom is the rule*

Where differences prevail resting upon a strong

under-pinning of coamunity, control is the rule to the degree dictated
by coaqpromise between opposing factions.

Where differences prevail to the

extent that they cut through the community underpinning, control will again
be the rule, but tnis time extending to the degree dictated by the extreme
position of the ruling faction*
to the writer the problem of understanding freedom and
restraint is as simple as that.

And with that thought he closes*
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